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Editor’s Introduction
The present issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention is a combined issue. Since the pre-
vious two volumes, “60 Years after the Ratiﬁcation of the Genocide Convention: Critical
Reﬂections on the State and Future of Genocide Studies, Parts 1 and 2” were longer
than usual, the editors decided to combine Volume 7, Issues 2 and 3 into a single issue.
It is a general issue containing a wide variety of material and should be, we hope, of
interest to a broad range of readers.
This issue continues the tradition followed by Genocide Studies and Prevention
throughout its now seven years of publication as a peer-reviewed, print journal dedi-
cated to publishing a wide variety of high-quality manuscripts devoted to the under-
standing and prevention of genocide.
The ﬁrst of the six articles examines a topic of great interest, but one which has
seen little in the way of scholarly material: it examines state-induced famine and use of
prisons as possible mechanisms of genocide—or, at least, massive human rights viola-
tions—in North Korea. Rhoda Howard-Hassmann examines the famine that took place
from 1994 to 2000 which, she estimates, killed 3–5% of North Korea’s population. She
notes that there appears to be “little recourse under international law to punish the per-
petrators of state-induced famine.” Yet, she points out that it might ﬁt some of the crite-
ria of genocide under the United Nations Genocide Convention. Her conclusion looks
at how strategic, political “concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons outweigh
humanitarian concerns about North Korea’s citizens.”
Of course, there is nothing unusual in this state of affairs since political calculations
always trump humanitarian concerns in international politics. In the second article, “A
System, Society, and Community Perspective on Genocide,” Adrian M. Gallagher points
out that genocide scholars often miss the point that the very deﬁnition of genocide is
open to interpretation. Their perceptions are, he argues, warped by a view of the world
which helps to explain the different perspectives. Gallagher then uses the “concepts of
an international system, an international society, and an international community to
demonstrate how one’s worldview holds implications for how one understands geno-
cide.” These two articles are followed by two case studies: the ﬁrst addresses the leader-
ship of Roméo Dallaire in the UNAMIR mission to Rwanda and the next, the fourth in
the volume, focuses on the 1965–1966 genocide in East Timor.
In “The True Measure of Success: The Leadership of Roméo Dallaire in the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” Sarah Devonshire evaluates Lieutenant General
Dallaire’s actions prior to the beginning of the genocide. She concludes that his attempts to
fulﬁll UNAMIR’s directives—“despite resistance on all sides”—disproves arguments that his
failure of leadership “was a primary contributor to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide.”
This is followed by an examination of mass murder in Indonesia and East Timor in the
1960s and 1970s. In “Foreshadowing Future Slaughter: From the Indonesian Killings of
1965–1966 to the 1974–1999 Genocide in East Timor,” Kai Thaler argues that the failure to
stop the earlier mass killing in Indonesia allowed the “establishment of genocidal regimes
that institutionalize genocide as a tactic of repression and power consolidation.” This was
exactly what happened with the “New Order government of Indonesia, which committed
mass killings of known and alleged Communists throughout Indonesia in 1965–1966 and
later carried out a genocidal colonial occupation of East Timor.” He notes parallels between
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the actors and tactics, and concludes that the “Indonesian case illustrates the necessity of
punishment for genocide to preclude a culture of impunity that encourages both previous
and new offenders.”
The ﬁfth contribution to this joint issue shifts gears to examine psychological fac-
tors in the possible dissolution of human bonds which contribute to genocidal beha-
viors. In “Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between Social Distance and
Dehumanization Intensity during Genocides,” Lisa Haagensen and Marnix Croes
hypothesize that “the degree of social distance between the perpetrator group and the
victim group prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of dehu-
manization severity employed by the perpetrator group during the genocide.” Using
data from Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern and Western Europe, they ﬁnd that
their hypothesis is conﬁrmed by the cases of Rwanda and Eastern Europe, but that the
results for Western Europe present “an anomaly within the context of the proposed
hypothesis.”
The ﬁnal contribution, “The Question of an Armenian Revolution and the Radica-
lization of the Committee of Union and Progress toward the Armenian Genocide” by
Wolfgang Gust, raises questions concerning Hilmar Kaiser’s argument and ﬁnds that
important “facts showing the extent of the Genocide have been overlooked.”
Finally, this combined issue concludes with a review of two books edited by Samuel
Totten: the ﬁrst, An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide; and the sec-
ond, co-edited with Raﬁki Ubaldo, We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.
GSP 7.2/3 is a combined issue with a diverse series of articles that examine numer-
ous aspects of genocide and the prevention of genocide. Throughout our seven years of
publication we have endeavored to bring to our readers the ﬁnest scholarship in these
areas. We hope this combined issue continues that tradition.
Herb Hirsch
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State-Induced Famine and Penal Starvation in North Korea
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann
Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights
This article discusses North Korea as a case of state-induced famine, or faminogenesis. A famine
from 1994 to 2000 killed 3–5% of North Korea’s population, and mass hunger reappeared in 2010–
2012, despite reforms meant to address the shortage of food. In addition, a prison population of
about 200,000 people is systematically deprived of food; this might be considered penal starvation.
There seems little recourse under international law to punish the perpetrators of state-induced fam-
ine and penal starvation. State-induced famine does, however, ﬁt some of the criteria of genocide in
the United Nations Convention against Genocide, and could also be considered a crime against
humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There would seem, then, to
have been a case for referral of North Korea’s recently deceased leader, Kim Jong Il, to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and it is still a case for referral of Kim’s successors. However, strategic con-
cerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons outweigh humanitarian concerns about North Korea’s
citizens.
Key words: North Korea, state-induced famine, faminogenesis, penal starvation
Introduction
Scholars of genocide know that it is not unusual for governments to kill their own citi-
zens, but two ways that states do this have remained relatively unstudied. The ﬁrst
method is state-induced famine—that is, state policies that create famine. The second is
penal starvation—state policies to starve prisoners to death.
David Marcus coined the term faminogenesis to describe public policies that gener-
ate famine, using Amartya Sen’s deﬁnition of famine as a “particularly virulent manifes-
tation of [starvation] causing widespread death.”1 Marcus presents a typology of four
levels of faminogenic behavior: intentional famine (deliberately using famine as means
of extermination), reckless famine (continuing policies despite evidence of famine),
famine by indifference (turning a blind eye to mass hunger), and famine by incompe-
tence.2 He also recommends that intentional and reckless faminogenesis be speciﬁcally
prohibited by international law. I add to Marcus’s analysis my own recommendation
that penal starvation also be speciﬁcally prohibited by international law, perhaps as a
subcategory of faminogenesis. I deﬁne penal starvation as a state’s deliberate policy to
subject prisoners in penal institutions and camps to starvation rations.
I use the term state-induced famine interchangeably with faminogenesis to clarify
that faminogenesis is often a state activity. The history of the twentieth century reveals
several major cases in which communist states caused citizens to starve. Among those
citizens were the approximately 3.3 million ethnic Ukrainians who starved to death in
the Soviet Union in 1932–1933;3 the 45 million people who starved during Mao Tse-
Tung’s “Great Leap Forward” from 1958 to 1962;4 and the hundreds of thousands who
starved to death in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979. Similarly, both
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communist and fascist regimes used penal starvation as a tool of punishment and exter-
mination. Under Nazi rule, Jews in ghettoes, Soviet prisoners of war,5 and all inmates of
concentration camps faced starvation. Under communism, prisoners in the Soviet
gulag6 as well as the Chinese laogai (prison camp complex)7 were also starved to death.
One might wish to think that state-induced famine and penal starvation disappeared
with the defeat of Nazism and the end of both Soviet and Chinese communism, but
there are still countries where these practices exist—for example, North Korea (formally
named the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). North Korea is an example of reck-
less and possibly intentional faminogenesis.
Examination of North Korea raises the question of whether intentional and reckless
faminogenesis is or should be considered an aspect of the crime of genocide. Knowledge
of the general human rights situation helps to evaluate whether a famine is intentional
or reckless. If a regime denies all human rights, it cannot be deemed less than reckless
in its creation of a famine. Famines do not occur, contends Sen, in countries with func-
tioning multiparty democracies.8 This is because when citizens can exercise their demo-
cratic rights, they can protest against government policies that undermine their access
to food and threaten to vote the government out of ofﬁce. No such recourse is possible
in totalitarian dictatorships such as North Korea.
This article begins with a brief historical background, followed by sections explain-
ing the occurrence of famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s and 2010–2012, and
discussing the legal basis for considering North Korea’s food policies to be at mini-
mum reckless, possibly intentional, faminogenesis. Following this is a section describ-
ing penal starvation and its victims. The article continues with discussion of what
could have been done under international law before the December 2011 death of Kim
Jong Il—North Korea’s leader since 1994—to punish the regime for its use of famine
and penal starvation. At best, I contend, Kim Jong Il was guilty of reckless faminogen-
esis and should have been prosecuted accordingly, had a law prohibiting reckless
faminogenesis existed. In the absence of such a law, Kim should have been prosecuted
for the many crimes again humanity—and possibly crimes of genocide—he had
committed. Should the leaders who took over after Kim Jong Il’s death continue his po-
licies, they will also become candidates for such prosecution. However, as the ﬁnal sec-
tion explains, the international community’s strategic and security interests in North
Korea render it unlikely that the rulers of the country will be tried for any of these
crimes.
Before continuing, a note is necessary on sources. This article relies in part on news
reports, reports from international human rights non-governmental organizations, and
books written by reporters and activists. These sources, in turn, rely heavily on inter-
views with North Korean refugees in South Korea and northern China; interviews in
China are clandestine. It is almost impossible for foreigners to enter North Korea and
those who do enter are very carefully watched. Nevertheless, the testimony that the vari-
ous researchers have accrued over the years, especially since large numbers of people
started to enter China illegally during the famine of the mid-1990s, is remarkably con-
sistent and can be considered reliable. As of 2001, 2,300 refugee accounts existed;9 by
2011, there were many more. These are not sensationalist accounts; researchers are very
careful to cross-check them when they can and, if possible, to conduct methodologically
sound surveys of refugees.10 Taken as a whole and checked against other sources, refu-
gees’ accounts can be considered reasonably reliable.
148 Howard-Hassmann
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2/3 doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.147
Historical Background
North Korea, a state severely isolated and cut off from the international community, is
a creation of the Cold War. From 1910 to 1945, the Korean Peninsula was colonized by
the Japanese. At the end of World War II, the Americans and Soviets agreed that Korea
would be split at the 38th parallel, a line arbitrarily chosen as it roughly divided this
ancient kingdom into two equal parts. Kim Il Sung, allegedly a heroic guerilla leader
against the Japanese in Manchuria,11 was chosen by the Soviet Union to lead the North.
In 1950, anticipating an easy victory, he attacked the South. The United Nations and
the United States came to the defense of the South, leading newly Communist China to
enter the war on the side of the North. An extremely brutal, three-year war ensued in
which hundreds of thousands died, many from American bombs and napalm.12 North
Korea is estimated to have suffered 300,000 military and 400,000 civilian deaths.13 In
1953, the two parties signed a truce and retreated to their respective sides of the 38th
parallel. There is no peace treaty, and the two Koreas are still technically at war, leaving
a heavily defended demilitarized zone between the two states.
North Korea’s ofﬁcial ideology, introduced in 1970, is called Juche, comprising
“self-control, independence, and self-sufﬁciency”14—in a word, self-reliance. The re-
gime also perpetuates a mythology that its hereditary rulers represent “the will of both
heaven and earth.”15 Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and was succeeded by his son Kim
Jong Il, who ruled North Korea until his death; he, in turn, was succeeded by his own
son, Kim Jong Un. While Kim Jong Il lived a life of luxury, enjoying Western movies,
Western food cooked by imported chefs, and “entertainment women,”16 the over-
whelming majority of the population lived on the edge of starvation. The ofﬁcial organ
controlling the state is the Korean Workers’ Party,17 supplemented by an extremely
large military of approximately 1.1 million people out of an estimated population of
24.5 million.18
In the 1950s and 1960s, North Korea was more prosperous than its southern neigh-
bor.19 In part, this was because it had inherited most of the industrial capacity and in-
frastructure created under Japanese rule;20 in part it was because the Soviet Union
heavily subsidized its economy.21 When the Soviet Union de-Stalinized in the 1950s,
North Korea turned to China for infrastructure, energy, and food support. Food
shortages occurred in 1945–1946 (just after WWII), 1954–1955 (just after the Korean
War), and 1969–1974,22 and food rations began to decline steadily from about 1970.23
Moreover, industry and infrastructure quickly declined as a result of inadequate mainte-
nance, poor management, lack of spare parts, and lack of an external market for the
shoddy goods that the factories produced.24
Problems in food production were caused in large part by highly inefﬁcient, collec-
tivized agriculture. Immediately after World War II, the government seized all land be-
longing to Japanese colonialists and Korean landlords and redistributed it to peasants.
The initial redistribution was unsuccessful and food production fell. The government
then collectivized all land in the 1950s,25 ﬁrst in cooperative farms and then in state
farms. Above a certain minimum left for farmers’ own consumption, the entire harvest
had to be turned over to the state, which distributed it to citizens through the Public
Distribution System (PDS) adopted in 1950. Outside the collectivized farms, only very
tiny “micro-farms” on which citizens could cultivate fruits and vegetables and keep
small animals, poultry, and bees for their personal consumption or for periodic, legal
farmers’ markets were allowed.26
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About 62% of the people, mainly urban, were dependent on the PDS for all their
food. The PDS distributed food according to a scale that privileged some categories—
especially members of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and the military, and heavy
industry workers.27 Even with the PDS system in place, however, the country relied on
food aid from its Communist allies—the Soviet Union and China—as early as the
1980s, as its own production of food substantially declined.28 Thus, North Korea’s col-
lectivized system of food production, its refusal to allow almost any private production
of food, its prohibition of food markets, and its reliance on food rationing all set the
stage for the famines of the 1990s and 2000s.
Famine
In the early 1990s, the World Food Programme (WFP) described the food situation in
North Korea as a “famine in slow motion.”29 By the mid-1990s, it was experiencing a
major famine. While many refugee, newspaper, and other reports cited ﬁgures of up to
3 million out of a then population of 23 million as having died between 1994 and
2000,30 scholarly accounts present a lower ﬁgure of about 600,000 to 1 million dead.31
A South Korean scholar using several types of demographic and statistical data con-
cluded that between 580,000 and 1.1 million people lost their lives during the famine of
1994–2000, or 3–5% of the population.32
North Korea attributed the famine to natural disasters, citing poor harvests and
ﬂooding in 1995. But these “natural” disasters were in large part a consequence of poor
decisions by the central government in the 1980s about agricultural policies, which exa-
cerbated the earlier food shortages caused by collectivized food production and distribu-
tion. During the 1980s, the government ordered continuous cropping and overuse of
chemical fertilizers, which eroded soil quality; there was also much soil erosion and
deforestation as hills were denuded of trees to provide more land for cultivation.33
When the ﬂoods came, terraced hillsides simply collapsed. By this point there was very
little agricultural machinery or fuel; much cultivation was by hand.
This extremely poor agricultural policy was exacerbated when, in the early 1990s,
both Russia and China cut their food and fuel aid to North Korea.34 Russia, the succes-
sor state to the Soviet Union, had no interest in subsidizing Communist states abroad.
Chinese exports of maize to North Korea declined by 80% from 1993 to 1994, in part
because of a poor harvest in China itself and in part as punishment to North Korea for
having opened up diplomatic relations with Taiwan.35 Both Russia and China informed
North Korea that it would have to start paying market prices in hard currency for their
exports.36
The regime responded by describing the famine as an “Arduous March.”37 Adopt-
ing a disingenuous approach to the famine’s causes, Kim Jong Il ﬁrst urged upon his
subjects the virtues of eating only two meals a day,38 then one, while in the meantime at-
tributing the famine to an imperialist blockade against North Korea.39 At the same time,
the regime reduced farm families’ grain rations by 35%, far below subsistence level.40 Ra-
tions under the PDS also appeared to have been completely cut off to the northeast in
1994.41 Nevertheless, privileged groups—especially members of the government, the
military, and the Korean Worker’s Party—continued to receive rations.42
Reports on the famine, many by refugees, are heartbreaking. A refugee doctor de-
scribed wasted (emaciated) children whose desperate mothers had fed them weeds
and wild grasses. Unable to digest this food, children appeared in the doctor’s under-
equipped North Korean hospital with severe medical complications, or simply with a
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vague malaise that preceded their deaths; babies died from lack of mother’s milk.43
Often parents and grandparents denied themselves food so that children could eat;44
sometimes entire families killed themselves.45 Married women prostituted themselves in
order to obtain money to buy food for their children.46 Homeless children were reputed
to be cannibalized;47 one refugee reported witnessing the public execution of a 28-year-
old man accused of eating a four-year-old child;48 and the WFP requested the right to
inspect farmers’ markets where it was reported that “special meat” on offer was actually
human ﬂesh.49 Ironically, in this devastated land, the very children dying of starvation
were taught a song about how they had “nothing to envy” from the rest of the world.50
In 1998, a survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),WFP, and the
European Union (EU) found that 60% of North Korean children were stunted and 50%
malnourished.51 A survey conducted by the UN and EU in 2002 found that the average
North Korean, 7-year-old boy was 20 centimeters shorter and 10 kilograms lighter than
his counterpart in South Korea.52 Indeed, the height requirement for entry into the
North Korean military was reduced because so many military-age men were stunted.53
Once the actual famine ended around 2000 as a result of better weather, international
food aid, and some policy reforms, a “chronic food emergency” nevertheless ensued
well into the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century.54
After the worst of the famine in the 1990s, the government introduced some re-
forms in food production and distribution. As early as 1987, it had decided to permit
industrial workers to cultivate small plots of land at their under-producing factories
and to permit farmers to expand their personal plots and trade in illegal—though toler-
ated—farmers’ markets.55 The factories were given some autonomy from state control
and were granted permission to trade manufactured products among themselves and in
international markets.56 The state deregulated cooperative farms and permitted farmers
to keep a larger proportion of the food they produced.57 Men were sometimes obliged
to spend time at factories even if there was neither work nor wages for them, while
women, who were less likely to be obliged to spend time at factories, began to engage in
“sideline” production, selling home-cooked food or handicrafts.58 The state turned a
blind eye to private markets that sprang up in urban areas, indeed legalizing them in
2002.59 The government also decided to change the pricing structure to reﬂect domestic
real market conditions, aligning ofﬁcial prices more closely with black-market prices.
Economic reforms that introduced the basic elements of a market economy were
absolutely necessary to put North Korea on the path to real self-sufﬁciency in food,
in contrast to the ofﬁcial ideology of Juche that claimed to be a prescription for self-
sufﬁciency. However, the reforms also had their own detrimental consequences.
Although wages were increased, prices rose as well.60 Moreover, the reforms did not
appear to cause a substantial increase in production,61 as farms and factories still lacked
necessary inputs and fuel.62 As a result, North Korea faced the classic inﬂationary sce-
nario of too much money facing too few goods—especially too little food.
By 2005, a new system of stratiﬁcation between rich and poor had developed; those
who had access to hard currency63 either through remittances (mostly from Japan or
China), smuggling across the border with China, or crime (such as exporting arms or
narcotics64) could buy what little food was in the market, while those dependent on
meager state wages could not buy what they needed. Thus, this incomplete, regulated,
“socialist” marketization resulted in high rates of post-famine malnutrition for those
who could not ﬁnd ways to earn hard currency. Moreover, in its attempt to marketize
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the economy, the government abolished the PDS in 2002 except for the top 1 or 2 mil-
lion people in the country.65 Those many other North Koreans who had relied on the
PDS were suddenly forced to either cultivate their own food or buy food in markets;
many lacked the resources to do either. About 50% of formerly PDS-dependent house-
holds were unable to meet their caloric requirements.66 Complicating matters even fur-
ther, in 2005, the state overturned some of its reforms. It once again banned the private
buying and selling of grain67 and reintroduced the PDS.68 As of 2008, markets were
again closed and women under 40 were no longer allowed to trade, even though women
were the mainstays of their families.69
Finally, a currency reform in late 2009 effectively wiped out the savings of those
North Koreans who were managing to make money in private markets, which they had
been using to purchase food. Citizens were obliged to turn in their banknotes, which
were replaced at a rate of 1 per 100 wons.70 This was one of the few times that some
parts of the population showed their displeasure, with demonstrations taking place
against the regime. In response, the government executed Pak Nam Gi—the ofﬁcial in
charge of the reform—and sent three dozen of his relatives to prison.71
Partly as a consequence of these incomplete and erratic reforms, severe food
shortages causing malnutrition and death returned by the end of the decade. This food
shortage was partly a result of a lack of seeds, fertilizer, fuel, storage capacity, and ad-
vanced agricultural technology.72 By 2008, the country was “once again on the brink of
starvation,” with families eating grass, tree bark, and poisonous mushrooms that could
cause death by diarrhea in young children.73 Matters were made worse by periodic cam-
paigns to boost industrial production, which removed farmers from their ﬁelds; “We
are being led to our deaths,” said one such farmer.74 These campaigns continued in
2010–2011 as preparations were made to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of
Kim Il Sung in 2012.
Rations in 2010 met less than half the daily food needs of the 68% of the population
dependent upon them.75 In early 2011, North Korea was begging for food aid as a result
of a hard winter, ﬂoods, and the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among its animals.76
In March 2011, estimates were that 6.1 million people—about a quarter of the popula-
tion—were at severe risk of starvation, especially in the northern and eastern pro-
vinces.77 Diplomats reported that food rations had been halved in 2010–2011,78 while
“feral children” ate dead dogs and rotten food in the markets.79 By November 2011, a
visiting UN ofﬁcial found that about a third of the children under ﬁve were at risk of
long-term effects of malnutrition.80 Even members of the military, normally favored by
the regime, were suffering malnutrition.81
This short description of North Korean economic policy cannot explain all the de-
cisions that caused famine in the 1990s and mass hunger, if not famine, again in 2010–
2011.82 In brief, until 2000, North Korea was a dogmatic, highly authoritarian state that
refused to make even the mildest reforms. In the twenty-ﬁrst century, reform was
erratic and internally contradictory—in a word, incompetent at best. Thus, food
shortages have been severe for two decades, reaching acute stages from 1994 to 2000
and again in 2010–2012.
The Crime of Faminogenesis
To determine how, if at all, Kim Jong Il should have been treated under international
law, it is ﬁrst necessary to assess in which category of faminogenesis his actions
fell. Marcus’s four categories are intentional, reckless, indifferent and incompetent
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faminogenesis; he argues that the ﬁrst and second categories should be prohibited and
punished. To reiterate, famine is intentional if the state deliberately uses it as a means of
extermination; it is reckless if the state continues its food policies despite evidence of
famine. North Korea’s famines are at minimum reckless; over two decades the state con-
tinued policies that resulted in underproduction and maldistribution of food. The re-
gime’s consistent disregard for its citizens’ food needs, its imprisonment of those
committing “crimes” such as hoarding, and its suppression of those civil and political
rights that might have permitted citizens to communicate their needs to the government
also suggest intentional famine, though stronger evidence of mens rea than can be pro-
vided in this article may be required in a court of law to prove intentional famine.
Marcus argues that some of the North Korean government’s actions during the
1990s famine constituted the ﬁrst-degree crime of intentional faminogenesis. He accuses
the government of “manipulating the famine to target certain populations that threaten
its political survival” by denying them food rations.83 During the 1990s famine, “it was
persistently reported that PDS rations were delayed or temporarily suspended in the
northern parts of the country.”84 However, Haggard and Noland state that they “ﬁnd
no evidence that particular segments of the population were deliberately starved.”85
They consider evidence demonstrating that the regime cut off four northern provinces
to be circumstantial, although they note that there is evidence that the government
focused food aid on the western coast, despite evidence that the (north) east coast was
facing particularly severe food shortages.86
Haggard and Noland’s view is that “informational failures and the lack of account-
ability characteristic of authoritarian regimes played a crucial role” in the famine.87 This
suggests that the government was guilty of the second-degree crime of reckless famino-
genesis, continuing policies that caused famine even when their consequences were
known. Not permitting citizens to farm small plots of land was reckless; as such farms
could have produced food to supplement ofﬁcial rations. Prohibition of trade and fora-
ging was also reckless. In Marcus’s view, “North Korea’s behavior in refusing to admit
that its policies are ﬂawed . . . constitutes a second-degree famine crime.”88 The same
might be said of the famine of 2010–2012, which was caused in part by the regime’s
continuation of these extremely ﬂawed policies. Recklessness is implied, for example, by
the 2005 decision to rescind the reforms that had been implemented to assist in creating
a market economy.
Incompetence, Marcus’s fourth degree of faminogenesis, is the most generous
description of a regime that followed policy prescriptions from the Soviet Union and
China that had been abandoned by both countries by 1990. On the other hand, the fact
that North Korea sought food aid during the 1990s famine, and again in 2010–2012,
suggests that the regime was not indifferent to the famine, thus not guilty of the third
degree of faminogenesis. The regime did seek international help during the 1990s, ask-
ing South Korea, the UN, and the US for food aid.89 However, there was some suspicion
that the food was not disbursed to the neediest citizens; rather, it seemed that the mili-
tary was well fed while others starved.90 The regime may simply have treated food aid
as balance-of-payments assistance: the less it spent on food, the more it had to pay off
debts.91
Feffer claims the famine was not deliberate, but rather was a result of ‘“atrocious
policy.”92 Haggard and Noland also argue that “the famine was a classic case of state
failure,”93 rather than having been deliberately constructed. However, these arguments
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seem to inadvertently imply that the policies were made by honest bureaucrats who
accidentally made poor decisions; they run contrary to Marcus’s view that the govern-
ment recklessly continued these policies even when their consequences became known.
An alternate view is that the regime made decisions according to its own interests,
regardless of the effects on some sectors of the population. As long as members of the
Korean Workers’ Party and the military—along with the relatively privileged inhabi-
tants of the capital, Pyongyang—were fed, the regime could ignore its other citizens.
The regime also denied all human rights, so that citizens could not make their con-
cerns known. Systematic denial of human rights during severe food shortages suggests
at minimum reckless faminogenesis. The state deliberately denies itself a key resource—
the voices of its own people—that could help rectify its faminogenic policies. North
Koreans enjoy no freedom of speech, assembly, or press; no political right to vote; and
no civil rights to protection from torture or arbitrary execution. Citizens cannot protest
the policies causing them to starve, nor can they vote their leaders out of ofﬁce; if they
do protest, they risk imprisonment, torture, and death. They cannot fulﬁll their need for
food when they are not permitted freedom of movement to leave the country or even
within it.
Moreover, North Koreans, enjoy no right to privacy whatsoever: neighbors are en-
couraged to spy on neighbors and all citizens must attend self-criticism sessions where
they must confess and repent for even the tiniest acts that might be considered disloyal.
Thus, independent thought and conversation are completely blocked by a system in
which neighbors can and do report each other for “crimes” against the state such as
foraging for, producing, and selling food, or even complaining about food shortages.
Radios and televisions are wired so that they can receive only state channels94 which
broadcast propaganda into every household,95 thus prohibiting the spread of informa-
tion about food shortages that might cause unrest.
Another major policy “error” in North Korea is prohibition of private property.
The right to own property is protected by Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). This right helps individuals be self-sufﬁcient rather than rely
on the state to provide for all their needs. Aside from the micro-farms described above,
no personal cultivation of land was permitted in North Korea until the 1990s96 and
there is still no private ownership of land. Even in the brief period of ﬂowering markets
during the early 2000s, no reforms were introduced to enable individuals to own the
land they were farming. Yet individual land rights have been shown to result in “higher
productivity, cultivation and yields, as well as the retention of surpluses against the risk
of climatic disaster.”97
All these denials of citizens’ human rights are consequences of deliberate policy de-
cisions. A government concerned with the welfare of its citizens would not continue
policies that cause its citizens to starve. Thus, the regime is recklessly faminogenic, pro-
hibiting human rights that could avert or alleviate famine. It is not quite as easy to
make a case for intentional faminogenesis, especially given the inconsistent and erratic
“reforms” the state introduced after the mid-1990s. In either case, though, denial of
citizens’ civil and political rights is a key cause of the starvation. Not enjoying any of
these rights, North Koreans resort to occasional protests, strikes, uprisings, sabotage,
and even murders of local ofﬁcials.98 There have also been reports of attempted assassi-
nations and coups d’état, suggesting dissension within the ruling clique and/or the
military.99
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The Crime of Penal Starvation
The North Korean regime is responsible not only for famine, but also for a deliberate
policy of subjecting its prisoners to starvation rations. The government maintains a
large system of repressive slave labor camps—in effect, a gulag—in which prisoners are
even more likely to starve than the general population. Rations are far below what is
needed to maintain health and were so even before the food shortages and famine of
the 1990s: “Prisoners are provided only enough food to be kept perpetually on the verge
of starvation.”100 Food is allocated on the basis of productivity: the less a prisoner pro-
duces, the less he eats, resulting in a spiral downward as those deprived of even more
food produce less and less. Many in the camps die from lack of food, while some are
executed for foraging; in one case a prisoner was executed for eating ripe chestnuts that
had fallen at the entrance of a slave labor mine.101
I use the term penal starvation to describe this phenomenon. Penal starvation does
not cause death in the manner to which Sen refers, in which malnutrition spreads over
wide populations. Rather, it attacks a signiﬁcant percentage of prisoners who cannot live
on rations constantly below subsistence level, or whose food rations are even lower than
the prescribed below-subsistence level because they do not work hard enough or have an-
gered the authorities in some other way. Estimates of how many people are in the prison
camps at any time vary, but most sources agree on about 200,000 every year.102 Pierre Ri-
goulot, publishing originally in 1997, estimated that 1.5 million people had died in the
camps since the creation of North Korea.103 Becker’s lower estimate suggested that as of
2005, 1 million people had died, assuming an annual death rate of 10% of prisoners.104
Inmates in these camps fall into two major groups. The ﬁrst is people who have
been imprisoned for political reasons or because they belong to population categories
that the regime considers disloyal or dangerous. Over the course of North Korea’s his-
tory, tens of thousands of people have been imprisoned in various political purges.105
The state also classiﬁes every individual citizen on the basis of perceived loyalty, or lack
thereof, to the regime: the three classes are the core, or loyal, class; the wavering class;
and the hostile class. South Korea estimates that these categories constitute 30, 50, and
20% of the population respectively.106 Membership in the three core classes is hereditary;
for example, an individual might be deemed a member of the hostile class if his great-
grandfather was a landlord. Members of the hostile class are most likely to be sent to the
gulag; they were also the ﬁrst to have their rations cut during the 1990s famine.107
Some other categories of people are so despised that they are frequently sent to
prison camps where they suffer a high risk of starvation. In the past, North Korea im-
prisoned Japanese-Koreans; that is, Koreans who had lived in Japan when Korea was
under Japanese colonial rule, but had been badly treated there. Some of the estimated
93,000 returnees from Japan were incarcerated.108 Christians are also imprisoned or
executed;109 the earliest massacre of Christians appears to have taken place in Novem-
ber 1945,110 and it is believed that the government executed about 400,000 religious
practitioners (not all Christians) during the 1970s.111 In the past, moreover, disabled
people were sent to special concentration camps in accordance with the Kims’ (father
and son) belief that North Koreans ought to be physically perfect.112 The Kims had a
particular aversion to dwarfs, who along with other disabled people were exiled from
the capital.113 Dwarfs were put in special prison camps and subjected to forced steriliza-
tion. It appears, however, that in the last two decades disabled people have been some-
what better treated and are less likely to be imprisoned.114
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Not only those convicted of crimes, but also their families, including parents,
spouses, siblings, and children, are imprisoned. This is in accordance with Kim Il
Sung’s 1958 directive that “[prison] inmates are class enemies and must be actively ex-
terminated to three generations,”115 which was apparently repeated in 1972: “Factional-
ists or enemies of class, whoever they are: their seed must be eliminated through three
generations.”116 Thus, for example, Kang Chol-Hwan, author of a rare memoir of the
camps, was incarcerated at the age of nine because his grandfather was suspected of a
crime; Kang survived partly by eating rats.117 This form of collective punishment is one
reason why the gulag contains so many prisoners.
The second group of prisoners is made up of people whose actions in search of
food are considered illegal. Their crimes consist of engaging in petty trade, cultivating
small plots of land, hoarding food,118 foraging, traveling within the country in search of
food,119 stealing food, smuggling and other black market activities, and cannibalism. It
is estimated that about 200–300,000 people ﬂed to China during the 1990s famine:120
China returns refugees to North Korea, where most are then imprisoned and “re-
starved.” Having committed what the state considers to be crimes in order to survive
the famine, they are incarcerated and deliberately subjected to starvation rations. It is
not yet known, however, whether North Korea engaged in the same policy of incarcer-
ating people who were trying to ﬁnd food in 2010–2012 as it did during the 1990s.
Applying Marcus’s four categories of intentional, reckless, indifferent, and incom-
petent famine to penal starvation, it appears clear that penal starvation is intentional.
The state decides whom to imprison, it decides on food rations for prisoners, and it de-
cides that prisoners can be deprived of food for various further transgressions while in
prison, such as not working hard enough. Thus, as a subset of faminogenesis, penal star-
vation should be punished as a ﬁrst-degree famine crime, although again, a court of law
might require stronger proof of mens rea that I can supply here.
International Law: The Question of Genocide
If famine in North Korea is at minimum reckless and possibly intentional, and if penal
starvation is clearly intentional, then how, if at all, can international law stop these two
practices? One possibility is to pressure North Korea to live up to its formal commit-
ments to uphold those human rights covenants to which it is party. North Korea
became party to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
on 14 September 1981. The ICESCR includes the right to adequate food (article 11[1])
and freedom from hunger (article 11[2]). But as discussed above, this right cannot
stand alone: in order to have access to enough food, citizens must also enjoy their civil
and political rights.
It is unlikely, however, that the North Korean regime will be susceptible to pressure
to protect human rights. In a facade of legality, the regime has introduced constitutional
changes that are supposed to—but do not—protect human rights on several occasions.
In 1998, a constitutional revision introduced habeas corpus and revisions in 2004 pro-
hibited arrests and detention not in accordance with the law, required warrants for ar-
rests, and introduced other such procedural guarantees.121 In 2009, the constitution was
revised ostensibly to protect human rights.122 For example, articles 65–68 protected
equal rights; the right to vote; freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and
association; and freedom of religion.123 At the same time, however, the principle of
“military ﬁrst” was included, allocating resources to the military before any other sector
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of society.124 There is no indication that North Korea now respects the rights written
into the 2009 constitution.
Since the regime is unlikely to protect human rights, the possibility of punishing its
leaders must be considered. It is possible that Kim Jong Il could have been referred to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the crime of genocide before his death in
December 2011. In 1996, Kim apparently said that North Korea only needed 30% of its
populace to survive in order to reconstruct a “victorious” North Korean society, sug-
gesting a very high tolerance for mass deaths among those for whom he was supposed
to be responsible.125
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG) is meant to protect groups at risk of genocide because of their
race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality.126 Certain groups that ﬁt these categories have
been targeted for extermination in North Korea. North Korean Christians are one such
group, as adherence to Christianity is viewed as treason against the Juche philosophy
and the Kim dynasty. A second group is Japanese-Koreans, whose situation has been
described above. A third is Korean-Chinese infants,127 who are considered to be “pollut-
ing” the pure Korean race. These infants are the children of North Korean mothers who
ﬂed or were trafﬁcked to China, where they sometimes voluntarily married and some-
times were forcibly married or prostituted to Chinese men. In violation of its obligations
under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR), as dis-
cussed below, China returns refugees to North Korea. Eyewitnesses have recounted that
if these women are pregnant when they return, they are made to undergo forced abor-
tions. If they are in the late stages of pregnancy, delivery is induced and the infants
are then murdered or tossed alive into garbage cans before their mothers’ eyes.128 This
can be considered “ethnic infanticide,” which constitutes “killing of members of a
group.”129
While the particular cases of Christians, Japanese-Koreans, and Chinese-Korean in-
fants may ﬁt the UNCG deﬁnition of victim groups, the majority of people subjected to
state-induced famine or penal starvation do not ﬁt this deﬁnition. Rather, the North
Korean regime commits politicide, deﬁning “victim groups . . . in terms of their political
status or opposition to the state.”130 The famine of the 1990s and the continuing risk of
starvation in the twenty-ﬁrst century affects all North Koreans except the core, inner
elite; even members of the military and of the Korean Workers’ Party are at risk. More-
over, disproportionate incarceration of members of the hostile class might be consid-
ered a form of politicide; certain categories of people deemed to be politically unreliable
are at substantially increased risk of penal starvation. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s
deﬁnition of genocide applies to North Korea: “Genocide is a form of one-sided mass
killing [for example, by state-induced famine and penal starvation] in which a state or
other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are de-
ﬁned by the perpetrator.”131 The perpetrator—the North Korean regime—deﬁnes some
citizens as hostile and starves them accordingly.
Even if some of North Korea’s famine victims ﬁt the UNCG’s deﬁnition of victim
groups, however, the crime of faminogenesis is not speciﬁed in the UNCG. Yet both the
intentional and the reckless varieties of state-induced famine cause serious bodily harm
to members of a group and also inﬂict “conditions of life calculated to bring about
[a group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part,” thus fulﬁlling aspects of genocide
as deﬁned in article 2 (b) and (c) of the UNCG.132 State-induced famine also prevents
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births within a group, a practice prohibited by Article 2 (d), as starving women are not
capable of conception. The group, in this case, is made up of all North Korean citizens.
A further difﬁculty in proving a charge of genocide against Kim Jong Il is the ques-
tion of intent. Did Kim intend to kill 3–5% of North Korea’s citizens, or was he merely
reckless in continuing his economic policies even when it was obvious that they caused
starvation? Jasper Becker, a journalist, contends that “the most heinous part of the story
is that the leadership, especially Kim Jong Il, resisted adopting every policy that could
have brought the misery [of the 1990s] to a quick end. This makes the suffering he in-
ﬂicted on an entire people an unparalleled and monstrous crime.”133 Paul French
agrees, noting, “At no time did the state admit to any ideological, economic, or systemic
problems as causes of the . . . famine.”134 Indeed, it might seem that resistance to eco-
nomic reform, combined with complete denial of all civil and political rights; diversion
of food aid to support the Korean Workers’ Party, the military, and the elite; and dis-
crimination against some provinces in provision of food, add up to evidence of intent.
Nevertheless, none of these elements provides the “smoking gun” proving that Kim
wanted to kill his own population, and his frequent appeals for international food aid
suggest the contrary.
A further gap in international law is the absence of a speciﬁc crime of penal starva-
tion. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
ruled that whenever individuals or groups are unable to enjoy the right to adequate
food via their own means, the state has the obligation to directly fulﬁll that right.135 The
United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners specify that
“every prisoner shall be provided . . . with food of nutritional value adequate for health
and strength.”136 These rules can be read to protect not only “normal,” individual pris-
oners, but also large groups of people deliberately incarcerated and subjected to rations
below the subsistence level. This positive obligation to provide food, however, fails to
penalize states that deliberately starve large numbers of prisoners as a matter of policy
or of common—and encouraged—practice. Nor is penal starvation speciﬁed as an act
of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in the Convention against Torture,137
although it is obviously extremely cruel and degrading to force individuals to beg,
scrounge, smuggle, steal, kill, and even become cannibals in their search for food.
Even if referral to the ICC for genocide was not possible, a strong case could have
been made that Kim Jong Il was guilty of almost all the crimes against humanity the
ICC prohibits, including murder, torture, deportations, enslavement, and persecu-
tion.138 There is no speciﬁc mention of state-induced famine or penal starvation in the
list of crimes against humanity; rather, it seems these two crimes would qualify merely
as “other inhumane act[s] . . . intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health.”139 Grace Kang argues that food deprivation in
prison camps can be considered acts of murder or extermination, reinforcing the argu-
ment that Kim Jong Il should have been referred to the ICC.140 Similarly, Debra Liang-
Fenton argues that “the North Korean government is actively involved in committing
crimes against humanity with respect to both its food policy leading to famine and its
treatment of political prisoners;” these are crimes against humanity because the govern-
ment knowingly engages in policies that cause hunger and starvation.141
In October 2011, a coalition of human rights groups launched a campaign in
Tokyo to have the United Nations establish a commission of inquiry into crimes against
humanity in North Korea.142 As of the time of writing (August 2012), however, North
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Korea was not party to the ICC; thus, were he still alive, Kim Jong Il would have to be
referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such referral
either of him or of his successor, Kim Jong Un, was and is unlikely, as North Korea has
been testing nuclear weapons and the geostrategic concern to contain its nuclear ambi-
tions tops the international community’s agenda, as discussed further below. North
Korea has, however, been referred to the ICC by South Korea for a possible war crime.
In March 2010, a South Korean ship, the Cheonan, sank, resulting in the loss of 46 lives.
An international commission determined that a North Korean torpedo had struck it
and in December 2010 the ICC opened a preliminary investigation into whether the
sinking of the Cheonan was a war crime.143 This suggests some willingness on the part
of the international community to refer North Korea to the ICC while concurrently try-
ing to negotiate with the regime to curb its development of nuclear weapons.
Another aspect of international law that might be useful in protecting North Kor-
eans is refugee law. It is estimated that by 2009, between 100,000 and 300,000 North
Koreans were living in China.144 China has been party to the UN Convention on Refu-
gees since 1982; thus, it is obligated to protect refugees ﬂeeing North Korea because of
political or religious persecution. This entails setting up a refugee adjudication process
and allowing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees access to North Koreans in
China.145 China also should protect refugees who have had contact with South Koreans,
missionaries, or aid workers, as they are likely to be punished more harshly than other
returnees should they be sent back to North Korea; people who went to church in
China, for example, are sentenced to ten years in prison camps.146 China is also obli-
gated to protect those many female refugees—both women and girls—who end up
working in the sex trade147 and to make sure that they are not persecuted if they are re-
turned to North Korea.
Yet China signed an agreement with North Korea in 1986 to return refugees,148
sending back about 10% of them every year.149 The agreement permits North Korean
agents to operate in northern China to intimidate, abduct, and murder refugees.150 It
also imposes arrest quotas on Chinese border police,151 ﬁnes anyone helping refugees a
substantial sum,152 and offers a reward of $500 to any Chinese citizen who turns in a
North Korean refugee.153
In general, China does not consider starving North Koreans to be political refugees,
as if they were ﬂeeing a natural, rather than a politically-designed, food disaster; the
Chinese government claims they are economic migrants.154 Yet they are actually politi-
cal refugees, in the sense that they are ﬂeeing state policies that prevent them from eat-
ing. Moreover, the government’s discriminatory distribution of food—for example, by
denying food to members of the hostile class—constitutes political persecution.155 At
the moment, refugee activists are limited to the argument that even if North Koreans
are not political refugees when they enter China, they become political refugees sur
place when threatened with the torture, imprisonment, starvation, and execution that
follow refugees’ return to North Korea.156 In 2008, 13 women and two men were exe-
cuted merely for planning to go to China.157 To avoid such repatriations and to incor-
porate both faminogenesis and penal starvation into refugee law, state-induced famine
should be considered a crime against humanity—if not a form of genocide—and people
ﬂeeing this crime should be considered refugees.
Despite the laws against genocide and crimes against humanity, and the laws that
ostensibly protect refugees, the international community takes relatively tentative
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actions against North Korea. Strategic and security interests trump concern for human
rights.
Conclusion: Strategic vs. Humanitarian Concerns
Marcus argues that aspects of intentional and reckless faminogenesis are already crimes
under various international laws, but that all these laws should be brought together in a
single UN convention.158 Had such a convention existed, it might have been possible to
indict Kim Jong Il before the ICC without having to prove that his crimes were directed
against a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,” as required by the
UNCG. Such a convention might also have prohibited penal starvation as a speciﬁc
sub-category of the crime of faminogenesis. In the absence of such an agreement, Kim
Jong Il should have been prosecuted for the many crimes against humanity and geno-
cidal acts of which he was guilty. Some of Kim’s close associates were still in power in
2012 and remained candidates for prosecution, as will be his son and successor, Kim
Jong Un, if he does not change North Korea’s food production and distribution policies
and does not immediately ensure that prisoners are properly fed.
But such prosecution is unlikely. The international community’s chief concern
regarding North Korea is strategic, not humanitarian. North Korea has been developing
nuclear weapons since the 1980s and already possesses illegal chemical and biological
weapons.159 Six-party talks among the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and
Russia have been taking place sporadically since 2003 with the objective of controlling
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Food aid, along with other types of aid, is sometimes
used as an incentive to persuade North Korea to take part in these talks, and conversely
is sometimes withdrawn or cut if North Korea refuses to cooperate.160
The US is particularly concerned by North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and has had
sanctions against North Korea for some years, partly for the purpose of choking off the
ﬂow of luxury goods into elites’ hands. North Korea ﬁnances its purchases of these
goods by exporting drugs such as opium and heroin and by counterfeiting US cur-
rency.161 China, on the other hand, has an ambiguous relationship with North Korea.
Like the US, it fears nuclear weapons, but it has also been investing in North Korea and
is interested in more bilateral trade. Moreover, China also fears a much larger outﬂow
of refugees from North Korea into its northern region than currently exists, should the
North Korean regime collapse.
South Korea is interested in preserving a stable North Korea. Its ofﬁcial ideology is
that the two Koreas will someday unite, but, in fact, it also fears a refugee overﬂow162
and is wary of the very severe costs of reuniﬁcation, were it ever to occur: one estimate
has put the amount at $900 billion over four decades.163 Finally, South Korea has a very
real fear of attack by North Korea, which already possesses conventional weapons that
could wipe out its capital, Seoul.164 It must therefore balance its concern for its starving
co-ethnics with the need to avert attacks and to protect its own economy.
Thus, it appears that the international community, the US, China, and South Korea
all agree that their ﬁrst strategic priority is a stable North Korea that does not develop
or use nuclear weapons. It is extremely doubtful that either China or Russia would sup-
port referral of North Korea’s leaders to the ICC by the UNSC; even the US might
argue that such an indictment would stand in the way of the six-party negotiations. No
state or international organization has invoked the evolving principle of the responsi-
bility to protect with regard to North Korea.165 The preferred option appears to be to
simply wait for change. News of the prosperity of China and South Korea ﬁlters into
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North Korea via returned refugees and via traders who smuggled videos and DVDs in
from China.166 The more North Koreans encounter goods from the global marketplace
and visitors from the rest of the world, the harder it is for the regime to trumpet its non-
sensical propaganda about being the best country in the world.167
However, since Kim Jong Il’s death the principal concern of the international com-
munity has been to preserve North Korea’s internal stability and avert further nuclear
development. Factional inﬁghting among members of the military or civilian elites
could result in a collapsed or failed state, causing massive refugee outﬂows into China
and South Korea, civil war, and the need for United Nations peacekeeping or peace-
making troops. Such inﬁghting might also trigger actual use of nuclear weapons by one
faction. As long as nuclear threat and internal stability are the international commu-
nity’s chief concerns, the crimes of faminogenesis and penal starvation will likely
remain overlooked.
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A System, Society, and Community Perspective on Genocide
Adrian M. Gallagher
University of Leeds
The question of why the international community continually fails to prevent genocide remains an
ever-present concern. Genocide scholars question how the political will of the politically unwilling
remains unaltered by the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. However, it appears that little consider-
ation has been given to the fact that genocide is open to interpretation. By this I mean that all scho-
lars and policy makers have a view of the world which shapes their understanding of genocide
within it. This is important because it helps explain why actors at the international level perceive
genocide prevention in a radically different light from one another. With this in mind, the article
uses the concepts of an international system, an international society, and an international com-
munity to demonstrate how one’s worldview has implications on how one understands genocide.
These three perspectives help underline the complexities involved as genocide prevention remains
dependent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.
Key words: genocide prevention, international system, realism, international society, the English
School, international community, cosmopolitanism
This article incorporates the concept of genocide into Martin Wight’s “three tradi-
tions” framework in order to put forward a realist–international system, a rationalist–
international society, and a cosmopolitan–international community perspective on
genocide in international relations (IR).1 The value of this approach is that it enables a
three-way dialogue to be forged between competing worldviews that highlights how the
assumptions embodied within one’s view of international relations shapes one’s under-
standing of issues such as justice, power, and, in this context, genocide. The utility of
Wight’s approach has seen an upsurge in the three traditions literature over the past
two decades as scholars have sought to analyze issues such as humanitarian interven-
tion, globalization, and the security dilemma within this tripartite framework.2 To date,
there has not been a single article published which analyzes genocide within the context
of the three traditions. Accordingly, this article addresses this lacuna and, in so doing,
demonstrates how alternative worldviews shape perceptions, interpretations, and un-
derstandings of genocide. This is not to suggest that other factors—from the psychologi-
cal mindset of a leader to the grand strategy of a state—do not also play a role in
shaping perceptions, but that at present the discourse tends to overlook the implications
of competing worldviews for the issue of genocide prevention.
To put the issue of rival worldviews into context, let us consider a recent debate in
the Journal of Genocide Research between Linda Melvern and Stephen Wertheim over
whether the Rwandan Genocide could have been prevented.3 While many issues were
raised, of speciﬁc interest here is Melvern’s claim that the 2,500 UN peacekeepers in
Kenya, 250 US Rangers in Burundi, 800 French troops in the region, and “80 Italians
everywhere!” (to use Wertheim’s phrase4) among others, could and therefore should
have been brought together in order to prevent the Rwandan Genocide or at least
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minimize its destruction.5 Opposing this view, Wertheim claims that while possible, this
was not plausible.6 The point here is not to judge whether Melvern or Wertheim is right
as that would take an entire article in itself. Rather, the aim is to simply highlight that
each perspective embodies a different worldview regarding the potential for cooperation
between states.7 From an IR perspective, Melvern seemingly upholds a normative
approach which posits that since states could have cooperated, they should have, and
thus by “pooling” their resources, states could have prevented the Rwandan Genocide.8
On the other hand, Wertheim’s focus on what is plausible rather than possible reveals a
realist approach which stresses the inherent difﬁculties of cooperation in an anarchical
realm (though Wertheim is sympathetic to the idea that the US could have supported
the Rwandan Patriotic Front).9 Notably, this example illustrates that the debates that
emerge between genocide scholars do not necessarily stem from alternative views of
genocide (both Melvern and Wertheim wanted the Rwandan Genocide to be prevented)
but instead stem from different worldviews.
Problematically, these worldviews are rarely acknowledged within the discourse.
Until this is taken into account, my fear is that scholars and policy makers will continue
to talk past one another rather than to each other. By this I mean that because a dia-
logue is created on a single subject matter—in this case, genocide—the actors involved
assume they are talking about the same thing, whereas in fact, they have a fundamen-
tally different understanding of genocide prevention that stems from their worldview.
While such thinking is increasingly accepted in political science,10 this remains an un-
explored theme in genocide studies.11 Addressing this lacuna, this article incorporates
genocide into the three traditions framework in order to illustrate how one’s worldview
shapes one’s understanding of genocide within it. The hope is that through deconstruct-
ing alternative worldviews on genocide we can generate valuable insight into how a
more fruitful dialogue that aids the prevention of genocide can be constructed.
To do this, the article is structured in a fourfold format. The ﬁrst section presents a
brief overview of the three traditions in order to explain what is meant by an interna-
tional system, an international society, and an international community perspective.
This provides the groundwork for the following three sections, which put forward more
in-depth analyses of each outlook to reveal how the assumptions embodied in each
worldview have implications on genocide prevention. This is something that needs to
be considered carefully within the discipline of genocide studies.
The Three Traditions
It was in the 1950s that Martin Wight ﬁrst identiﬁed the three traditions of realism,
rationalism, and revolutionism as a teaching tool to help students navigate the realist–
idealist dichotomy that dominated the discipline of IR in the interwar period.12 As An-
drew Linklater explains, “In his lectures, Wight lamented the way in which debates
between realism and utopianism in the interwar years had neglected the via media with
its distinct focus on international society.”13 For Wight, there was middle ground to be
found between the overt pessimism embodied in realism and the overt optimism embo-
died in what he labeled revolutionism. Responding to this neglected middle ground,
Wight brought the rationalist tradition (which he associated with Hugo Grotius), back
into his analysis of international theory. In so doing, Wight developed a threefold ana-
lytical framework that, as I have stated, has undergone a revival since it was published
posthumously in 1991. Accordingly, this article incorporates the concept of genocide
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into this threefold framework to help shed insight into understanding genocide in inter-
national relations.
As stated, Linklater uses Martin Wight’s three traditions to equate the tradition of
realism with the more pessimistic idea of an international system, the tradition of ratio-
nalism with the idea of an international society, and the tradition of revolutionism with
the more optimistic idea of an international community.15 Understandably, for those
not familiar with IR theory, this overview may seem somewhat alien. Thus, in Figure 1
I attempt to bring the Linklater–Wight juxtaposition to life in order to help illustrate
the three alternative worldviews prior to integrating the concept of genocide.
It is important to take note of three caveats prior to continuing. First, the spectrum
falls foul of failing to recognize “discontinuities of thought”16 and exclusions of thought,
such as gender.17 Second, Wight himself feared that reiﬁcation would only further sim-
plify and distort the three concepts which he himself never published.18 While both
these points are valid, it seems that the discipline of IR has always been plagued by the
problem of classiﬁcation. Scholars use frames, labels, ﬁgures, and models as ways of il-
lustrating the complexities involved. The reality is that if we did not categorize the his-
tory of ideas, we would be left bewildered. What is important, then, is that scholars
remain aware of the limitations involved while continuing to explain their position as
clearly as they can. A third and ﬁnal caveat is that Wight stressed that “the three tradi-
tions are not like three railroad tracks running parallel into inﬁnity. . . . The three tradi-
tions are streams, with eddies and crosscurrents, sometimes interlacing and never for
long conﬁned to their own riverbed.”19 This statement neatly captures the idea of
blurred boundaries and underlines the notion that realism, rationalism, and revolution-
ism should not be viewed as three separate pillars.
Figure 1 simply aims to illustrate that the three traditions of realism, rationalism,
and revolutionism represent different and competing worldviews. This is important
because one can see that one’s position on this spectrum consequently holds implica-
tions for how one understands genocide prevention in international relations just as it
would with any other concept, such as war, sovereignty, diplomacy, or justice. Each tra-
dition embodies assumptions, and understanding these helps reveal how one’s view of
Figure 1 An overview of the Linklater–Wight juxtaposition14
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the world shapes one’s view of genocide prevention within it. To consider this further,
let us ﬁrst address the tradition of realism and the idea of an international system.
International System: Realism
Critics often portray realism in an overly simplistic and crude manner, which in turn al-
lows them to dismiss realism, or at least their representation of realism, with ease.20
This is not to suggest that realism does not have its problems, but to acknowledge at the
outset that realism does offer insight into understanding international relations.21 Per-
haps Barry Buzan summarized this position best in “The Timeless Wisdom of Real-
ism?,” where he essentially concludes that realism offers us wisdom, but not timeless
wisdom.22 From this perspective, realism offers insight into the complexities of interna-
tional relations, but it fails in its attempt to provide objective knowledge claims that are
applicable across both time and space. However, the dominance of realism in policy
making remains unavoidable: “From 1939 to the present, leading theorists and policy
makers have continued to view the world through realist lenses.”23 It is therefore impor-
tant to engage with realism for it helps explain why policy makers give low political pri-
ority to the issue of genocide prevention.
To return to Linklater’s analysis, he equates the tradition of realism with the idea of
an international system: “The Hobbesian or Machiavellian perspective represents the
anti-progressivist approach to international relations which contends that states belong
to an international system in which there is seldom relief from competition and con-
ﬂict.”24 The statement encapsulates the skepticism embodied in the realist view of inter-
national relations. Unlike English School scholars—who champion the idea of an
international society—realists tend to see a world of international instability rather than
international order. The origins of this instability are traced back to the anarchical
structure (neorealism) or human nature (classical realism).25 With no world govern-
ment to constrain the conditions of anarchy or human nature, states remain embroiled
in a never-ending competition for power, security, and survival. Essentially, states are
locked into this international system of competition and conﬂict which prevents any
potential for progress toward an international society or international community.
To put this logic into the context of genocide studies let us consider Alex Alvarez’s
work Governments, Citizens and Genocide, in which the author explains that diplomats
“are often held hostage to Realpolitik strategies that place a higher value on protecting
national security than protecting an oppressed group.” 26 The prioritization of national
security dictates that the prevention of genocide and mass violence is given little politi-
cal priority. For instance, in 1975, prior to the Indonesian oppression in East Timor, the
Australian ambassador to Indonesia wrote that Australia should assume a “pragmatic
rather than a principled stand,” because “that is what national interest and foreign pol-
icy is all about.”27 Echoing such sentiment, James Wood, a US deputy assistant secretary
of defense, placed Rwanda–Burundi on a list of potential trouble spots only to be
informed by a superior: “Take it off the list. . . US national interest is not involved . . .
we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the
Middle East and North Korea and so on.”28 Similarly, as Slobodan Milošević engineered
a process of destruction and dispossession in the former Yugoslavia, George Bush’s sec-
retary of state James Baker repeatedly stated, “We don’t have a dog in this ﬁght.”29 The
attitude expressed through these statements underlines the central point that genocide
prevention is not considered to be in a state’s national interest. Because of this, policy
makers view genocide prevention as somewhat altruistic and part of an unrealistic
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foreign policy agenda. It is important to consider, however, that this does not necessarily
represent an amoral or immoral position, even though it is obviously a highly conten-
tious issue.30
Although realists would like to live in a world without problems such as genocide,
they do not see how such problems can be resolved without the establishment of a
world government. To go back to the aforementioned debate over the potential for
cooperation between states, realists argue that international institutions such as the
United Nations do not have the power to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on
interstate cooperation.”31 In other words, because there is no world government, states
operate within a climate of mistrust and fear (the security dilemma32). This zero-sum
environment dictates that state x will only cooperate with state y if state x perceives that
it will gain more out of the agreement than state y (and vice versa); for realists, this ex-
plains why there is so little cooperation at the international level. This represents a rela-
tive gains approach as opposed to an absolute gains approach which is upheld by those
that favor the idea of an international society. Such understanding helps explain why
realists view genocide as just another insoluble problem as they reject the so-called ide-
alistic belief that “no problems—however hopeless they may appear to be—are really
insoluble, given well-meaning, well-ﬁnanced, and competent efforts.”33 In sum, realists
do not credit institutions such as the UN with any real power to help foster cooperation
between states which, when juxtaposed with the fact that there is no world government,
dictates that there is no functioning collective security system to address problems such
as genocide.
Moreover, without a world government or a functioning collective security system,
realists remain fearful of states getting involved in altruistic moral crusades. Thus, a
normative argument emerges as realists claim that “the path of justice and honour in-
volves one in danger.”34 In other words, genocide prevention is a classic example of
moral overreach, for as Morgenthau succinctly stated, while the individual has the right
to say, “Let justice be done, even if the world perish,” the state does not have the right
to say this on its citizens’ behalf.35 Since realists reject the idea that states have a moral
obligation to anyone other than their own citizens, they have tended to view interna-
tional normative developments such as the 1948 United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) as humanitarian con-
cerns that are of little real concern to a state’s national interests. From this perspective
states should not send—or let the UN send—their “sons and daughters” to die “saving
strangers.”36 In addition to this, realists claim that so-called humanitarian intervention
is nothing more than a “Trojan horse.”37 Political elites may speak with a moral tongue
when intervening in a certain state but they pursue ulterior motives. Thus, a secondary
moral argument arises as realists claim that state sovereignty and nonintervention help
protect weaker countries from the imperialistic agendas of more powerful ones. Accord-
ingly, this realist framework embodies a moral rationale.
For realists, whether right or wrong, humankind has divided itself up into states. It
is therefore unrealistic to ignore the reality that policy makers create policy on behalf of
states rather than on behalf of humankind. Yet as shall be discussed below, this is pre-
cisely what cosmopolitans advocate. Realists claim that when states do cooperate, they
do so only to further the national interest. For example, long-term collective security
strategies are adopted when attempting to prevent crimes such as nuclear proliferation,
international terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, and piracy at the international level.38 Using
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realist logic, it would seem that policy makers perceive that such crimes outstrip the
individual security capacity of states who then work collectively to address this security
deﬁcit. Accordingly, the collective interest furthers the national interest within such spe-
ciﬁc contexts. The fact that there is no long-term collective security strategy regarding
genocide reﬂects that policy makers do not perceive genocide as posing an international
threat. Such understanding only goes to restate the point that when it comes to geno-
cide prevention, policy makers do not perceive that they have a “dog in the ﬁght” and
in turn do not treat the prevention of genocide as a matter of national interest.
Prior to highlighting the counter-perspectives put forward by English School scho-
lars (international society) and cosmopolitans (international community) it is impor-
tant to stress that further interdisciplinary research needs to be done. For example,
realists have to consider whether their view of genocide stems from their understanding
of human nature, cooperation, national interest, anarchical structure—a mix of these—
or, more importantly, genocide itself.39 By this I mean that despite their having a pessi-
mistic view of human nature, a narrow understanding of national interest, a relative
gains approach toward cooperation, and/or a neorealist belief that the anarchical system
can push states to behave in certain ways, realists do accept that on certain issues states
do cooperate within the anarchical realm. This acceptance of cooperation is important
because it highlights that the realist view—that genocide prevention is not within the
national interest of states—stems not from their view of cooperation, human nature,
and so forth, but their view of genocide. In other words, realists do not believe that
genocide poses a security threat to states. It is this perception of genocide, therefore,
that drives realists to claim that states should not engage in genocide prevention unless
there are matters of national interest at stake. However, a problem arises as realists have
not spent any signiﬁcant amount of time questioning whether genocide does in fact
have an impact on international order. Simply speaking, they have a view of genocide
but have not actually studied genocide in any great detail. This brings us back to the ar-
ticle’s opening claim that more interdisciplinary research on the relationship between
one’s worldview and one’s understanding of genocide within it is needed.
At present, it appears that the realist view of genocide is built on a set of under-
theorized assumptions. This was put into perfect context in the aftermath of the Rwan-
dan Genocide as hard-line realist Henry Kissinger stated,
At least in Bosnia we did something—maybe too late—but in Rwanda hundreds of
thousands were killed. [Rwanda] is not a country of strategic importance for the
United States; you cannot deﬁne a national interest that would take us there. And
yet, there, I tend to think I personally would have supported an intervention. It
would have been a violation of what ordinarily is my principle. Ordinarily I feel
that you should not risk American lives for objectives where you cannot explain to
the mothers why you did it. . . . [Yet] my instinct tells me we should have done it in
Rwanda.40
The statement neatly captures much of the rationale set out above as Kissinger
highlights that states should only engage in complex foreign policy matters when there
are national interests at stake. From a moral perspective, the prioritization of the
national interest is justiﬁed on the grounds that the lives of citizens should not be risked
for anything other than national security. While one could raise the point that many
grieving mothers may accept genocide prevention as a “just cause,” the interesting point
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is that Kissinger favors intervention even though it violates his ordinary principle (by
which he means the assumptions set out above). Kissinger’s omission is very interesting
for the following concluding point: if realists accept that they may be willing to violate
their ordinary principles when it comes to genocide prevention, then is it not time that
realists reformulate their ordinary principles so that they did not have to violate them
in the ﬁrst place?41 Otherwise, realism provides us with a theory of international rela-
tions except at those times when genocide is occurring, which notably undermines the
entire premise of so-called realism. Therefore, it is worth considering that realists do
not hold a monopoly over interpreting reality, which naturally leads us to the two alter-
native perspectives discussed below.
In sum, realists ask us to consider the tragedy that lies at the heart of international
relations.42 This tragedy stems from the fact that there is no world government to con-
strain human nature (classical realism) or mitigate the impact of the anarchical struc-
ture (neorealism). Because of these factors, genocide represents an insoluble problem;
furthermore, genocide prevention represents an altruistic and dangerous foreign policy
agenda that states should not pursue unless there are vital national interests at stake.
Until a world government is formed, to think otherwise is simply unrealistic or utopian.
Yet of course, counterclaims can be made, which leads us to the international society
perspective as English School scholars claim that even without a world government
states can and do uphold legal, moral, and political agreements.
International Society: Rationalism
As stated, the English School approach to international relations—which Wight asso-
ciated with Hugo Grotius—is also known as the international society approach or the
rationalist approach.43 All three terms, therefore, are used interchangeably to refer to the
English School view that international society represents a via media between the interna-
tional system advocated by realists and the international community advocated by cos-
mopolitans (to be discussed below). While the English School’s focus on the state and the
role of power within international relations has sometimes seen critics label it “realism in
drag,” as will be discussed, the idea that states have formed a society rather than a system
demonstrates a fundamentally different interpretation of international relations, which
holds signiﬁcant implications for how English School scholars view genocide.44
To ﬂesh out this idea of an international society let us return to Linklater, who
summarizes the meaning of this society approach:
The Grotian tradition occupies the intermediate position since it believes there has
been qualiﬁed progress in world politics exempliﬁed by the existence of a society of
states which places constraints on the state’s power to hurt and facilitates interna-
tional cooperation. States in this condition are orientated towards communicative
action—to participation in diplomatic dialogues in which they advance claims and
counterclaims with a view of establishing global standards of legitimacy which dis-
tinguish between permissible and proscribed behavior.45
The statement encapsulates the spirit of the international society approach as
English School scholars believe that although societal relations have developed beyond
that of an international system, they have not progressed, and indeed are unlikely to
progress, to the point of an international community. As a result, international society
represents the middle-ground position: there is more to international relations than the
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realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires.46 The idea of an international
society, therefore, stems from the belief that just as individuals at the domestic level cre-
ate societies based on the establishment of collective understandings, states create inter-
national societies by establishing what Linklater refers to as “global standards of
legitimacy.” These standards of legitimacy are expressed via the norms, values, princi-
ples, and institutions of international relations.47 It is claimed that these collective un-
derstandings enable and/or constrain the behavior of states, thereby increasing the
likelihood of order at the international level.48
From this perspective, the UNCG represents a normative reaction to the Nazi
atrocity which was later labeled genocide. By this I mean that the Nazi genocide acted as
a catalyst which altered international legal, moral, and political expectations, thus chan-
ging international society’s understanding of “rightful conduct.”49 For instance, Gareth
Evans explains that for 300 years the Westphalian principles that underpinned interna-
tional relations acted to “institutionalize indifference” in that political leaders were both
immune to external accountability and largely indifferent toward the suffering of others
within states.50 This is not to say that political elites never voiced concern over human
rights violations within other states.51 Events such as those in Armenia acted as notable
precursors for the changes made in the post-World War II era.52 The point is that the
pattern of institutionalized indifference was deemed to be morally and legally unaccep-
table in the aftermath of the Nazi genocide. From this perspective, international so-
ciety’s willingness to accept the term genocide and codify it into international law
reﬂected a new global standard of legitimacy. Furthermore, the Nazi genocide had
broader implications as it helped shape the discourse on universal human rights.53 Such
developments reinforce the English School belief that states form a society at the inter-
national level by creating collective institutions, rules, norms, values, and principles.
These reﬂect that international relations have progressed to the point that the interna-
tional system has become an international society.
At this point the genocide scholar may rightly point out that while the UNCG may
represent a global standard of legitimacy, so far, political elites have systematically failed
to meet the goals of the convention. Of course, English School scholars would not reject
this position for it is evident that states have failed to fulﬁll their legal and moral duties
to prevent genocide.54 Yet at the same time, one has to consider that since genocide pre-
vention may lead states to complex and dangerous foreign policies, fundamental pro-
blems arise from legal, moral, and political perspectives.55 Although English School
scholars want genocide prevention and favor the idea of collective preventative strate-
gies being forged, they also share some realist fears regarding humanitarian intervention
which they believe “exposes the conﬂict between order and justice at its starkest.”56 The
reason for their apprehension is that the debate over humanitarian intervention creates
tension between the fundamental principles that are seen to underpin both order (state
sovereignty) and justice (universal human rights) in international society. As is well
documented, the Charter of the United Nations embodies a dual commitment to both
state sovereignty and human rights.57 Although the latter took on a subordinate role in
1945,58 developments since have seen contemporary interpretations of the Charter
claim that both state sovereignty and human rights should be understood as ordering
principles within international society and that the former should be understood in the
conditional rather than the absolute sense as implied by the UNCG and the 2005 for-
malization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).59
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Notably, this has seen a division arise within the English School between pluralists
and solidarists. On the one hand, English School pluralists reject the idea that states can
legitimately intervene in other states’ internal affairs and uphold the rules of absolute
sovereignty and nonintervention on the grounds that these rules help serve interna-
tional order.60 From this perspective, humanitarian intervention acts as a crime against
humanity (in a non-legal manner) as it violates the very rules that serve humanity
best.61 On the other hand, English School solidarists claim that sovereignty should be
understood as conditional, human rights as universal, and humanitarian intervention as
legitimate if they bring an end to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide.62 Critically,
both sets of scholars appeal to different empirical developments in their attempts
to legitimate their own set of rules. For example, pluralists invoke the UN Charter—
especially Article 2 (7)—to claim that sovereignty should be interpreted as absolute.63
Solidarists advocate subsequent developments such as the adoption of the UNCG and
R2P in order to demonstrate that sovereignty should be interpreted as conditional.
While an assessment of these claims cannot be put forward here,64 the division within
this one school of thought succinctly illustrates the magnitude of the task at hand, as
international society has been constructed upon fundamentally opposing ordering prin-
ciples. Genocide prevention will remain entrenched in a legal and political quagmire
until what Ian Clark refers to as a “tolerable consensus” has been forged between rele-
vant actors at the international level.65
A ﬁnal point worth considering within this analysis of international society is the
faith that English School scholars place in the idea of an international society. Indeed it
may seem somewhat paradoxical to highlight the moral deﬁciencies of international
society on the one hand but also uphold a commitment to international society on the
other. This brings us naturally to the criticism that the English School is state-centric in
nature. How can it stress the moral imperfections of the state system yet remain com-
mitted to a state-centric approach? This is perhaps best illustrated in Paul Keal’s accom-
plished study, in which he highlights that the laws and ideas embodied within the
expansion of international society led it to be constructed on the dispossession of indig-
enous lands, the dehumanization of indigenous peoples, and ultimately genocide.66
From this perspective, the historical evolution of international society should be under-
stood as “morally backward.”67 However, despite Keal accepting this, he upholds an
English School approach for he claims that international society remains the most
appropriate vehicle for moral progress within contemporary international relations.68
In other words, English School scholars accept that states have committed atrocities in
the past and will no doubt commit them in the future, but to suggest that an alternative
non-state framework can be constructed is a fallacy. Again, it may be possible, but not
plausible. As Andrew Hurrell succinctly explains, “The state can certainly be a major
part of the problem but remains an unavoidable part of the solution.”69
So where does this leave genocide, the UNCG, and genocide prevention from an
English School perspective? English School scholars would illustrate that although the
UNCG and R2P have laid some groundwork, much more has to be done to entrench
and institutionalize universal moral standards and implement exiting legal commit-
ments.70 International law will never cause states to act in a certain way, but it does
shape the behavior of states and most of the time states do uphold international legal
developments. The problem is that genocide prevention, as discussed, remains highly
problematic from a legal, moral, and political perspective. Therefore, English School
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scholars accept that normative developments will not come about quickly as an interna-
tional consensus needs to be forged in order to implement—not just agree upon—global
standards of legitimacy such as the UNCG. The fear is that just as international rela-
tions can progress, they can also regress, and the survival of international society re-
quires a consensus being forged over the basic principles of international order.71 In
essence, English School scholars uphold an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary
ethic as they seek to gradually improve international society rather than radically rede-
sign it. It is this latter aspect that this article now turns its attention toward.
International Community: Revolutionism
The tradition of revolutionism remains the most undertheorized tradition identiﬁed by
Martin Wight—at least from an English School perspective. For Wight, revolutionism
was a hybrid category which captured the “soft” revolutionaries from Kant to Nehru, as
well as the “hard” revolutionaries of Jacobins and Marxists.72 While the complexities in-
volved in this broad spectrum cannot be addresses here, it is evident that these revolu-
tionary perspectives share common ground in that they act to remind both realism
(international system) and rationalism (international society) of the moral imperfec-
tions to be found in the present state-centric model.73
It is important then to stress that Figure 1 reﬂects Linklater’s focus on Kant’s softer
revolutionary position and the idea of an international community. As Linklater ex-
plains, “The Kantian tradition represents the progressivist tendency in international
thought since its members believe in the existence of a latent community of humankind,
and are conﬁdent that all political actors have the capacity to replace strategic orienta-
tions with cosmopolitan political arrangements governed by dialogue and consent
rather than power and force.”74 Perhaps the best way of viewing this Kantian perspec-
tive is in terms of what humanity should move away from, rather than exactly what
humanity should move toward. For example, a Kantian commitment to humanity im-
plies that we should move away from the present Westphalian, state-centric model as
this serves the interests of states rather than the interests of humanity. Yet at the same
time there remains signiﬁcant debate among Kantians as to how societal relations
should be ordered instead.75 The point of relevance is that this perspective prioritizes
the value of humanity over the realist focus on power or the English School focus on
order.
To relate this cosmopolitan focus back to the study of genocide, it seems clear that
cosmopolitans could use the occurrence of genocide to illustrate how the present state
system is failing humanity. In so doing, cosmopolitanism poses a direct challenge to the
realist and English School dependency on states and policy makers, which further
strengthens the cosmopolitan normative claim that international relations should
progress to the point that the security of the individual is given priority over that of the
state—while acknowledging that the state has a role to play.76 By starting with the indi-
vidual rather than the state, cosmopolitans break away from the state-centric, top-down
focus embodied in both the aforementioned international system and international
society perspectives. Martin Shaw’s work on global society provides great insight here as
he explains that state-centric approaches are limited precisely because they neglect
“complex social relations which bind individuals and states.”77 Thus, Shaw invokes a
more complex formulation of international relations which seeks to understand both re-
lations between and within states, and in so doing invokes the idea of human society.78
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While not a cosmopolitan as such, Shaw’s work could be placed within the international
community framework as he claims that a new politics of global responsibility needs to
be forged that goes beyond the narrow, state-centric focus embodied in the interna-
tional system and society perspectives.79
Furthermore, it is important to stress that cosmopolitanism is not some utopian
dream; in sharp contrast, many cosmopolitan principles already exist in international
relations. For example, scholars such as Linklater and Richard Shapcott have used the
idea of harm to highlight that a “global harm narrative” has already emerged in inter-
national relations.80 The reality is that states have managed to forge a common under-
standing on a “range of matters which belong to a lower moral register than visions of
some supposedly universal conception of the good.”81 In other words, although there
is still a debate regarding what constitutes a universal good, states have come to an
understanding over what constitutes a universal bad. It is here that the crime of geno-
cide is of relevance. Although different societies have different views on what constitu-
tes harm, there is a universal consensus regarding the crime of genocide. As Shapcott
explains,
It follows that the more serious or fundamental the nature of the harm, the more
likely it is to be identiﬁed as such by people in diverse situations. Starvation is a
clearly harmful condition that is close to being both objectively identiﬁable (the
point at which life can no longer continue) and commanding of a near universal
consensus as to its harmful status. Likewise, having one’s identity, or community of
belonging, removed or destroyed (harmed), is also something that might well com-
mand such a consensus. Genocide is perhaps one value that states have agreed (in
principle) overrides national sovereignty, thus recognising a universal crime (or
harm) against communities as well as individuals.82
Both Shapcott and Linklater recognize genocide as a paradigm example of harm
and claim that the UNCG represents a cosmopolitan harm convention.83 Moreover,
they make the case that the principle of harm can be used to promote a global civilizing
process that beneﬁts not just states but humankind itself.84 Furthermore, as the state-
ment suggests, this process has already begun and should not be seen as some abstract
dream. Yes, we may live in an international society rather than an international com-
munity, but this does not mean that cosmopolitan principles do not exist within this
society and that they cannot be further institutionalized in order to help bring about an
international community.
It is the concept of humanity, therefore, that seems to represent a point of fracture
between the international society approach outlined above and the international com-
munity approach upheld by cosmopolitans. For example, leading English School scholar
Nicholas J. Wheeler has put forward a seminal text in which he claims that humanitar-
ian intervention could be legitimate if it were to prevent crimes such as genocide.85 In
contrast, William Bain claims, “It seems as though Wheeler merely invokes humanity
as a self-evident moral truth—the authority of which requires no further explanation—
which in the end cannot tell us the reasons why we should act to save strangers.”86 The
statement is signiﬁcant for it explains that in failing to justify the existence of humanity,
English School scholars such as Wheeler fail to explain why we should act to save those
targeted by crimes like genocide. In sharp contrast, cosmopolitans ask us to consider
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the Kantian understanding of humanity, which is built on the claim that human beings
are inextricably connected: “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt every-
where.”87 Again, one can see such thinking evident in the discourse; for example, Fergal
Keane’s analysis on the Rwandan Genocide led him to claim that “genocide killing in
Africa diminishes us all.”88 In so doing, Keane invokes the idea that an international
community of humankind actually exists which reﬂects his worldview. This would be
categorically rejected by realists.
To return brieﬂy to the debate set out between Melvern and Wertheim at the start
of this article, the cosmopolitan framework discussed here would ask policy makers not
to calculate the cost–beneﬁt analysis of genocide prevention based on the interests of
the state but on the interest of humanity itself. Thus, while Wertheim is correct to high-
light the difference between what is possible and what is plausible, one should not let
the focus on the latter obscure the potential for the former. From a cosmopolitan per-
spective, Wertheim’s approach places too much emphasis on the state-centric reality of
how the world is, rather than how it should be. After all, when faced with the horror of
genocide it seems perfectly acceptable to make the normative case that since states can
cooperate, they should cooperate in order to stop genocide. But again, these perspectives
stem from alternative worldviews, and it is impossible to prove (in the scientiﬁc sense)
that one is right and the other wrong as this is a matter of judgment, not science.
As with the system and society perspectives discussed above, there are, of course,
limitations and problems that need to be considered. The central concern with the
international community perspective is the value it places on the concepts of humanity,
human nature, and human essence to condemn acts such as genocide as inhuman.89
The problem with this worldview is that it is built on the assumption that humanity
and human essence exist.90 One could, for example, claim that the widespread partici-
pation of “ordinary people” in the genocidal process highlights the tragic reality that
such acts are, in fact, human.91 This somewhat profound philosophical argument was
put into context in the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities as news and images of events
began to ﬁlter through mainstream British society. After viewing a Daily Express exhibi-
tion on the horrors that took place in Belsen, one 30-year-old woman stated,
I’m afraid it didn’t make me feel anti-German; it made me feel anti-humanity.
Would the same have happened here, I wonder, if we’d had the same government?
I’ve heard some violent anti-Semitic talk which makes me think it would. I feel it’s
the fault of humanity at large, not the Germans in particular.92
The statement highlights that just as one can appeal to the idea of humanity to con-
demn the crime of genocide, one can also appeal to the crime of genocide to refute the
existence of a common humanity. Furthermore, even if realists and English School
scholars were to accept that humanity does in fact exist, they would then question how
we can realistically transform the present international system or international society
into an international community.93 While cosmopolitan scholars offer normative
claims, these problems demonstrate how this is an ongoing debate and that further
research needs to be done.
In sum, cosmopolitans would tend to accept that we do not live in an international
community; yet they uphold a commitment to cosmopolitan principles in the hope that
a community of humankind can be established. While English School scholars would
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advocate the prevention of genocide on the grounds that this is a legal duty that has to
be fulﬁlled, cosmopolitans would tend to claim that there is something bigger at stake:
humanity. Yet at the same time, the concept of humanity is problematic. Whereas scho-
lars such as Keane make the claim that genocide “diminishes us all,” realists would sim-
ply question if this is true. If it is not, what does this tell us about the concept of
humanity? If it is, how are we meant to transform the present international system into
an international community? Thus, further dialogue on this issue is essential for it may
be the case that even if humanity does not exist, this does not mean that we should not
construct it, cherish it, and protect it.94
Conclusion
This article has examined three perspectives on genocide to illustrate how one’s view of
international relations shapes one’s perception, interpretation, and understanding of
genocide within it. This is a simple yet important point. For example, genocide scholars
continually refer to the international community’s failure to prevent genocide; yet it is
clear that most IR scholars do not actually believe that an international community exists.
Therefore, when genocide scholars use the term international community they seem to
be simply repeating a political mantra which is often put forward by politicians for politi-
cal purposes.95 Through an examination of the ideas of an international system, interna-
tional society, and international community, this article revealed how alternative
worldviews embody fundamentally different understandings of cooperation, power, jus-
tice, order, human nature, and so forth, which in turn shape perceptions of genocide. In
other words, genocide is open for interpretation. This may seem somewhat shocking as
some genocide scholars might claim that all scholars, policy makers, and laypeople
should see genocide as a problem of the greatest magnitude. Yet the truth is that there is
not one interpretation of genocide. Thus, the three perspectives outlined in this article
help underline the magnitude of the task at hand as genocide prevention remains depen-
dent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.
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The True Measure of Success: The Leadership
of Roméo Dallaire in the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda
Sarah Devonshire
Queen’s University
Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, as force commander for the United Nations Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the ﬁgure most associated with the infamous mission, has often been ac-
cused of providing poor leadership that ultimately failed to prevent the outbreak of genocide in
April 1994. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to analyze Dallaire’s actions prior to the outbreak.
By looking at his personal suitability, situational nuances, and moments of opportunity during the
UNAMIR mission between October 1993 and April 1994, it is possible to form an accurate assess-
ment of Lieutenant General Dallaire’s leadership in Rwanda and its relation to the development of
the catastrophe. This article will demonstrate that prior to the death of Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana, Dallaire succeeded in fulﬁlling UNAMIR’s directives despite resistance on all sides.
This assessment disproves arguments that his failure in leading UNAMIR was a primary contribut-
ing factor to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide.
Key words: UNAMIR, Rwanda, genocide, Dallaire, leadership
Introduction
Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire’s United Nations (UN) mission to Rwanda is often
interpreted through the prism of the genocide that exploded months after the peace-
keeping force arrived. The majority of the literature on the mission, including ofﬁcial
UN summary publications, has focused on the colonial and pre-1990s national conﬂicts,
glossing over the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until the onset of the
genocide on 6 April 1994.1 In this context, the plane crash that killed President Juvénal
Habyarimana and marked the beginning of the 100-day massacre became just another
step toward chaos for the troubled nation. This paper will argue that this view places
undue blame on UNAMIR’s military leadership for the genocide’s occurrence and dis-
regards UNAMIR’s successes prior to the crash when Dallaire was able to manage the
evolving scenario and the limitations of the UN mandate with skill and resourcefulness.
Until the crash, the situation in Rwanda had been volatile but had presented opportu-
nities for Dallaire and UNAMIR to genuinely further the aims of the Arusha Accords.
In the face of numerous stumbling blocks, Dallaire’s tenure prior to the crash was a ten-
tative success. Once the plane crashed in Kigali, neither Dallaire nor any other element
of the UN had the capability or speed to address and halt the rising tide of genocide.
The true measure of his success or failure in Rwanda can only be judged by looking at
the days before 6 April 1994.
This argument will establish the criteria by which Dallaire’s leadership of the
Rwanda mission can be judged a success or failure. With a realistic evaluation of the
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resources available and the nature of the UNAMIR mandate, success will be deﬁned as
the keeping of peace, the maintenance of the ceaseﬁre, and the facilitation of political
processes toward the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Conversely, a
failing mission would be deﬁned by the resumption of large-scale military aggression
and the practical inability to facilitate meetings and uniﬁed political gatherings. This
corresponds with Paul Diehl’s suggested criteria for evaluating peacekeeping operations
by “how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conﬂict in its area of deploy-
ment; and how much it facilitated ‘resolution of the disagreements underlying the con-
ﬂict.’”2
Dallaire’s suitability must be evaluated for the peacekeeping mission, but also for
the complicated forces at play in Rwanda. Aside from his own suitability, it must also
be determined whether any other potential leader had a chance of success, or whether
the mission was already troubled prior to his appointment as force commander (FC).
Diehl and Daniel Druckerman have raised concerns over the use of the “lessons
learned” approach to analyzing peacekeeping, which promotes methods that have
worked well in the past with little investigation into why they were effective and
whether they are applicable to different situations.3 This is very much the attitude that
has been used to measure Dallaire’s performance. His evaluation in respect to the
UNAMIR mission has been based primarily on its ﬁnal, violent outcome. This argu-
ment will instead attempt to analyze his tenure from his arrival until the airplane crash
in an effort to understand leadership in peacekeeping missions as more than a matter of
responsibility, but as having a unique set of challenges and requirements which need to
be further studied and structured in order to strengthen future missions. By looking at
pivotal moments to determine whether Dallaire piloted these events toward the best
possible outcome, a more accurate measurement of his proﬁciency as force leader can
be formed, and the argument that his leadership was a contributing element to the
genocide can be refuted.
Once Dallaire was made force commander, what mission was he to lead? The man-
date of the UNAMIR mission is a key element in this appraisal. The mission he believed
he was undertaking and the means he understood to be available gave him an image of
the mission that would be violently disrupted by the reality of Rwanda. While the situa-
tion on the ground changed under his feet, the necessary adaptations to his formal man-
date languished in the bureaucratic paper trays of UN Headquarters (UNHQ) in New
York. This situation was both a functional and ideological constraint on Dallaire’s abil-
ity to react and reassess as opportunities as challenges arose.
The obstacles and opportunities that arose during the UNAMIR mission were the
showcase of Dallaire’s competency as force leader. These scenarios began to shape the
progress of the mission before it even touched down in Kigali, and continued to do so
until the 6 April 1994 death of President Habyarimana. Beginning with the 21 October
1993 coup in neighboring Burundi and followed by the complications of the Belgian
peacekeeping contingent and the deﬁciencies of the majority of the force, the political
concerns surrounding Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jacques-
Roger Booh-Booh and the informant Jean-Pierre’s report of weapons caches in Kigali,
Dallaire was confronted with a number of critical moments. The paths he chose and his
reactions to obstructions would reveal the true measure of his leadership.
This investigation will look into whether there was still hope that a controlled—if
not entirely peaceful—environment could be maintained by the UN force at each
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turning point, and will ask whether the mission was fated to fail before it even began. It
will be argued that the possibility of success remained, under the leadership of Dallaire,
until the night the presidential jet crashed just outside of the Kigali airport.
Dallaire’s Suitability for the Situation
Evaluating Dallaire’s potential for success in the months leading up to 6 April 1994 re-
quires examining his qualities as a leader and, more speciﬁcally, his suitability for the
role of force commander of the Rwanda mission. Doing so requires ﬁrm guidelines for
the FC’s role in relation to other leaders involved in the mission.4 Dallaire’s position
made him responsible for the military and security concerns of UNAMIR. His superiors
assured him that his ﬁrst peacekeeping mission was to be a “relatively tranquil affair.”5
Matters of politics and diplomacy were assigned to SRSG Booh-Booh. Dallaire was to
be subordinate to Booh-Booh, who—as the political leader of UNAMIR—was intended
to be a “special representative to lead the mission and provide the diplomatic glue that
would make sure the Arusha Accords didn’t come unstuck.”6 In the fulﬁllment of the
Arusha Accords and the establishment of Rwanda’s new government structure, Dal-
laire’s role was to be one of facilitation, not implementation.
This suited Dallaire, who has been described as a “NATO man,” implying that his
military knowledge had been shaped by the needs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) during the Cold War, rather than a “UN man” experienced in the com-
plex political machinations of peacekeeping operations.7 Aware of his inexperience with
the political and social elements of UN forces, Dallaire selected Major Brent Beardsley—
who at the time was involved in the drafting of the Canadian Forces peacekeeping man-
ual—to assist him and supplement his knowledge of UNHQ and peacekeeping.8 Dallaire
was not an experienced UN force leader, but he understood himself to be centered in a
support network that would supplement his deﬁciencies in this respect.
Measuring Roméo Dallaire’s personal suitability for the Rwandan mission reveals
that his deﬁciencies in experience were mitigated by his suitability to the nature of the
conﬂict. Dallaire’s experience with cultural and linguistic plurality in society was
ingrained from his youth and the earliest stages of his career. As a young man in Quebec
during the era of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) Crisis, René Lévesque’s Parti
Québecois, and as a bilingual soldier in a predominantly Anglo military, Dallaire was
well versed in cultural tensions and prejudices.9 He was also experienced in actively navi-
gating and ﬁnding solutions to the barriers created by language and ingrained relations.10
This was a valuable asset in Rwanda, where the negotiations faltered between the
French-speaking Rwandan government forces (RGF) and a largely anglicized Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF).11 Both conceptually and linguistically, Roméo Dallaire was able to
comprehend dynamics between the two antagonists that other military ﬁgures could not.
These skills were mobilized when SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh failed to act
proactively in his political role. Rather than supplying essential political leadership, Dal-
laire felt that Booh-Booh was unable to provide any innovation and at times even rea-
sonable aid in response to a volatile situation.12 In his own memoir of the UNAMIR
mission, Booh-Booh would argue that the lack of movement could be blamed on the
intransigence of the Rwandan political class.13 Booh-Booh’s own publication, a clear
attempt at a rebuttal to Dallaire’s claims, called this view of his role a “puerile dream”
and often chastised Dallaire for his political ventures.14 Nonetheless, Dallaire frequently
attended the often frustrating political meetings between Rwandans, for which his dep-
uty commander, Henry Kwami Anyidoho, acknowledged him.15 He found that his
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language skills led him to act as translator between the English-speaking RPF and
French-language representatives of the Rwandan government. He later claimed it was
this role as a linguistically neutral ﬁgure that gave him greater access and comprehen-
sion in Rwanda and motivated communication with all sides.16 Faced with a mission
leader whom he found at best uninterested and at worst negligent, Dallaire proved that
he was not only willing, but particularly well suited to bridging the personnel gaps at
UNAMIR’s highest levels.
While experience with antagonistic cultural plurality and bilingualism were valu-
able tools in the Rwandan conﬂict, they do not single Dallaire out as one uniquely well
suited to the mission. Other nations could have provided military leaders with similar
characteristics, but what they did not have was the connection to Rwanda found in Can-
ada. Deliberations between the RPF and RGF had identiﬁed Canada in particular as a
prospective nation from which to draw a peacekeeping commander.17 While a Western,
bilingual nation, it was free of the colonial history of comparable European states.18
Positive impressions of Canada had been developed in Rwanda during the decades after
the 1960s decolonization, when Canadian relations with the African nation were tied
strongly to education and philanthropy.19 These positive bonds made Dallaire a desir-
able leader for the UN’s military force. It also meant that Dallaire was entering an arena
where key players had been inﬂuenced by his own cultural heritage and experiences.
Considering his linguistic and cultural suitability to Rwandan society, Dallaire
seems to have emerged as the most viable candidate for leadership. His own civilian
and military experiences ﬁtted him to the organizational and social characteristics of
the Rwandan conﬂict. His character was said to ﬁt well into the African culture, with
less cool reserve than many of his anglophone contemporaries.20 He was described as
energetic, charismatic, patient, principled, and hard-working, sometimes to the irrita-
tion of others, but often to the beneﬁt of his leadership position.21
As a leader, he was versed in the realities of modern peacekeeping. When troops
under his command were sent to join UN forces in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, Dallaire
discovered the vulnerability and possibility of casualties among peacekeepers in regions
where conﬂict continued to spark.22 He recognized this risk in his own mission once on
the ground and was subsequently aware of it during his decision-making processes. Dal-
laire was a man who ﬁt the needs of the situation and culture of Rwanda, had his own
knowledge of the dynamics of national conﬂict, and had a strong career as a military
leader.
One of the elements he did lack for an African mission was being from the conti-
nent himself. While the UN often tried to give a regional character to African missions,
the front-runner for the position, a Nigerian general leading the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) observer mission in Rwanda before the UN’s arrival, left much to be de-
sired. This ofﬁcer’s own men informed Dallaire during his observations of Rwanda prior
to UNAMIR’s establishment that the general had abandoned the military observers he
had been charged with in the midst of a break in the cease-ﬁre in the de-militarized zone
(DMZ), retreating to Kigali and leaving them to fend for themselves.23 This was not the
strong military ﬁgure necessary for a mission that depended as much on its control of
minds as its control of bodies. Dallaire was a man who could lead and interact with his
own men, and decipher the Rwanda that confronted him.
His primary role was to be the military leader of the UNAMIR force; as such, his
military background is an important measure of his suitability for the mission. Dallaire
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was not an experienced UN peacekeeping soldier, nor were his inclinations to be partic-
ularly aggressive. In the post-Cold War era, the nature of peacekeeping was beginning
to undergo a drastic change. Without the divisive inﬂuence of Western-Soviet conﬂict,
new and more complex dimensions were becoming apparent.24 Even experienced UN
peacekeepers were entering theaters that were unfamiliar and evolving beyond their
ﬁelds of reference. Criticisms of Dallaire’s foundations as an artillery ofﬁcer are valid for
the technical nature of the mission, which was not combat-based or heavily armed.25
However, the characteristics of an artillery ofﬁcer as outlined by the Canadian Forces
are highly compatible with the challenges the Rwanda mission produced. The artillery
ofﬁcer was to expect “long hours under stress both by day and night . . . to be out of
doors with little shelter in all weather, often in physically demanding conditions.”26
In response to this environment, artillery ofﬁcers were expected to perform as superior
leaders, especially among subordinates, and to possess physical and mental strength
and stamina, methodical and mature judgment, and the ability to perform steadily and
quickly while under great stress.27 Dallaire’s mobilization of these transferable skills
from his artillery leadership role to the Rwandan arena shows his suitability as a new
leader in a new kind of peacekeeping. His deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho
afﬁrmed in his own work on UNAMIR that Dallaire was “a high calibre ofﬁcer that one
rarely comes across . . . a courageous leader who showed the way and we all followed.”28
As a ﬁnal measure of his suitability to UNAMIR, Dallaire’s resistance to aggressive
displays of force was an important feature of his success prior to the outbreak of geno-
cide. While he was not against pre-emptive displays of action or a strong defensive
stance, Dallaire’s insistence on control among his men was essential in preventing out-
breaks of public violence or internal disruptions for months before the crash. From UN
force observations and intelligence on Hutu extremists included in Dallaire’s cables to
the UN, it was evident that the forces of the RGF and its paramilitary organizations
were actively agitating an already volatile situation.29 RGF elements participated in
mass demonstrations during key events in the peace process—armed, but in plain
clothes—hoping to incite the crowds and the UN forces protecting politicians. Their
aim was to set off violence that would reignite the Rwandan conﬂict and to target
UNAMIR’s Belgian troops in order to prompt their withdrawal.30 By promoting calm
and measured actions and disciplining those who crossed behavioral and disciplinary
lines, Dallaire proved that his even temperament and reservation were an appropriate
approach in a volatile situation not only prone to violence, but at times speciﬁcally
working to incite it.31
L.Gen Dallaire’s strengths and weakness reﬂect the reality of UN peacekeeping pro-
cesses. In the United Nations, the force commander and the head of peacekeeping mis-
sions are both appointed by the secretary-general.32 This detail is not highlighted in
order to redirect blame or responsibility for the outcome of missions onto the secretary-
general, but to raise the question of the need for well-reviewed guidelines in the selec-
tion of force leaders. This would likely require matching those individuals selected for
their suitability to the mission, such as Dallaire, with the necessary training and guid-
ance in the intricacies of modern peacekeeping that he was not provided with. Such an
arrangement would also allow for a greater forum for communication that could build
future leaders of peace operations. While Dallaire had proven himself to be a strong
leader in the Canadian Forces, there is much that could have been done to support him
further as leader of a UN mission.
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Initial Appraisal of the Situation
In order to understand the character of the UNAMIR mission, it is important to under-
stand Rwanda as it was seen at the time, without the beneﬁts of hindsight, and with a
view to Dallaire’s responsibilities as a military leader for the UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO). Determining whether Dallaire’s actions up to 6 April
1994 can be considered successful requires an understanding of what potential for reso-
lution the UN believed existed in Rwanda. If the scenario in Rwanda was massively un-
derestimated prior to commencement, can the standard concept of success as non-
violence and the development of democracy still be applied?
In the 1980s, Rwanda found itself in a position of secure—though not ideal—gover-
nance under the dictatorship of Juvénal Habyarimana. For more than 15 years, Habyar-
imana had ruled over a country which was pragmatically described as “in general one of
the least bad in Africa if one considers only its actions and not its intellectual underpin-
nings.”33 However, stability fell and racial tensions rose as economic downturns struck
the nation. The coffee and tin industries—highly important for the Rwandan econ-
omy—collapsed, and the tiny nation became dependent on foreign aid as its main
source of income. Leaning on traditional links between Rwanda and France, Habyari-
mana loosened his monopoly on public power after French president François Mitter-
rand advised him that democratization was paramount in maintaining a ﬂow of
international aid.34 While the opening of politics to opposition parties was in keeping
with changes being made in many nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it
stirred up civil conﬂict in Rwanda. The racialized political tensions between Hutu and
Tutsi citizens and exile populations erupted in the early 1990s. Composed largely of ex-
iled Tutsi living as refugees in Uganda after decades of conﬂict in their homeland, the
RPF launched an offensive against the ruling Habyarimana government.35 The resultant
civil war was the catalyst for international intervention in the African state.
UNAMIR’s aim was to monitor the enforcement of the Arusha Accords, the com-
plicated resolution proposed to end the war. Many outside politicians and diplomats be-
lieved that these accords presented the best opportunity for establishing a new
governance system between the warring factions.36 One American representative,
Herman J. Cohen, embodied the optimistic view of the UN by stating, in April 1993,
that “in terms of the Arusha agreement moving forward, [he] did not consider a non-
implementation scenario.”37 Much of the UN saw Rwanda as a chance to revitalize its
damaged peacekeeping reputation following recent missions in Somalia and Yugosla-
via.38 In 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered Rwanda “the
site of a unique experiment in preventative diplomacy—which was supposed to be the
ﬁrst step in averting war . . . and the experiment [was] on the verge of success.”39 SRSG
Booh-Booh was clearly dedicated to the structure of the Arusha agreement and com-
plained that Dallaire did not understand the need to have the conﬁdence of all Arusha
signatories, even once the agreement no longer effectively addressed the shifting dy-
namics of the conﬂict.40 This level of optimism toward a successful Rwandan peace was
passed on to Dallaire as the truth of the scenario. In an interview, Dallaire himself stated
that the atmosphere at the UN during the formation of his mission plan was decidedly
optimistic:
The information we received from the international community and from the UN,
who were monitoring and assisting the peace agreement, led us to believe that the
mission would be a success. There would be some friction and there was a sense of
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urgency surrounding our deployment. But both sides had come to UN HQ in New
York and said that they wanted the peacekeeping mission to happen. It was per-
ceived as a classic low-budget Chapter 6 mission.41
A “classic” Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission was based on the idea of the “Paciﬁc
Settlement of Disputes” and lacked a Chapter 7 mission’s capacity for physical enforce-
ment regarding “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression.”42 On the direction of the organization sponsoring his efforts and already
investigating the conﬂict, Dallaire initially perceived that his would be an achievable
mission in a willing nation.
In reality, Dallaire was not fully informed of the true nature of the Rwandan conﬂict.
A well-trained and respected soldier, he was admittedly not a political specialist, nor was
he adequately equipped with one on his initial investigative technical mission.43 In a
complex political situation with multiple players, the mission lacked adequate political
analysis and understanding. The Rwandan nation may have desired peace and stability,
but its leaders did not.44 Vital information that could have aided Dallaire and altered his
mission plan dramatically was withheld or simply not communicated to the DPKO
through the often convoluted and competitive structure of UN departments.45 A Human
Rights Watch report completed in 1993 outlined the trends of violence and rights viola-
tions that were already occurring in Rwanda. Even the Network Zero organization—
anti-Tutsi “squads” formed across the nation associated with high-level ﬁgures like First
Lady Agathe Habyarimana and central to the promotion and preparation for the geno-
cide—was speciﬁcally identiﬁed by observers in the region before Dallaire’s arrival.46
Despite warnings that any response to the Rwandan situation needed to be properly
equipped to address these concerns, Dallaire was not aware of the report until after his
return to Canada, after the 100 days of genocide had already consumed the country.47
Even the World Bank failed to pass on vital information about Rwanda’s militarization
to the UN, considering it unnecessary to inform the Security Council of its knowledge of
arms shipments arriving into the country.48 This lack of information likely inﬂuenced
Dallaire’s determination that while a mission force of 5,500 would be ideal, a “reasonable
viable option” of a 2,500-strong force could still complete the mission while passing the
UN’s austere approval standards for mission size and cost.49 It was with this dearth of
knowledge and barely adequate force strength that Dallaire would face the challenges of
Rwanda. If he was to succeed, he would have to do so with a less-than-ideal force in a
scenario more complex than he could have known. This was the challenge Dallaire faced
from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the night of 6 April 1994.50
Crisis Point
To understand why an investigation into Roméo Dallaire’s success must begin before
April 6, the plane crash that resulted in the death of President Habyarimana must be
clearly understood as the critical fracture point in the Rwandan conﬂict. The event and
its direct repercussions removed Dallaire’s ability to act in any meaningful way toward
the establishment of peace. A survivor of the genocide focused the restricted nature of
Dallaire’s response on the rising tide of violence after the crash:
We wondered what on earth UNAMIR was doing in Rwanda. . . . [They] could not
even lift a ﬁnger to intervene and prevent the death of tens of thousands of inno-
cent people who were being killed under their very noses. . . . An institution must
have the capacity to be effective. But the UN protects no one.51
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While some have stated that UNAMIR’s “greatest challenge” was to stop the kill-
ings, in reality this was neither its purpose nor within its ability.52 Dallaire had not been
sent to Rwanda to ﬁght for peace, only to facilitate it. He would later recall that in the
face of the rising violence “UNAMIR’s hands essentially remained tied.”53 He posited
that if he had been provided with a contingent able to convince Rwandans it was “risk-
ier to go [out] . . . than stay at home, we could have stopped it.”54 Unfortunately, the
reality of UN dynamics and logistics made the plausibility of this a moot point. If pro-
viding a monitoring force during ceaseﬁre was considered impractical by the US or UK,
volunteering troops when the element of risk escalated was too foolish to even consider.
Unwilling to increase support in the months prior to the crash, the UN certainly would
not send in troops after it.55
Habyarimana’s death irreparably destabilized the nation. Ignace, a Hutu inter-
viewed by author Alain Destexhe during his post-genocide research in Rwanda, was
one of the many génocidaires who rose from the wreckage of the crash. He recalled the
new, collective sentiment that formed following it.56 Ignace told of a radical Hutu ele-
ment that “no longer worried about who had followed the teachings of the presidential
party or the teachings of a rival party. We forgot all quarrels, and who had fallen out
with whom in the past. We kept only one idea in the pot.”57 That idea was genocide.
This was mirrored in the international connections around the Rwandan peace set-
tlements. Habyarimana was the conduit between Rwandan politics and the interna-
tional community.58 The inﬂammatory Hutu radio station Radio Télévision Libre des
Milles Collines (RTLM) encouraged the public to “stand up, take action . . . without
worrying about international opinion.”59 Many did just that. A witness to the genocide
later revealed that the violence “did not become widespread until extremists saw the
world would not get involved and that UNAMIR’s contingents would protect only
themselves.”60 Hutu radicals were no longer held back by the inﬂuence of the interna-
tional community embodied in an established leader or UNAMIR. Habyarimana’s
death released the ties that had kept intent from becoming action.61
Colonel James Allen, who had led peacekeeping missions before retiring from the
military to become a journalist, shamed Dallaire. He chastised him for not diving into
the conﬂict in the “best military tradition,” which would have been tantamount to sui-
cide for his troops, yet at the same time criticized him for allowing the deaths of the Bel-
gian soldiers on security detail with Prime Minister Madame Agathe.62 Allen argued
that Dallaire’s Canadian contemporary, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, chief of staff
in the 1992 UN mission in Yugoslavia, would not have failed as he believed Dallaire
had.63 Yet, in his contradictory disapproval of both action and inaction, it is hard to
determine what outcome he would have considered a success. Deputy Commander
Anyidoho later reinforced Dallaire’s pragmatic stance, questioning the wisdom of pla-
cing UN forces “with basically only personal weapons . . . in the face of belligerents who
were armed to the teeth.”64 While morality obligated action, it was not a practical or
political possibility in Rwanda in 1994. The ﬂood gates had been opened and no one
man, whether willing or recalcitrant, masterful or inept, could close them.
Mandate
The UN’s approval of Dallaire’s proposal for a force of 2,500 led to the creation of the
mission mandate for UNAMIR. However, it was not the only outline that would be cre-
ated in the early months of the mission. The political and military settlement in Rwanda
had been created through the Arusha Peace Accords, the heavily debated peace
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agreement made in Arusha, Tanzania, between the RPF, RGF, and other Rwandan par-
ties.65 The Arusha Accords called for a neutral international force to assist in imple-
menting the new government structure and maintaining the unsteady truce between the
sides. However, the creators of the accords recognized to a greater degree that “peace-
keeping cannot be an end in itself—it merely buys time.”66 African politicians and insi-
ders were becoming aware that the possibility of force would be a vital element to any
response. However, the response they wanted and the force they received had consider-
able differences. Arusha outlined a mission which would have secured the country as a
whole, taken part in actions such as arms conﬁscations, and enforced security. Both
unwilling and unable to ﬁnd funding or willing participants, the UN watered down
these strong aims, cutting down the geographic reach and the force’s bite, replacing
conﬁscation with mediation, and security with monitoring.67 The UN mandate con-
sisted of eight roles for the UNAMIR force:
a. to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons-secure
area established by the parties in and around the city
b. to monitor observance of the cease-ﬁre agreement . . .
c. to monitor the security situation during the ﬁnal period of the transitional Govern-
ment’s mandate, leading up to the elections
d. to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes
e. to investigate . . . instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Pro-
tocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and
to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report . . . as appropri-
ate to the Secretary-General
f. to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of dis-
placed persons . . .
g. to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities . . . with relief op-
erations
h. to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and
police68
The primary intent of the mandate was to monitor and assist the Rwandans in
their progress toward a peaceful settlement. While the mandate initially appeared to be
a sufﬁcient outline for the simple mission the UN believed Rwanda to be, in truth the
situation was much more complex than the mandate recognized.
The mandate itself presented numerous problems. It was formed at a time in 1993
when the DPKO’s perception of Rwanda was simplistic and uncomplicated. As such,
Dallaire did not consider the exact semantics of the mandate to be of great importance.
Without the anticipation of active and widespread violent elements in Rwanda, it was
not important that the speciﬁc wording could eventually prevent UNAMIR forces from
engaging with violent mobs or individuals.69 Due to these expectations, the mandate
was also formulated around traditional perceptions of peacekeeping operations. It pre-
supposed goodwill, respect, and cooperation from both sides of the conﬂict so that UN
forces could remain a neutral force between them.70 When this was discovered to be
untrue, the need to institute ﬂexibility into the mandate to address the shifting situation
on the ground was heightened.71
Further, the generic quality of the mandate gave Dallaire a wider impression of his
options than the UN had conceived. In an interview, Dallaire spoke of
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the impasse over philosophy and interpretation of the mandate. I saw my mandate
as “6-plus,” which gave me a certain amount of room for manoeuvre. DPKO saw it
in a much more restrictive sense, because of the fear of casualties and so on.72
In the spirit of a “six-plus” mandate that gave room for military actions in the face
of threats to human rights, Dallaire produced the guiding document for UNAMIR that
elaborated on the outline in the mandate: his rules of engagement (ROE). In UN opera-
tions, the ROE are written by the commanding ofﬁcer after the establishment of the
mission. Upon reaching this stage, Dallaire took what he perceived to be the open spirit
of the mandate and shaped his Rules to ﬁt his scenario. He saw it as his general role to
“create an atmosphere of security,” and to do so, he recycled a portion of the Cambo-
dian peace-enforcement mission’s text, which became paragraph 17 of the ROE.73 Para-
graph 17 stated that the occurrence of crimes against humanity “morally and legally
[required] UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them.”74 Dallaire believed that
this was within the boundaries of his vague mandate, and necessary in light of recent
developments in Rwanda. The UN never responded to his ROE, neither positively or
negatively, and Dallaire took this as a tacit approval of his direction.75
Crossroads
Evaluating Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UNAMIR mission prior to 6 April 1994
requires a speciﬁc area of investigation. For this analysis, the most important evidence
is in the decisive moments when conﬂict in Rwanda and the mission determined in
which direction UNAMIR and the nation would go. Dallaire’s ability to lead a success-
ful mission rested less on the stasis of peace, and more on the resolution of conﬂicts
that threatened it. By investigating these moments of conﬂict and their results, it is pos-
sible to evaluate the point at which the mission was or became irredeemable.
Burundi Coup
The ﬁrst crisis that Dallaire faced during the UNAMIR mission arose as he touched
down in Kigali. Arriving on 22 October 1993, Dallaire found that the very fundamentals
of Rwanda’s national situation had changed drastically the day before.76 Along the
southern border of the country lay Burundi, with its own postcolonial legacy of Hutu
and Tutsi conﬂict. The day before Dallaire’s arrival, leaders in the nation’s Tutsi-led
army overthrew and assassinated Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye, who had been re-
cently elected in Burundi’s ﬁrst free elections after 30 years of Tutsi dictatorship.77 This
coup had several repercussions on the Rwandan situation. In the wake of reprisals from
Hutu and Tutsi, 300,000 mostly Hutu refugees crossed the border to camps in southern
Rwanda.78 For Hutu in Rwanda, fears of Tutsi hegemony were escalated by the coup,
providing not only the spark, but also fuel for the ﬁre of charged opposition. Theories
of an overarching Tutsi plot were enﬂamed by radical propaganda that warned against
believing that “what happened in Burundi cannot happen here.”79 Large Hutu refugee
populations in the south proved to be fertile recruiting ground for the RGF, where
“Hutu Power” grew in a climate of the Hutu nation under siege.80 The lack of Western
reaction and recognition of the Burundi crisis was also compelling evidence to Rwan-
dans of the limitations of international intervention.81 The upset in Burundi did not
only remove the secure southern front Dallaire had depended on, but it also agitated
the conﬂicts and tensions in Rwanda just in time for his arrival.
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This was a key moment for Dallaire’s leadership. He recognized immediately that
“everything had changed. Not only would the coup in Burundi shake the fragile political
situation in Rwanda, but the stable southern ﬂank, which I had relied on in my mission
plan, had vanished.”82 As his ﬁrst test, it was important to set a precedent while reshap-
ing his understanding of the atmosphere. It was essential that the mission did not run
out of hand within its ﬁrst days. In response, he reorganized according to the increased
security requirements. Dallaire immediately requested an increased force from the UN.
The DPKO informed Dallaire that the troops were not requested in the initial mission
report, ﬁled before the coup had occurred, and as such would not be added on at that
point.83 Establishing an element of stability in southern Rwanda would require the jug-
gling of his already limited personnel to a region he had not intended to staff heavily.
Dallaire stretched his force of unarmed military observers into the south to maintain
UNAMIR presence throughout the unsettled nation.84 Determined to make higher
powers aware of the heightened tensions, Dallaire continued to report to the UN that
the stretching of UNAMIR’s forces in this new environment would require taking more
risks. It was not ideal, but it was a reality he was willing to work with. In his reports,
Dallaire gave a realistic but positive look at the situation and needs, recognizing his
responsibility to protect the Rwandan peace and his own contingent. It was not until
after the mission that he found out that SRSG J. R. Booh-Booh had watered down his
expressions of concern to a picture of slow and steady progress before allowing them to
reach the UN.85 At the time, Dallaire was painted as a cowboy and Booh-Booh’s reports
were considered more balanced and understanding of the situation.86 In the aftermath,
it would appear that these perceptions were not an accurate representation of events.
The situation in Rwanda at this time was not out of hand. Radicals did not take
advantage of the chaos in Burundi to mount their own political or military action in
Rwanda and Dallaire was able to establish a monitoring force that fulﬁlled UNAMIR’s
needs in the south. While tensions had been raised and racial rhetoric spread, it was not
obvious at that point that widespread genocidal chaos would ensue as a direct result.
Force Dynamics
Dallaire’s second challenge arose with the arrival of the various national groups that
formed the UNAMIR forces. Without the support of large nations such as Great Britain
or the United States, the UNAMIR contingent was composed largely of forces from
smaller nations in Asia and Africa. The only signiﬁcant Western elements were the Bel-
gians. While their skills and experience were essential to the success of Dallaire’s mis-
sion, they had their own complications. They arrived with limited supplies and
equipment, although more than other contingents, and fresh from assignment in the
Somalian conﬂict. When further equipment did arrive, the long distances involved in
their transportation to Rwanda left most machinery and vehicles broken and stripped
of vital components.87 Furthermore, the colonial history of Belgium as an oppressive
power in Rwanda made their contribution to the force controversial at best. Dallaire
was faced with the added complication of dealing with Belgian para-commandos fresh
from active conﬂict in Somalia and used to peace enforcement, not peacekeeping.88
Their attitude and the environment they were accustomed to encouraged aggressive
behavior that did not mesh with UNAMIR’s methods. However, as his only signiﬁcant
Western force, Dallaire needed the Belgians as a controlling and secure inﬂuence in a
complex environment. Dallaire would become aware in the course of the following
months that the Belgian soldiers were speciﬁcally targeted for agitation by radicals trying
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to get Belgium to withdraw from the force in the face of casualties.89 They were a target
for disturbances and worsened the situation by actively creating problems for the mis-
sion. The best example occurred when the Belgian protective detail supporting the transit
of RPF representatives to Kigali abandoned them in the face of attack. Dallaire reported
that the “shame this incident brought on UNAMIR forces was never expunged.”90 The
Belgian contingent was both a blessing and a curse to Dallaire and to UNAMIR.
The majority of UNAMIR’s forces were provided by poorly prepared and under-
supplied “Third World” nations. These soldiers were promoted as “highly motivated, if
less well trained.”91 In reality, many arrived with broken or outdated equipment, little
to no supplies, and without the training or desire to meet UNAMIR’s challenges.92 For
Dallaire, the Bangladeshi contingent was the epitome of this conundrum. Contributing
nations were required to supply their troops with sixty days of supplies. The Banglade-
shis came without many of the most basic requirements for food and shelter. This was
particularly striking when considering that the Bangladeshi contingent made up the
majority of logistical support units for the mission, including the engineering and medi-
cal services. Dallaire’s deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho of Ghana had
warned him against depending on a developing country to serve as a central element of
UNAMIR’s logistics, but Dallaire countered that Bangladesh was also the only nation
that had offered.93 When he tried to train them as a quick-response force, they proved
unequal to the task, more likely to escalate than improve a high-risk scenario.94 In peri-
ods of tension, Dallaire would discover that they and other contingents would operate
according to orders issued by their country, not by UNAMIR.95 The Bangladeshis and
other, similar force contingents created a constant juggling act for Dallaire to monitor,
supply, and control in the sparse time available outside the maintenance of the mis-
sion’s basic requirements.
In response to these challenges of mission leadership, Dallaire was able to assess
both his personnel and his environment in order to juggle the complex force dynamics.
When the Belgians lost RPF conﬁdence after Belgian soldiers abandoned their duties,
Dallaire modiﬁed the placement of his contingents. Instead of the controversial Bel-
gians, the well-trained Tunisian force was positioned at the RPF headquarters in Ki-
gali.96 Dallaire was also able to use general Belgian presence and participation to the
beneﬁt of the mission, calling on Belgian personnel for intelligence information that
UNAMIR itself lacked. Such changes revealed some ﬂexibility in UNAMIR that allowed
Dallaire to react to challenges. His was a responsive force, not one locked in a down-
ward spiral.
Dallaire also revealed himself to be willing to make difﬁcult decisions for the overall
success of the mission. In response to Belgian forces’ fraternization in Rwandan bars and
with Rwandan women, their aggressive attitude toward Rwandan politicians and impor-
tant ﬁgures, and general insubordination, Dallaire went to the Belgian command, threa-
tening that control had to be established or the continuation of a Belgian presence would
become a greater hindrance than help to UNAMIR.97 Several Belgian soldiers were re-
moved to Belgium in the face of their actions.98 It is difﬁcult to believe that Dallaire
would have been willing to even consider the removal of the Belgian contingent force if
he had thought that large-scale violence was about to break loose across Rwanda.
Political Deﬁciencies
With the establishment of the UN mission in Rwanda, attending to the political require-
ments of the Arusha agreement became a primary concern. Dallaire was aware of his
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position as a military man and hoped that UNAMIR requirements beyond his expertise
would be handled by an effective ally. Dallaire wanted this ally, the special representa-
tive to the secretary-general, to be a military ﬁgure who would lead a French-language
mission in Rwanda. In reality, he received a civilian, Cameroonian Jacques-Roger
Booh-Booh, and a mission with English as the operational language in a primarily
French-speaking region of Africa.99 Booh-Booh was supposed to be the “glue” that
kept the Arusha Accords together, but for Dallaire he was often more divisive than
effective.100 Though the SRSG was a conﬁdant to then UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, he also refused to use his inﬂuence to aid the mission.101 Seemingly
favorably biased toward the former Rwandan government and often damaging to the
vital image of UN neutrality with his numerous personal visits with President Habyari-
mana, Booh-Booh’s ﬁt with the Rwandan mission was awkward at best.102
Politically, Dallaire found Booh-Booh’s diplomatic efforts limited and ﬁlled with
ultimata and threats toward both sides of the civil conﬂict. His communications with
the UN were full of watered-down appraisals and assurances that contributed to a regu-
lar pattern of denial to Dallaire’s requests, even when tensions escalated.103 According
to Dallaire, at one fragile point in February 1994 during political discussions between
the parties to form the new government, Booh-Booh “suddenly pounded the table . . .
and got up, knocking his chair over in his haste. This meeting was going nowhere, he
announced emphatically, and he was not going to waste any more of his time. In fact,
he refused to chair any more such meetings.”104 Deputy Commander Anyidoho stated
a belief that Booh-Booh’s missteps, including his visits with Habyarimana, were done in
innocence of their harm.105 As the senior political ﬁgure for the mission and the sup-
posed diplomatic head of UNAMIR on the ground, it would seem that Booh-Booh
should have had the foresight to understand the implications of his actions in a delicate
political situation. An interview allowed Dallaire to reﬂect on Booh-Booh’s position as
the ﬁgurehead and political leader of UNAMIR:
Booh-Booh was given the task of leading the process, but he was never able
to bring forth innovative ideas. Indeed he seemed, at times, to not be particularly
helpful in bringing along possible solutions. . . . Looking back, it would have
been interesting to have had a political advisor—rather than a political boss—a
solid, experienced diplomat-politician . . . with whom we could have built a
team.106
Booh-Booh would later attempt to contradict this image of himself by arguing that
an arrogant Dallaire struggled under the authority of an African.107 There were no such
similar claims from Dallaire’s other African counterparts.
Dallaire’s response to Booh-Booh’s limitations would reveal both his adaptability
and his continuing belief in the viability of maintaining the Arusha process. He couldn’t
overpower Booh-Booh’s inﬂuence at the UN to argue for the primacy of his mission’s
needs. Instead, Dallaire attempted to ﬁll the diplomatic gap to the best of his own abil-
ity.108 He held and participated in political meetings in an attempt to break deadlocks
on cabinet assignments to the broad-based transitional government (BBTG) proposed
by the Arusha Accords109:
I attended all the political meetings (as the number two of the mission) as the Force
Commander, so not only was I sitting at the table with the SRSG and attempting to
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whisper comments, etc., but I also often found myself being the translator between
the English-speaking RPF and the French-speaking government representatives.
Consequently, a number of people—extremists, Tutsi and Hutu moderates, and so
on—would conduct overt and covert meetings with me.110
Dallaire’s dedication evidences his belief that Arusha was not a lost cause in the
early months of 1994. His attempts at politics contributed to the continual efforts to
resolve those issues involved in installing the BBTG. In his own book on UNAMIR,
Deputy Commander Anyidoho recognized the difﬁculties involved for military leaders
unable to avoid political machinations during a civil conﬂict and the way in which
peacekeepers, including Dallaire, had to be ready to “face all these frustrations to the
point of being humiliated.”111 He would go on to recommend that in recognition of this
emerging challenge, diplomacy become part of the training given to potential peace-
keeping soldiers and military leaders.112 Under the auspices of UNAMIR, attempts were
made to further the government’s formation on January 1, January 5, February 14, Feb-
ruary 23, March 25, March 28, and in early April 1994.113 While it was a frustrating sit-
uation for Dallaire, who admitted he was no expert in political machinations, an overt
consensus on Rwanda’s descent toward destruction did not dominate UNAMIR.
“Jean-Pierre” and Kigali Weapons Caches
A galvanizing possibility for UNAMIR arose in mid-January when Dallaire was pre-
sented with the testimony of an RGF informant code-named “Jean-Pierre.” He claimed
to be a military trainer who was preparing elements of a national militia, the Intera-
hamwe, for acts of mass violence.114 He gave speciﬁc information on the location
of arms caches in Kigali that were intended for distribution. Dallaire saw this informa-
tion—which was veriﬁed by a member of the contingent who was shown the cache by
Jean-Pierre—as a golden opportunity.115 He directly informed the DPKO of his plan to
conduct a raid on the cache, bypassing the SRSG. Believing that the cache was in direct
violation of the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA), a key element to Arusha and
UNAMIR, Dallaire considered this action to be well within his mandate. The message
to the DPKO was intended as a notice of action, not a request for approval.116 In likely
the fastest response from New York during the mission, a direct notice from DPKO
heads Koﬁ Annan and Iqbal Riza forbade the raid.117 Dallaire was not only told
that this would be in violation of his mandate, but he was instructed that for the pur-
poses of transparency, he had to inform President Habyarimana and his advisors of the
information.118
The action Dallaire was forbidden to take could have been a key stabilizing element
in the Rwandan conﬂict. In a post-conﬂict analysis published by the Pearson Peacekeep-
ing Centre and including input from an OAU report, it was argued that the “power of
presence,” the psychological impact of a force beyond their physical strength, should
not be underestimated in situations like Rwanda.119 The report of UNAMIR knowledge
of the caches turned out to be a shock to the president and his associates.120 The seizure
of the weapons could have had a considerable impact, projecting a more powerful
image of UNAMIR and international control in Rwanda. Instead, the surprise exhibited
by the RGF quickly receded and the distribution of arms from the cache was accelerated
as a result. Dallaire was frustrated by the prohibition on conducting arms raids, which
he believed satisﬁed the original mandate’s requirements for the establishment of
KWSA and contributions to the security of Kigali. Public knowledge of other caches
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and expectations that UNAMIR would address them aggravated this further.121 It had
been an ideal opportunity to gain a grip on the security situation in Kigali. Dallaire
would later learn that his warnings had failed to reach the highest levels of the UN,
including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a move that would come to be con-
sidered by some an “incomprehensible” disgrace to the UN structure.122 Others consid-
ered it a failure by Dallaire for not sending the message directly to the highest levels,
even though he was already breaking protocol in bypassing Booh-Booh and sending it
directly to the DPKO.123 In retrospect, Dallaire’s intentions looked to head off problems
that might arise in the future. Yet the disavowal of pre-emptive action was still not a
death sentence to the peace process.
In the period that followed Jean-Pierre’s revelation, Rwanda did not appear to be
facing a downward spiral into mass violence. Violence in February was followed by a
period of calm in March that precipitated the continuation of political discussions.124
Dallaire was aware of the threats radical groups posed, yet “despite increased tensions
and insecurity engendered by the political impasses, the cease-ﬁre was generally hold-
ing. UNAMIR forces . . . continued to play a stabilizing role.”125 Even some Rwandan
politicians were cautiously optimistic. In March 1994, Moderate Faustin Twagiramungu
expressed a belief that the only thing that could possibly stop the Arusha agreements
was a decision by President Habyarimana.126 The comment would become surprisingly
prescient. The day before the crash, UN Resolution 909 of 5 April 1994 “[welcomed]
the fact that, despite the difﬁculties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace
Agreement, the cease-ﬁre has been respected and commends in this respect the essential
contribution made by UNAMIR.”127 The UN did not yet see that their forces were
stuck in a futile situation and in need of withdrawal. Even though the opportunity pro-
vided by Jean-Pierre’s information was missed, it did not appear that the extreme vio-
lence of the coming days and weeks was a foregone conclusion at this time.
Conclusion
Three dynamics are vital to making any judgment about Dallaire’s performance in
Rwanda; the ﬁrst is his personal and professional suitability to the mission; the second,
the evolving structure of UNAMIR; and the third, his response to key crossroads during
the development of the mission. However, these three dynamics must be considered
within speciﬁc parameters. The plane crash that killed President Juvénal Habyarimana
and precipitated the eruption of violence and genocide is the cut-off point of this inves-
tigation. After this point, it can be seen through an examination of the changes in cir-
cumstance, power, and politics in Rwanda, and the guidelines of the UNAMIR
mandate, that Dallaire had neither the ability nor the authority to respond to the wide-
spread chaos. This is not to limit the importance or gravity of the genocide that would
follow, but to produce an examination of the UNAMIR mission and speciﬁcally Dal-
laire’s leadership that is not biased by the moral responses formed in the aftermath of
the genocide. The literal decimation of Rwanda at its own hands was watched by a
world which cried out at the failure of international forces to stop the ﬂow of blood, the
same world that neglected the efforts to stabilize it, only to then cast it as a catastrophic
failure. Upon examination, there is much more to the legacy of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda than the 100 days of genocide in 1994. As a military
leader, Roméo Dallaire had six months of operation during which he maintained an
uneasy peace with a limited pool of resources to draw from. As other peacekeeping ana-
lysts have argued, it may be better to look at the methods and means of Dallaire’s
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leadership that worked and why, rather than the destructive conclusion the country ulti-
mately came to.
Dallaire’s suitability to the Rwandan situation provides the basis for examining his
effectiveness. A leader, no matter how dedicated or capable, can be hindered by the
nature of his approach or lack of environment-speciﬁc skills, such as language or cul-
tural knowledge. For Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire would prove himself to be an effective ﬁt
for an unusual situation. His background, not only as a military ofﬁcer, but as a French-
Canadian integrated into a largely anglicized environment of the Canadian Forces made
him familiar with concepts of minority populations, bilingualism, and cultural preju-
dices so predominant in Rwanda. Although he was inexperienced with UN missions
and his suitability for the position as an artillery ofﬁcer was questioned, Dallaire gath-
ered others with experience into his team for support and used the transferable skills
from his artillery position to adapt to the rigors of Rwanda. In addition, the value of
experience in UN peacekeeping missions in the past, which Dallaire did lack, was com-
plicated by the rapidly changing character of peacekeeping in the immediate post-Cold
War period. The scenarios UN veterans had faced were often vastly different from the
situations they began to ﬁnd themselves in. His nationality was also a particularly good
ﬁt for a mission in Rwanda, as the country’s relations with Canada lacked the specters
of colonialism that European nations represented, and charitable and educational works
had developed a positive impression of Canada since decolonization. Dallaire, as a
French Canadian, arrived to ﬁnd that many leading ﬁgures were directly tied to his own
nation, province, and culture in a way few others could have appreciated. These
strengths would be vital to Dallaire in an environment with few other suitable candi-
dates and little support from the UN’s political elements in Rwanda and New York.
The structure of the mission reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the sys-
tem upon which Dallaire depended. The inﬂexibility and ambiguity of the mandate in
response to a rapidly changing situation on the ground limited the requests Dallaire
could make and the actions that he could take. The complications of the UN’s interde-
partmental rivalries and disconnects further hampered Dallaire by depriving him of
information on Rwanda, including arms movements and human rights violations, that
would have been vital elements of the mission’s primary evaluations. Requests for addi-
tional forces, supplies, and support were denied, communications unanswered, and Dal-
laire was left to assume that in his approach to the situation and interpretations of his
options, no news could only be good news. This situation reveals a great deal about Dal-
laire’s determination and the dedication of many members of the UNAMIR mission to
keep it operational, while at the same time revealing the betrayal by UN ofﬁcials who
were meant to be supporting them.
Ultimately, the means to judge Dallaire’s leadership and success in Rwanda in the
period prior to the crash is the examination of his decisions at key crossroads. These re-
sponses reveal whether the mission of maintaining ceaseﬁre and facilitating political
development was still viable. The ﬁrst challenge arose with the coup in Burundi, which
negated the calm southern front Dallaire had depended on in his mission plan. Despite
the contagion of unrest present in the ﬁrst days of the mission, Dallaire was able to real-
locate his forces and begin the planned initiation of UNAMIR on the ground. In estab-
lishing the mission, he would be challenged by complications caused by force dynamics
and personnel deﬁciencies. The complications of poorly provisioned or ill-suited troops
marred the military element and required regular adjustments and reassignments to
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maintain the security and ceaseﬁre of Kigali and Rwanda. The reticence of the political
head of the mission, SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, forced Dallaire to act as a politi-
cal liaison at many turns, a role beyond his military position and training, but vital to
the overall mission. Dallaire’s greatest test would come with the informant Jean-Pierre.
While potential raids on weapons caches within the KWSA were forbidden by the UN
DPKO hierarchy and may have ultimately been numerically insigniﬁcant, the action
that Dallaire aimed to respond with emphasizes a very different perspective. The
planned raid could have depicted Dallaire as a potential man of action in Rwanda and
made a huge contribution to UNAMIR’s image and control in the region. In a position
hindered by the realities of UN supply issues and mission restrictions, this image was
one of Dallaire’s strongest tools. The decision of the DPKO to forbid the raid struck a
blow to UNAMIR’s perceived effectiveness but did not make it a wholly lost cause.
The UNAMIR mission and the Rwandan genocide are inextricably tied together in
memory as part of an incomprehensible tragedy. In the face of this, the simplest way to
deal with the aftermath was to ﬁnd a scapegoat who could be blamed this “failure of
humanity.” A closer analysis of the situation and the environment, both in Rwanda and
across the international stage, reveals a different story. Investigating the mandate and
mindset of the mission, it can be seen that the outbreak of civil war negated the role of
the forces that were there as peacekeepers, not peace enforcers. UNAMIR and the geno-
cide were unavoidably separated by the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, and as
such, Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UN mission can best be judged in the period
from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the crash at the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994.
Not only for Dallaire, but for the study of peacekeeping, it is of greater use to under-
stand these months of stability, rather than the ultimate conﬂagration. It is during those
months, when tensions and strains could have lead to a renewal of violence at any time,
that Dallaire’s effectiveness as a peacekeeper can be seen. His actions revealed a suitabil-
ity, resourcefulness, and resilience that pushed the nation toward the process of peace,
or at least barred the way to widespread chaos. When the president’s plane went down,
it took many things with it. A storm of unstoppable events swelled within the nation as
the mission’s mandate was destroyed. Neither Dallaire, nor the slow-moving UN, nor
the unwilling, powerful nations of the world could stop what had begun. The genocide
was a current that swept up everyone within the nation, and destroyed any evidence of
progress in Rwanda, leaving Dallaire vulnerable in the public eye. That narrative ulti-
mately fails to tell the whole story of the UNAMIR mission. Rwanda may have been a
failure of humanity, but it was not Dallaire’s failure alone.
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The failure of the international community to act on the legal and moral imperative to stop, punish,
and prevent genocide and other mass killings has led to the establishment of genocidal regimes that
institutionalize genocide as a tactic of repression and power consolidation. One such repeat offender
regime was the New Order government of Indonesia, which committed mass killings of known and
alleged communists throughout Indonesia in 1965–1966 and later carried out a genocidal, colonial
occupation of East Timor. I demonstrate parallels between the actors, tactics, and discourse of the
communist killings and the Timorese Genocide. The failures of domestic resistance and interna-
tional pressure to punish the New Order after 1966 allowed génocidaires to retain power and rein-
forced their belief in the acceptability and effectiveness of genocidal tactics. The Indonesian case
illustrates the necessity of punishment for genocide to preclude a culture of impunity that en-
courages both previous and new offenders.
Key words: genocide, Indonesia, East Timor, New Order, communists, impunity
Genocide and Repeat Offenders
After World War II, as the full extent of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during
the Holocaust came to light, there was a sweeping sentiment of “Never again.” Never
again could a state be allowed to attempt such human destruction. The Nuremberg
trials brought convictions for crimes against humanity, the United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) was adopted in
1948, and memorials were built around the world. Yet, in a sense, the Holocaust itself
was an example of “again.” Not only did it come in the wake of the Armenian Geno-
cide,1 but Germans themselves had already committed genocide in the twentieth cen-
tury through their slaughter of the Herero and Nama peoples of German South-West
Africa.2 Scholars have identiﬁed many parallels in examining these cases, with the Ger-
man experience in South-West Africa having acted as a testing ground for ideas and
methods later “perfected” by the Nazis.3
While Isabel Hull has found a common military culture in Germany oriented
toward seeking “ﬁnal solutions,”4 the genocide in Africa was committed by the regime
of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Holocaust by the Nazis, with the Weimar government se-
parating the two. Later in the century, one regime was allowed to commit not one but
two mass killings, each of which can be argued to be cases of genocide. Within the span
of a decade, the New Order regime of Suharto in Indonesia organized both the killing
of hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged leftists within Indonesia from
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1965 to 1966—hereafter referred to as “the Killings”—and then, in 1975, invaded East
Timor, which was subjected to a brutal, 24-year occupation. To my knowledge, there has
yet to be a detailed, direct comparison of these two cases.5 Following the example of the
German cases, this article examines the characteristics and methods of the Killings and
the occupation campaigns in East Timor to ﬁnd similarities and to determine what role
the Indonesian experience in the Killings played in shaping later actions in East Timor.
Based on this case comparison, I also explore the implications of impunity for the orga-
nizers of the atrocities, and how this impunity has led to a normalization of genocidal
policies in Indonesia, which may be seen today in the ongoing conﬂict in West Papua.
I ﬁrst turn to the story of the Killings, how they were committed, and who was
responsible. This discussion is followed by the history of the invasion and subsequent
occupation of East Timor, in which I make note of the violent practices and discourse
that carried over from the 1965–1966 Killings, highlighting the similarities in anti-
Communist sentiment, military tactics, targeting of women and ethnic Chinese, biologi-
cal rhetoric of infection and extermination, and post-violence impunity. I then assess
whether or not these cases were or should be considered genocide, and what implica-
tions they hold for the prevention and further study of the crime.
The Indonesian Killings
Indonesia’s New Order regime came to power in 1965 in the wake of a complicated and
much-debated event. Since independence from the Dutch in 1948, Indonesia was led by
Sukarno,6 whose charismatic leadership enabled him to balance the power of the coun-
try’s political parties and the highly inﬂuential military. The key tenet of Sukarno’s
political program, called Guided Democracy, was Nasakom, which stood for “national-
ism, religion, communism.”7 While this principle served as part of Sukarno’s shrewd
political balancing act, he did in fact attempt to move the country to the left, for
instance by withdrawing from the United Nations and building closer ties with Com-
munist states in Asia. It is undeniable that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was
a great beneﬁciary of Sukarno’s policies: the PKI had been excluded from government
until 1957, but, with Sukarno’s emphasis on Nasakom, began to hold bureaucratic and
political ofﬁces and also gained inﬂuence in the military, especially in the air force, with
which it shared a dislike of the army.8 The PKI used its newfound inﬂuence to promote
policies such as land redistribution and the arming of workers and peasants to form a
“ﬁfth force” that would counter the power of the army, navy, air force, and police. The
issue of land redistribution was particularly contentious, with the PKI and its afﬁliates
sometimes using “direct action” land occupations to dispossess landowners, and both
party activists and landowners resorted to violence in the competition for land.9 The
land reforms came in the early 1960s, at a time of economic crisis that was exacerbated
by Sukarno’s misguided policies and had “left Indonesia as one of the poorest countries
in the world, its name conjuring up much the same connotations of chaos and misery
that the names of the Congo and Sierra Leone conjure up today.”10 The great economic
decline and increasing tensions between political parties led to an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty, strained even further by Sukarno’s increasing health problems and six attempts
on his life.11
The tensions ﬁnally boiled over on 1 October 1965. While there is much uncertainty
regarding the facts,12 what is certain is that on the night of September 30, a group of
middle-ranking ofﬁcers—who became known as the 30 September Movement (G-30-S)
and were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung13—kidnapped and murdered six generals of
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the military high command and one lieutenant and also fatally wounded the six-year-
old daughter of General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defense. The G-30-S
announced that they had undertaken this action to counter a plan by right-wing mili-
tary leaders to seize power from Sukarno and that they were forming a Revolutionary
Council to help govern the country.14 Major-General Suharto, commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), quickly mobilized troops to crush the rebel ofﬁcers. By
evening on October 1, Suharto, collaborating with other army ofﬁcers, was in control of
Jakarta.
The true role of the PKI in events surrounding G-30-S might never be known, but
most scholars agree that while the PKI might have been peripherally tied to the plotters
and some elements of the party expressed support for the group, the party was not
responsible for G-30-S.15 Public perception, however, was that the PKI was behind G-
30-S, and Suharto and his clique moved quickly to promote and exploit this viewpoint.
As Robert Cribb writes, Suharto “took steps to consolidate the already widespread pub-
lic presumption that the PKI had masterminded the coup (and was probably planning
further actions) and encouraged rumors that the communists had been planning to tor-
ture and murder their enemies.”16 Suharto and Nasution had been pushing the mur-
dered generals to take more action to check the PKI’s growing inﬂuence and preserve
military autonomy,17 and, now in power, they seized the opportunity to fulﬁll this
desire. Public sentiment was inﬂamed by the exhumation of the bodies of the murdered
generals and a public funeral for Nasution’s daughter.
Rumors were spread through the press that the generals had been tortured and muti-
lated, with their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by members of Gerwani, a wo-
men’s association afﬁliated with the PKI. The Gerwani members allegedly followed this
orgy of violence by participating in a literal orgy.18 These claims were proven false by the
ofﬁcial autopsies conducted on October 4 and 5 after the bodies were exhumed,19 and Su-
karno attempted to speak out against journalists writing “untrue things,”20 but Suharto
and the military had already seized the momentum. The autopsy results were never pub-
licly released, and so anger and fear were cultivated and directed toward the PKI. Marshall
Green, the US ambassador to Indonesia at the time, aided these efforts, recommending
“increased covert efforts ‘to spread the story of the PKI's guilt, treachery, and brutality,’
although he was unsure of the evidence of the PKI's role,”21 while the British and Malay-
sians also worked to inﬂame anti-Communist sentiment.22 Many Indonesians were also
reminded of the Madiun affair of 1948, when a small Communist group rebelled against
the larger Indonesian army during the ﬁght for independence from the Dutch.23
Through the media and ofﬁcial statements, the PKI were not only blamed, but sys-
tematically dehumanized. G-30-S was dubbed Gestapu by Brigadier General Sugandhi,
amalgamating the Indonesian name Gerakan September Tigapuluh with the connota-
tions of the German Gestapo clearly in mind.24 Especially in light of the false stories
about Gerwani actions in the killing of the generals, PKI members and supporters were
painted as “bloodthirsty and sexually sadistic monsters”25 and “scurvy mongrels [who]
put their slimy claws on the innocent souls of our children.”26 One paper printed a car-
toon showing the PKI and associated organizations as lizards lapping up the blood of
the murdered generals.27 The success of this propaganda is exempliﬁed by one killer’s
remark, “I did not kill people. I killed wild animals.”28
Also of central importance was the view of Communists as atheists, both immoral
and exercising a corrupting inﬂuence on Indonesian society. In the wake of the coup,
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the military newspaper Angkatan Bersendjata characterized the campaign against the
PKI as a holy war, writing that “the sword cannot be met by the Koran . . . but must be
met by the sword.”29 The equation of Communism with atheism also served to further
dehumanize PKI supporters, since “‘belief in the one God’ is the ﬁrst of the ﬁve princi-
ples which comprise the Pancasila, the national ideology contained in the Preamble to
the Constitution. Thus for its enemies the PKI was automatically disqualiﬁed from
inclusion in Indonesia.”30
Seeking to organize the anger they had built up and lacking the troop strength or
intelligence necessary to destroy the PKI using military forces alone,31 military leaders
met with younger leaders of anti-Communist parties and religious organizations, and
banded together to form the militant Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP-
Gestapu), which began holding protest rallies. Having whipped the non-Communist popu-
lation into a furor, military leaders decided to begin releasing the anger. At the funeral
of Nasution’s daughter, “as if by pre-arrangement, a high naval ofﬁcer gave Moslem stu-
dent leaders a one-word signal, sikat, which means ‘sweep.’”32 The next day, on Octo-
ber 8, after a KAP-Gestapu rally ﬁlled with anti-PKI speeches, a group of members of
Muslim student organizations marched to the PKI headquarters, which they attacked
and burned. Harold Crouch argues that while the mob had not sought permission for
this action from military or KAP-Gestapu leaders, “it is likely that they had been
assured by junior army ofﬁcers that the senior generals would not be displeased if the
PKI building were ‘spontaneously’ attacked by the ‘people.’”33 Brian May, however,
found that the PKI building was destroyed “while soldiers blocked the approaching
streets and ﬁremen looked on.”34 Rumors were spread that the PKI had been compiling
death lists and planning a purge of non-Communists, creating fears that it was a situa-
tion of “kill or be killed.”35
In the days after the funeral and attacks on PKI headquarters in Jakarta, the ﬁrst
massacres of PKI supporters began in heavily Muslim Aceh, with troops from the
regional military command and Muslim youth groups hunting people down and killing
them. According to some accounts, the families and household servants of PKI cadres
were also among the “several thousand” killed, and Brigadier General Ishak Djurasa,
the commander in the area, described Aceh as “the ﬁrst region to be cleansed of coun-
terrevolutionary G.30.S elements.”36 By December, Djurasa told the press that “the PKI
is no longer a problem for Aceh because the region has been entirely purged in a physi-
cal sense of PKI elements.”37 In the second half of October, mass killings of alleged PKI
supporters began in Central and East Java,38 with military forces arming, training,
and supporting youth groups, mainly from Muslim and Christian organizations.39 In
Central Java, according to Sarwo Edhie, the ofﬁcer in command of the anti-Communist
operations there, the massacres were initiated by his troops from the Army Paracom-
mando Regiment (RPKAD), which traveled from village to village, massacring alleged
Communists, sometimes killing the entire population of a village (except infants) if it
was suspected of being fully in support of the PKI.40 Edhie’s RPKAD moved out from
Jakarta through Central and East Java and ﬁnally to Bali, organizing massacres along
the way.41 Sensing that his units were too small to attack all the alleged Communist vil-
lages in the province, Edhie began delegating more responsibility to civilian youth,
nationalist, and religious groups: “We gave them two or three days’ training, then sent
them out to kill the Communists.”42 The troops also gave some of their prisoners to
civilian anti-Communist groups, who killed them with knives and sickles.43
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This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: civilians, usually
part of larger organizations,44 carried out the majority of the killings, but they had sup-
port, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many
of the killings. While there were existing tensions between PKI supporters and anti-
Communists across Indonesia, Aceh was an exception: in most regions, as in Central
Java, the massacres did not begin until after the arrival of troops.45 In Bali, it was only
after the replacement of the governor, a radicalization among the local military estab-
lishment, and the arrival of troops from Java in early December that massacre of PKI
supporters began. To polarize the population in Bali, propaganda teams spread the mes-
sage through rural areas that “there are only two possible alternatives; to be on the side
of the G-30-S or to stand behind the government in crushing the G-30-S.”46 Village
authorities in particular were exhorted to promote the purge of the PKI, and some of
them used “institutions of communal responsibility and labor” to carry out the kill-
ings.47 One older Muslim leader considered the killings by Ansor, a leading Muslim
youth group, as “the will of God; at the same time he said that Ansor had ‘fulﬁlled the
command of the army.’”48
It was difﬁcult for PKI members and afﬁliates to resist the tide of violence, as
almost all of them had been completely in the dark about the events of September 30.
Instead, there was bewilderment and a scramble for survival. A communist youth orga-
nization member recalled, “We were confused. The leaders of the organization didn’t
know what to do. There was a curfew, so I didn’t stay at home. I slept in the backyard
along with other friends. We didn’t know anything. After a few nights we went our dif-
ferent ways, trying to save ourselves.”49 Though there is evidence of some villages, espe-
cially in Java, organizing for defense against the anti-Communist onslaught, most of
those targeted offered little resistance in the face of death.50
Killings took place throughout the country, but the worst-affected areas were Aceh,
Bali, Central Java, East Java, and Northern Sumatra. The massacres were committed
with extreme brutality.51 While the military tended to shoot those Communists they
took prisoner, common methods of killing by civilians were beating, throat cutting, and
decapitation. Some particularly enterprising killers in Cirebon in West Java constructed
a guillotine to expedite their work.52 According to one report, victims were given knives
and told to kill themselves; if they refused, they were shot in the back.53 Corpses were
often dumped into rivers and, as described by an eyewitness in Central Java, “the depar-
ture of corpses from the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when
bodies were stacked together on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly ﬂew.”54 There
were so many bodies ﬂowing downstream that barriers were put up to keep them out of
irrigation channels; in Surabaya, corpses “became a danger to public health when eb-
bing tides deposited them on river banks.”55 Where there were no rivers, bodies were
dumped into mass graves, sometimes dug by the victims themselves.
And who were these victims? To be certain, many of those killed were, in fact, PKI
members, or members of closely aligned organizations; others, however, were only mar-
ginally afﬁliated with the PKI and the permissiveness of the situation led to violence
being used to solve more localized disputes as well, which played out along religious,
ethnic, economic, and personal lines.56 Youth organizations in Java traveled from village
to village using lists57 and informants to root out “Communists,” but “teachers and
other village intellectuals were especially common on the lists of victims.”58 In some
massacres, children were killed and it was common to kill the families of alleged PKI
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supporters in order to prevent future retribution.59 Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santi-
karma found in Bali that most of those killed as Communists “went to their deaths de-
nying such afﬁliation” and often “the label ‘communist’ was attached to victims and, by
extension, to their family and friends and even casual acquaintances once they were
dead, as an after-the-fact explanation of their fate.”60 The powerful demonization and
dehumanization of “Communists” allowed the misapplication of that label to be used as
a justiﬁcation for killing people “over land, over inheritance, and over more personal
problems such as long-remembered insults or sexual jealousy.”61 Thus, in a campaign
supposedly based on ideology, thousands were killed for “reasons that had little or noth-
ing to do with ideology.”62 Killings over land were often rooted in the PKI’s land reform
campaigns and the more general conﬂict between landowners and peasants. In one
region of Sumatra, Javanese transmigrants were killed by the local population,63 while
elsewhere, “on the ﬁrst day of the mass killings, one army ofﬁcer in civilian dress cheer-
fully left Kediri city, carrying a machine-gun, to shoot squatters who had refused to get
off his untilled land.”64 Ethnic Chinese were also targeted, in some cases due to their
mother country’s Communism, and in others for localized, economic reasons. Cribb ar-
gues, though, that the murders of and riots against Chinese during the Killings were
not out of proportion with prior and later eruptions of violence against Chinese in
Indonesia,65 and scholarly and media accounts have tended to give highly inﬂated esti-
mates of Chinese deaths.66
Women were singled out for especially brutal treatment. The myth of Gerwani
members mutilating and killing the generals during the G-30-S incident enraged the
population. “Communist” women were thus seen as savage monsters who were guilty
not only of the alleged crimes against the generals, but, in the words of Suharto, whose
“sadistic practices . . . had destroyed the identity of Indonesian women.”67 Some of the
anti-Communist slogans used were “‘Gerwani Tjabol’ (Gerwani Whores), ‘Gantung
Gerwani’ (Hang Gerwani) and ‘Ganjang Gerwani’ (Crush Gerwani).”68 In Bali, thou-
sands of women were rounded up and taken to government ofﬁces to have their genitals
examined for signs of sexual activity, which, it was claimed, could identify them as Ger-
wani members; these searches were frequently accompanied by rape.69 In a gendered
analysis of the Killings, Saskia Wieringa ﬁnds that in Indonesia’s sexually repressed
society, the alleged brazen sexual transgressions of the Gerwani women were both
arousing and infuriating to the young, often religious, men who comprised the majority
of the killers.70 The forms that violence against women took bear out this argument. A
document received by the human rights group Tapol is particularly illuminating: a
female PKI member was ordered to strip and had her “body and honor” burned before
she was hacked to death; a newlywed Gerwani member was raped multiple times by an
Ansor group and then was “slit open from her breasts to her vulva”; a woman nine
months pregnant was killed, then had her stomach cut open and her child butchered71;
another Gerwani leader was impaled through her vagina with a sharpened bamboo
pole.72 These extremes of violence reﬂect the dehumanization caused by the Gerwani
myth and also a reassertion of male power and control over female sexuality, eliminat-
ing those who would challenge it.73
By late December, the fury and pace of the Killings had slowed as the military
sought to consolidate violence under its control and restrain anti-Communist vigilante
groups in order to prevent anarchy.74 Massacres continued regularly into 1966, followed
by a period of what the army called “mopping-up operations,” aimed at hunting down
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the few remaining Communist cells.75 These operations peaked with the massacre of
hundreds of alleged Communist prisoners at Purwodadi in November and December
1968; Indonesian Institute for Human Rights Vice-Chairman Johannes Princen, who
investigated the massacre, concluded that at least 860 prisoners had been beaten to
death.76 Hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged supporters continued to be
imprisoned and in some cases used as slave labor, while being given insufﬁcient food
and denied medicine.77
It is uncertain how many people were actually killed during the massacres of 1965–
1966. Cribb provides a comprehensive list of the varying death toll estimates, which
range from 78,000 (from a late 1965 Indonesian government “fact-ﬁnding” commis-
sion) to 2,000,000.78 More recently, Cribb has come to believe that the correct ﬁgure for
those killed between October 1965 and March 1966 is approximately 500,000, while
Dwyer and Santikarma argue that this is still an underestimation.79 What is certain is
that the PKI, which in 1965 claimed 3 million members and 20 million people in af-
ﬁliated organizations,80 was destroyed as a political force. The New Order government,
however, still invoked the threat of Communism and continued to demonize all those
associated with it. A “clean environment” policy was instituted, whereby the descen-
dants of those who had been killed or imprisoned were considered “children of the
PKI . . . ‘infected’ by ‘political uncleanliness,’ ” and were discriminated against in
employment, education, and social services.81 These policies held even for children
born after 30 September 1965.82 There is also a sense that even after the physical elimi-
nation of the PKI, its pernicious spirit remains. As James Siegel writes,
Since the 1980s at least, Indonesian political leaders have spoken of organizations
without form when implying presumed communist resurgence. The state has gone
to great lengths to keep track not only of those communists released from years in
prison, but also of their descendants. This seems to indicate fear of something they
cannot locate, even when they know precisely who is a communist and who is the
son or daughter of one.83
In the aftermath of the Killings, with the elimination of the Communists from the
political scene, the military—most speciﬁcally, the army—was free to consolidate its
control over the government, deposing Sukarno in 1967 and ofﬁcially transferring presi-
dential power to Suharto. The army thoroughly penetrated all levels of government
across Indonesia, allowing it to quickly snuff out any political challengers and to exer-
cise complete control over policy.84 Thus, many of the same ofﬁcers who presided over
the Killings were still in positions of power in 1974, at the beginning of Indonesia’s next
episode of mass killing.
East Timor
Less than a decade after taking power and presiding over the purge of Communists, the
New Order regime decided to embark on a mission of territorial expansion. Indonesia
had taken control of the Dutch half of the island of Timor at independence, but the
other side, East Timor, remained under Portuguese colonial rule. With the collapse of
Portugal’s dictatorship in April 1974, the future of East Timor was thrown into ques-
tion. There were three different visions for the future, each with its supporters in East
Timor: independence, autonomous association with Portugal, or integration with Indo-
nesia. There were also three major political parties in East Timor at this time: the
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Timorese Democratic Union (UDT); the Timorese Social Democratic Association
(ASDT), which in September became the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (Fretilin)85; and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). The
UDT and ASDT/Fretilin supported independence, while Apodeti favored integration
with Indonesia.
Indonesia’s foreign minister, Adam Malik, gave assurances of Indonesian non-
interference in East Timorese internal politics, but the military ofﬁcers who were truly in
charge of the government had different ideas. They thought an independent East Timor
would destabilize their country by sparking desires for independence among discon-
tented ethnic groups on nearby Indonesian islands such as Ambon.86 The military
group, operating under and with the support of Suharto, included Major-General Ali
Murtopo, Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama, and Major-General Benny Murdani,87 all of
whom had served during the Killings. In order to facilitate the integration of East Timor,
the group began using special forces troops, propaganda, and small numbers of internal
supporters to destabilize East Timor in what was called Operation Komodo. The military
group also exploited fears of Communism to push for the annexation of East Timor,
with Sugama painting the UDT as socialist and Fretilin as Communist,88 and the group
going so far as to allege that ethnic Chinese Communists who had ﬂed the Killings had
relocated to East Timor to use the territory as a launching pad for further destabilization
of Indonesia.89 The Indonesians were able to inﬁltrate the UDT and used false claims
about Fretilin to press the UDT into staging a coup in an attempt to seize control, which
led to a short civil war in which Fretilin quickly defeated the UDT. The radio station
Indonesia had set up to broadcast propaganda into East Timor falsely reported heavy
ﬁghting and atrocities committed by Fretilin, prompting many East Timorese living near
the border to ﬂee into Indonesian West Timor. Here they became pawns, used by Indo-
nesia as evidence of the instability of East Timor, the threat it posed to Indonesia itself,
and thus the need for intervention.90 The plans for the destabilization and invasion were
drawn up by Generals Murtopo and Murdani, members of the larger Javanese military
clique that had risen to power with Suharto from 1965 onwards.91
The small remaining Portuguese military force and administration took refuge on
the island of Atauro during the civil war, and when they did not return, Fretilin took full
control of the government. Disappointed by the UDT’s loss and the failure of Apodeti to
gain traction, Indonesia decided to begin more active and direct military actions, attack-
ing East Timorese towns. Fretilin had been biding its time on declaring independence,
but after an intense Indonesian attack on the town of Atabae, the group’s leadership
decided that a full-scale Indonesian invasion was imminent and that the only possibility
for staving it off would be to declare independence and so gain the protection of the
United Nations. However, the United States and Australia—the two countries most in-
vested in the situation (for geostrategic and economic reasons, respectively)—had come
down in favor of an Indonesian annexation: the US to oppose the left-wing leanings of
Fretilin and protect deep-water passages in the Timor Sea for its nuclear submarines and
Australia in large part to protect oil exploration agreements and other economic ties.92
As one Australian ofﬁcial put it, “The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese;
what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians.”93
So outside help was not forthcoming for the East Timorese.
The full-scale Indonesian invasion began on 7 December 1975, spearheaded by
an assault on Dili from air, land, and sea. Fretilin prepared defenses in the city and
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provided stronger resistance than expected, but the Indonesians almost immediately
turned their full force against the civilian population. Indiscriminate massacres took
place all over the city, with a large number of executions at the waterfront that included
women and children. Indonesian forces had been told prior to the invasion that they
were “ﬁghting Communists in the cause of Jihad (Holy War), just as they had done in
Indonesia in 1965” and the Timorese were presented as “backward, primitive, almost
sub-human.”94 There were many stories, John Taylor writes, “of entire families being
shot for displaying Fretilin ﬂags on their houses, of groups being shot for refusing to
hand over their personal possessions, of grenades being rolled into packed houses, and
of Fretilin sympathizers being singled out for immediate execution.”95 There was no
method to the madness; on one occasion, for example, Indonesian soldiers asked a
group of 30 integration supporters what political party they belonged to, and then
machine gunned them even after they answered “Apodeti.”96 Even those East Timorese
who ﬂed into West Timor as refugees were targeted there, with their houses burned and
perhaps thousands killed.97
At a greater level than during the Killings, ethnic Chinese were targeted in Dili and
elsewhere. During the initial attack on Dili, many of those executed were Chinese; after
the assault on the city, a Catholic priest reported that 2,000 people had been killed in
the ﬁrst few days after the landing and 700 of them were Chinese.98 Meanwhile, in the
towns of Maubara and Liquiça, the entire Chinese population was killed.99 This came
despite many Chinese having been among the strongest supporters of Indonesian inter-
vention.100
Fretilin was forced to withdraw to the hills, taking thousands of civilians with
them. Indonesian forces countered with brutal counterinsurgency campaigns from 1977
to 1979, using such indiscriminate weapons as rocket batteries and napalm.101 It was
also alleged that Indonesian troops could be promoted for “acts of savagery against the
Timorese population.”102 The goal of these operations was termed the “encirclement
and annihilation” of Fretilin, and the US State Department called it Indonesia’s “ﬁnal
solution” for East Timor.103 Food supplies in Fretilin-controlled areas were especially
targeted and villages known or suspected of supporting the group were “systematically
wip[ed] out.”104 A priest in Dili described in November 1977 “the barbarities (under-
standable in the Middle Ages, and justiﬁable in the Stone Age), the cruelties, the pilla-
ging, the unqualiﬁed destruction of Timor, the executions without reason” and
expressed his fear that “genocide will come soon, perhaps by next December.”105 Indo-
nesian rhetoric promoted the biological extermination of the Timorese as it had with
the PKI. Following massacres in 1976 in Remexio and Aileu in which all residents
over the age of three were shot, the local people were described as having been “infected
with the seeds of Fretilin.”106
For those who managed to survive the encirclement and annihilation campaign, a
cruel fate awaited: they were rounded up by Indonesian forces and transported to “re-
settlement camps,” where they were not provided with and were prevented from grow-
ing sufﬁcient food to survive, in addition to being used for forced labor. One priest
wrote that “if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people to move around freely
and live where they like, there would be no shortage of food.”107 Indonesian troops
looted crops and livestock and robbed the pantries of houses.108 Aid groups were sys-
tematically denied access to the population and whatever aid that did arrive was stolen
by Indonesian soldiers and sold at inﬂated prices,109 while one report found that there
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was corn rotting away in warehouses in Dili.110 As a result, East Timorese starved and
died of disease by the thousands.
In May 1981, Indonesia launched a new offensive code-named Operation Security,
which the Defense Department also called “the ‘ﬁnal’ or ‘decisive’ war.”111 This opera-
tion was also one of encirclement, but this time the Indonesians tried a new method.
Tens of thousands of men between the ages of 15 and 50—though sometimes as young
as 9 and as old as 60—were ordered to march in front of Indonesian troops as they ap-
proached suspected Fretilin positions so as to force Fretilin soldiers to choose between
shooting their countrymen and surrendering. This method, known as pagar betis, or
“the fence of legs,” had previously been used in Indonesia to round up suspected Com-
munists during the Killings.112 One particular incident of note during this period was
the massacre of over 400 people at Lacluta in September 1981, where the targets were
mostly women and children, and the young were killed by smashing their heads against
rocks.113 Beyond those who were actually killed during pagar betis sweeps, the opera-
tions took men away from their crops, exacerbating the food shortage and starvation.
Pagar betis was also part of a plan to “Timorize” the war, in which some Timorese
came to the Indonesian side in exchange for pay or the opportunity to loot, in addition
to those forced to participate.114
Counterinsurgency operations continued throughout the 1980s, with ﬁghting ﬂuc-
tuating at times, but Indonesian forces remaining brutal. For instance, in August 1983,
the village of Malim Luro was looted by Indonesian troops who then bound over 60
men, women, and children, forced them to lie on the ground, and crushed them with a
bulldozer.115 Indonesians discussed their intent to destroy Fretilin “to the third or
fourth generation,”116 and food sources were still constantly attacked.117 It was also dur-
ing the 1980s that Indonesia began a program of transmigration, bringing Indonesians
from other islands and settling them in “the more fertile regions” of East Timor118;
combined with voluntary migrants, by 1992 there were estimated to be 100,000 Indone-
sians living in East Timor out of a total population of 750,000.119 International attention
was again focused on Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, when an esti-
mated 273 peaceful protestors were killed,120 but international outrage quickly dissi-
pated. Meanwhile, the Indonesians continued attacking and torturing the East
Timorese population and continued their practice of choosing ominous military code
names including 1997’s Operation Annihilation, in which hundreds were rounded up,
tortured, and in some cases killed in response to Fretilin attacks.121 Torture remained
prevalent, with one post-conﬂict survey ﬁnding that approximately half of all East Ti-
morese had suffered some form of physical, sexual, or psychological torture.122
The opportunity to break the decades-long cycle of violence ﬁnally arrived in 1998
with an economic crisis in Indonesia that led to the forced resignation of Suharto. His
successor, B. J. Habibie, made overtures toward peace and eventually decided to allow a
referendum to choose independence or autonomy for East Timor, under the auspices of
the United Nations. Yet his actions were contradicted by the military establishment,
which was sending thousands of new troops into East Timor to sabotage the referen-
dum. Troops worked with pro-Indonesian militias, arming and training them as they
had in 1965, to embark on a campaign of destruction, with an Indonesian lieutenant-
colonel calling for “the killing of pro-independence movement leaders, their children,
and even their grandchildren.”123 Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands
ﬂed their homes in response to the increasing violence. As Geoffrey Robinson argues,
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the militias “provided a perfect cover for ofﬁcial efforts to disrupt, or affect the outcome
of, the vote while simultaneously perpetuating the illusion that the ﬁghting was among
East Timorese,”124 a continuation of the program to Timorize the violence. Yet with an
extraordinary turnout estimated at 90%, the East Timorese people voted for indepen-
dence. This outcome was obviously not the result the Indonesian military or militias
had desired, and it was met with a campaign of total destruction—killing, rape, looting,
and so forth125—during which at least 150,000 people were taken into West Timor
against their will.126 Even after the referendum, the Indonesian military would not let
East Timor out of its control and it was only with the intervention of a UN force in late
September that the Indonesians ﬁnally left and widespread violence ceased.
As in the Killings, women were speciﬁcally targeted throughout the Indonesian
occupation. In the aftermath of the initial attack on Dili in 1975, Indonesian forces de-
manded women to use for their pleasure, and women who were related to Fretilin mem-
bers or were themselves members of associated organizations were singled out, like the
targeting of Gerwani during the Killings; the women were then imprisoned, tortured,
and raped, a pattern which continued in Dili for months.127 Rape became used as a
method of emphasizing Indonesia’s dominance of East Timor and a way to destroy Ti-
morese communities.128 Indonesia also embarked on a program of forced population
control, using surgical sterilization, injections of Depo Provera contraceptive, and even
infanticide.129
Indonesia was seeking to control the already degraded population of East Timor.
While estimates vary, the general consensus is that about 200,000 East Timorese died
from direct killing, starvation, and disease as a result of the Indonesian incursions and
occupation during 1974–1999.130 The UN-mandated Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation in East Timor found a minimum possible conservative death toll
totaling 102,800: 18,600 ±1,000 killings or disappearances and 84,200 ±11,000 deaths
due to hunger and illness beyond expected peacetime levels. It also reported that deaths
due to hunger and illness could have been as high as 183,000, which would be consis-
tent with an overall death toll of approximately 200,000.131 Clearly, as in the Killings,
hundreds of thousands of people died and the Indonesian military bears the ultimate
responsibility. But were these cases of genocide?
The Genocide Debate
Genocide, as deﬁned by the Article 2 of the UNCG, is the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
a. Killing members of the group
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group132
This deﬁnition excludes political and social groups, but many genocide scholars
include these in their deﬁnitions of genocide. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s deﬁni-
tion acknowledges victims that belong to “a group, as that group and membership in it
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are deﬁned by the perpetrator,” while Israel Charny includes as genocide any mass kill-
ing based on a shared characteristic, and Helen Fein argues that genocide is a “sustained
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indir-
ectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group mem-
bers.”133
PKI members and the party’s alleged supporters would not meet the UN’s deﬁni-
tion of victims of genocide since they were part of a political group and were targeted as
such; however they could ﬁt into the above deﬁnitions that allow for social or political
groups. The overall target for extermination was the G-30-S movement, which was de-
ﬁned by the New Order as the PKI or “Communists” in general. The statements and ac-
tions of the military and the New Order government in encouraging and organizing the
Killings show a clear intent to eliminate the PKI, and the equating of Communism with
an infection and something heritable presents it as a problem that can be remedied
through physical means—in this case, extermination. While the Killings cannot legally
be considered genocide, they have been accepted as genocide under the wider deﬁnition
that includes politicide.134 An alternate approach is to view Indonesia at the time of the
Killings through Christian Gerlach’s lens—as an “extremely violent society”135—in
which the military, civil society groups, and individuals joined together to destroy the
PKI for distinct, self-interested reasons, diffusing the intent required by the UNCG.
The case of East Timor is also nuanced. Ben Saul contends that the East Timorese
cannot be considered a national group for the period prior to 1999, since their sover-
eignty had not been recognized.136 I would argue, though, concurring with David Lis-
son, that the support Fretilin enjoyed from the majority of the population and its
declaration of independence in 1975 would constitute an exercise of the right to self-
determination; thus, the East Timorese can be considered a national group.137 Saul fur-
ther argues that much of the killing was done by East Timorese against one another, so
this might be considered a case of “auto-genocide”; however, the Indonesian policy
of Timorizing the conﬂict demonstrates Indonesian intent behind this intranational
violence. Indonesia’s systematic destruction of food sources and its failure to provide
adequate subsistence alternatives would meet Article 2 (c)’s condition of “deliberately
inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion.” It was for this reason that the truth commission accused Indonesia of committing
genocide by starvation.138 The coercive sterilization and birth control programs were
clearly aimed at preventing births within the group. In the words of one Timorese,
after at least 200,000 people have been killed off . . . any talk of over-population
is . . . ludicrous. There’s absolutely no need for family planning, but it’s quite clear
that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to this kind of thing is because
they want to kill off the Timorese and re-populate our country with their own
people.139
The targeting of Chinese in East Timor that reduced their population from about
20,000 at the time of the invasion to only a few thousand within a decade140 also quali-
ﬁes as a genocidal action as they were singled out due to their ethnicity.141 Overall,
human rights violations by the Indonesian military and their auxiliaries in East Timor
“were of a systemic nature, indicating a purpose beyond the destruction of individual
victims.”142 Thus, I ﬁnd that East Timor, too, was a case of genocide143 and one that
could be prosecuted based on the UNCG.144
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Conclusion
There were many parallels between the two mass killings committed by the New Order:
the involvement of the same clique of generals; allegations of Communism; targeting
of Chinese; gender and sexual violence; tactics like pagar betis and the delegation of
violence to non-state actors; and a violent rhetoric of extermination, often couched in
biological and genetic terms.145 Another common factor is that there has been no prose-
cution of the perpetrators in either case. The Indonesian military’s ﬁrm control over the
government ensured prosecution would not take place after the Killings, and of the few
ofﬁcers brought to trial in Indonesia for atrocities committed in East Timor, most have
been acquitted, and the few sentences handed out have been light.146
The cases of the Indonesian Killings and the occupation of East Timor bear out
Fein and Barbara Harff’s ﬁndings that perpetrators of genocide are likely to commit it
again as elites and the military become habituated to it.147 The failure of the interna-
tional community to sanction the New Order regime after the Killings emboldened it
and gave it a sense of free rein in East Timor, bolstered by the material and political
support of powerful Western allies. While the Killings served as an example that was
emulated in East Timor, the impunity with which the New Order acted serves as an
example to the world. Since the invasion of East Timor in 1974, the regimes of both
Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, for example, likely felt secure in committing
multiple ethnic mass killings.148
The Indonesian military’s continued inﬂuence in the government and the country’s
continued policies of internal colonization and suppression of ethnic resistance mean
that similar tactics and outcomes may be seen today in West Papua, where violence,
transmigration, and cultural suppression have led many to conclude that genocide is
ongoing.149 The “secession” of East Timor has been used by the Indonesian military as
a justiﬁcation for harsh measures in West Papua, where Kopassus special forces units—
the successors of Sarwo Edhie’s Killings-era RPKAD and themselves responsible for
many atrocities in Timor—are among the most active and have similar operational co-
denames, such as Clean Sweep and Annihilation.150
There is continuity among Indonesian military and political leaders through the
conﬂicts. Kopassus is currently led by Pramono Edhie Wibowo, son of Sarwo Edhie. In
1999, he led an anti-terrorism sub-unit of Kopassus that was accused of facilitating a
deadly attack on the Catholic diocese ofﬁce in Dili.151 Kopassus forces under Pramono
were subsequently accused of committing human rights violations against Papuans.152
The current president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the son-in-law of
Sarwo Edhie and in fact served three tours of duty in the military during “paciﬁcation”
operations in East Timor.153 Further, General Timbul Silaen, previously police chief in
East Timor in 1999, was appointed to the same post in West Papua in 2003.154 Scholars
who speak Indonesian would likely be able to uncover many more ofﬁcers with involve-
ment in both the Killings and East Timor or East Timor and West Papua.
In the cases of both the Killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor, In-
donesia’s neighbors and allies—in particular the United States, and Australia in the case
of East Timor—had ample opportunity to oppose the violence and bring pressure
to bear on the Indonesian government and military to halt their genocidal actions. Evi-
dence even suggests that US opposition to the invasion of East Timor through a
cutoff of military funding to Indonesia would have resulted in minimal damage to bilat-
eral relations.155 However, realpolitik, self-interest, and disinterest won out among the
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Western powers, allowing the genocidal campaigns to proceed. While it is possible for
individuals and civil society to intervene early in the process of genocide to try to halt
it,156 this private intervention is especially difﬁcult in the authoritarian settings of most
genocidal regimes, where information and opposition are tightly controlled. Thus, inter-
national intervention was needed to stop the Indonesian campaigns, and though it is
those countries with the closest relations with the perpetrator government that have the
most leverage, they also have the strongest disincentives to act.157 In the cases discussed
in this article, these close allies aided and abetted the ongoing genocides. Impunity and
international inaction allowed the Indonesian government and military to view geno-
cide as an acceptable tactic in the pursuit of power consolidation, territorial gain, and
economic expansion.
Without international condemnation and punishment or domestic outcry, geno-
cide becomes part of a repertoire of repression and control for regimes. Patterns of rape
and massacre learned and used during the Killings were embedded in the institutional
repertoire of the Indonesian military and state, then applied to East Timor. If genocide
truly is “our era’s most heinous crime,”158 the international community must act ac-
cordingly to ensure that genocidal regimes are punished for the atrocities they commit
and that any steps toward reoffending are cut short.
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This paper puts forth the hypothesis that the degree of social distance between perpetrator and vic-
tim groups prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of severity of dehu-
manization employed by the perpetrator group during genocide. Derived from psychological theory,
this hypothesis is illustrated by using a primarily literature-based method of analysis combined with
a vignette-designed severity of dehumanization scale. Three genocides are compared: the Rwandan
Genocide, the Holocaust as it occurred in Western Europe, and the Holocaust as it occurred in East-
ern Europe. The ﬁndings for Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe show a negative correla-
tion between the two variables, conﬁrming the hypothesis. The results for Western Europe, however,
present somewhat of an anomaly; variations in the extermination policies of the German perpetra-
tors in Eastern and Western Europe correspond to this difference and can, in this case, provide a
possible explanation for the incongruity.
Key words: psychology, social distance, perpetrators, victims, barbarity, genocide, Rwanda, Holo-
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Introduction
In her seminal work on genocide, Helen Fein deﬁnes the phenomenon as the “sustained
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collective directly or indir-
ectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members,
sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”2 Genocide
and other forms of mass killing have recurred frequently over the past 50 years. Events
in Rwanda and Darfur, for instance, are just two examples of recent genocidal events
that have left the international community in shock.3 Surprisingly perhaps, the perpe-
trators of this barbarity are neither extraordinary nor particularly prone to pathology
and/or insanity. Rather, perpetrators typically reﬂect an ordinary distribution of hu-
manity4: some are wealthy while others are impoverished; some are religious and others
agnostic; some are relatively young and others relatively old. Most of them are not
psychologically impaired nor are they typically the products of abusive childhoods.5 In
short, the majority of perpetrators of genocide are ordinary people.6
This is particularly apparent when examining the Rwandan Genocide, a case where
the killers were, to a large extent, not only ordinary civilians but also often personally
acquainted with their victims. Even so, they displayed an extraordinary inclination
toward brutality. Innocent Rwililiza, a survivor of the Rwandan Genocide, reﬂects that
the cruelty of the slaughter was not executed by “demons or drug-crazed interahamwe”
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(Hutu militias), but rather by “neighbors with whom we used to chat while walking to
the market.”7 During his interview, Rwililiza poses two important questions: “Why did
they chop people up instead of killing them straightaway? . . . If there was killing to be
done, all that had to be done was kill, but why chop arms and legs?”8 As illustrated by
the survivor and perpetrator interviews conducted by Jean Hatzfeld, many otherwise
ordinary Rwandan did not simply kill their victims. Rather, they inﬂicted a maximum
amount of pain and suffering, often wounding and leaving their Tutsi neighbors to die
slow and agonizing deaths.9 Considering that the vast majority of perpetrators were nei-
ther insane nor drugged, how can one explain the unwarranted mutilation, torture, and
suffering they inﬂicted on their victims? According to Rwililiza, it was their personal ac-
quaintanceships with their victims that became the driving force behind the malice. In
his view, mutilation and torture represented the means through which the humanity of
the victims was removed and the task of killing made easier.10
In this paper we seek to develop the hypothesis that social proximity prior to geno-
cides enhances severity of dehumanization during genocide. In other words, the smaller
the social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group the more severe
the dehumanizing behaviors of the perpetrators. To do this we compare the cruelty
of the killing methods employed by Rwandan perpetrators during the Rwandan Geno-
cide and German perpetrators during the Holocaust in Eastern and Western Europe.
To simplify the task of comparison, Germany is used as a model for Western Europe,
while the Baltic states and Poland are used as models for Eastern Europe. Although the
perpetrators of the Holocaust were in no way limited to those of German nationality,
we have to limit our analysis of the behavior of the perpetrators to German nationals
for reasons of conciseness. For the same reason, the victim group is limited to people
who were deemed Jewish according to the Nazi deﬁnition.11 As such, in the case of
Western Europe, the perpetrators are Germans while the victims are German Jews. In
the case of Eastern Europe, the perpetrators are again limited to Germans while the vic-
tims are Polish and Baltic Jews. Finally, in the case of Rwanda, the perpetrator group re-
fers to Hutu perpetrators while the victim group refers to Tutsi victims.
The reasons for which these two cases have been selected are twofold: First, the
Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust represent two of the most widely researched and
examined cases of genocide today. Consequently, in each case there exists a wealth of
information that can be drawn upon for this study. Second, in order to assess the effects
of social distance on dehumanization one requires contexts that are characterized by
different degrees of social distance. The Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust—given
that we distinguish between the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Holocaust in
Western Europe—represent three such cases. The Rwandan Genocide was a “neighbor-
hood genocide”12 where individuals from the victim and perpetrator groups were per-
sonally acquainted with one another. In contrast, the Holocaust in Eastern Europe was
a predominantly bureaucratic and military-driven undertaking targeting a diffuse popu-
lation with whom the German perpetrators were not previously acquainted.13 With
regard to the Holocaust in Germany, acquaintanceship between the German perpetra-
tors and the Jewish victim group did exist, albeit to a lesser extent than in Rwanda.
Theory
At ﬁrst glance, our hypothesis may appear counterintuitive from the perspective that
acquaintanceship overcomes social barriers and bridges social gaps—a viewpoint, for
instance, that underlies Dutch public policy for preventing segregation in public
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primary schools.14 However, psychological theory supports our hypothesis. The argu-
ment put forth in this paper begins with the assessment that for most people, hurting
another human being is unpleasant. Indeed, “most people ﬁnd it deeply upsetting to
inﬂict harm, pain or death on another person.”15 Consequently, no matter the extent of
prejudice and hate one group may feel for another, reservations against killing fellow
human beings are deeply entrenched. If systemic killing involving mass participation is
to transpire, the target group’s status as human beings—as being part of the same moral
universe as the perpetrators—must ﬁrst be removed.16 Through dehumanization, the
target group is rendered sub- or non-human in the eyes of the perpetrator group, clearly
distinguishing “us” from “them.”17 Ultimately, this is a process of facilitation because
killing individuals who have been devalued and excluded from the realm of humanity is
easier than killing those who have not.18 Restraints against persecution and violence are
eliminated and mass killings can then unfold within this context of moral exclusion.19
“Anything that is done to someone who is morally excluded is permissible no matter
how heinous the action.”20 This makes dehumanization a vital cog in the wheel of mass
killing campaigns.
Dehumanization can be viewed from the perpetrator’s perspective as well as a vic-
tim’s, and encompasses both the process whereby others’ humanity is denied and the
cruelty and suffering that embody that process.21 The majority of psychological research
tends to focus on dehumanization as a process in which negative imagery campaigns
and propaganda are employed to reduce the target group’s humanity before genocide.22
An extensive vocabulary is frequently employed to assign demeaning and animalistic—
or non-human—qualities to those comprising the target group.23 Cockroach, vermin,
and parasite are some of the epithets associated with past cases of genocide.24 This type
of systematic labeling represents a primary way of stripping the humanity of the target
group while simultaneously inciting the perpetrator group against them.25
Dehumanization, however, does not only play a role in preparing the ground for
genocide; it also drives genocidal campaigns forward, sustaining killing operations over
lengths of time.26 The very dynamic of mass killing necessitates and intensiﬁes dehu-
manization, for no matter the extent to which one is labeled cockroach or parasite, ex-
terminating people perceived as vermin is simply not the same as exterminating real
vermin.27 As a result, those who participate in genocidal massacres will infuse their acts
with dehumanizing vocabulary in a further and ﬁnal attempt to break the bonds that tie
human beings together.28 Dehumanization is as much a part of the killing operations of
genocidal campaigns as it is their preparation.
The actual killing that occurs during genocide is always imbued with a degree of
dehumanization; however, the degree of severity of dehumanization can vary. It is our
hypothesis that such a variation is somewhat determined by prior social distance. Im-
portantly, it must be acknowledged that degrees of social distance do not translate into
degrees of amicability. For instance, small social distance does not necessarily imply
fondness for the other group. Dislike can also be a function of small social distance; as
Roy Baumeister has so aptly put it, “most people reserve their greatest animosities for
people they know well.”29 Nevertheless, it goes without saying that smaller social dis-
tances often engender liking, which can be borne from similarity, sexual attraction, or
relationships of dependence;30 all of these categories presuppose social proximity. As-
suming that human bonds need more dehumanization to break when social nearness is
characterized by fondness, a more precise phrasing of our hypothesis would state that
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where social relations are more affable prior to genocide, more cruelty during genocide
is likely to ensue. However, given that we are not able to measure how friendly social re-
lations are or were—only how close—we have to limit ourselves to the inverse relation
between social distance and severity of dehumanization. Furthermore, it is important to
stress that our hypothesis is solely concerned with differences in perpetrator behavior
during genocide and is not concerned with either why the genocides in question oc-
curred, or with the events leading up to their commencement.
Methods
Measuring social distance
To measure the social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups in Rwanda,
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, we employed an adaptation of the Bogardus
Social Distance Scale. This scale, named after sociologist Emory S. Bogardus, includes a
sequence of between ﬁve and seven items or statements that convey greater or lesser
intimacy toward members of a particular group.31 The scale is both one-dimensional
and cumulative. Consequently, an individual or group that asserts a certain degree of
intimacy toward another will accept items denoting less intimacy.32 As a result, accept-
ing members from a group on the scale of marriage will automatically signify accep-
tance with regards to the previous scales of friends, work colleagues, and neighbors.
Table 1 illustrates the intimacy items or statements that make up the Bogardus Social
Distance Scale.33
For this study, we have utilized a modiﬁed version of the Bogardus Scale. The
cumulative nature of the original scale enabled us to limit ourselves to the ﬁrst four
items. This made the task at hand decidedly simpler, as data regarding the ﬁrst four ca-
tegories is much easier to come by. Furthermore, the ﬁrst four items on the limited scale
were modiﬁed from their original survey question format into four socio-demographic
categories of social distance: intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration,
and community integration.34 Table 2 presents the limited version of the social distance
scale and the associated socio-demographic conditions.
Using the modiﬁed scale, we analyzed the literature to determine the social distance
between the perpetrator and victim groups in each of the genocides studied.
Measuring Severity of Dehumanization
Measuring severity of dehumanization entails an in-depth analysis of published per-
sonal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators of the three
case studies. There are two justiﬁcations for the selection of this literature: First and
foremost, in order to obtain accurate depictions of the dehumanization behavior
Table 1 – Bogardus Social Distance Scale
1 Would marry
2 Would have as regular friends
3 Would work beside in an ofﬁce
4 Would have several families in my neighborhood
5 Would have merely as speaking acquaintances
6 Would live outside my neighborhood
7 Would live outside my country
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employed, ﬁrst-hand accounts from those who witnessed and even experienced such
events are vital. However, the nature of the topic is particularly sensitive due to its
focuses on episodes of extreme trauma and distress. Analyzing published personal ac-
counts and testimonies have represented an unobtrusive means of accessing eyewitness
accounts. Simply put, published personal accounts and testimonies have allowed us to
capture incidents of dehumanization without having to put those who witnessed these
traumatic events through renewed pain or distress during interviews. Furthermore, as-
sessing testimonies from perpetrators, victims, and bystanders has allowed us to gather
a variety of depictions stemming from all vantage points; this in itself has limited bias.
Second, the wealth of published personal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystan-
ders, and perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust render the conduct-
ing of fresh, ﬁrst-hand interviews unnecessary.
Consequently, in order to determine the degree of dehumanization, we have care-
fully examined the literature from which we compiled a list of all the dehumanizing be-
haviors represented in each case study. Any perpetrator behavior that encompassed
some degree of humiliation, dehumanization, or the inﬂicting of some level of pain—
physical and/or psychological—during the killing operations of genocide was consid-
ered to be dehumanizing behavior. Within each of the three lists, the behaviors were
subsequently grouped according to ﬁve behavior categories: dehumanizing living condi-
tions; psychological dehumanization; physical dehumanization without physical pain;
and physical dehumanization with physical pain. The latter was further separated into
abuse with the use of instruments and abuse without instruments.
Dehumanizing living conditions concerns living conditions that are unﬁt for human
dwelling and threaten survival. The victim is forced, either directly or indirectly, to
endure these conditions for extended periods of time.
Psychological dehumanization concerns perpetrator behaviors that inﬂict psycho-
logical torment, humiliation, and/or dehumanization upon the victim. Behaviors within
this category range from derogatory labeling and name-calling, through to threats,
taunts, degrading insults, defamation, and slander.
Physical dehumanization without physical pain concerns any humiliating and de-
humanizing behavior or action that is either inﬂicted upon a victim by a perpetrator, or
that the victim is forced to perform him- or herself. These actions are devoid of physical
pain.
Physical dehumanization with physical pain concerns any behavior that not only di-
minishes the humanity of the victim but also inﬂicts a degree of physical pain upon that
person. This group of behaviors was divided into two subgroups: abuse with instru-
ments and without instruments. Instrument refers to any tool or weapon used by a
Table 2 – Modiﬁed Bogardus Social Distance Scale
Social Distance Category Corresponding socio-demographic
condition
Would marry Intermarriage
Would have as regular friends Social Interaction
Would work beside in an ofﬁce Workforce Integration
Would have several families in my
neighborhood
Community Integration
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perpetrator to inﬂict torture, pain, and humiliation. Such instruments range from guns,
clubs, and machetes, through to ﬁre, water, and attack dogs. Conversely, behaviors cate-
gorized as abuse without instruments refer to all actions in which pain and humiliation
are inﬂicted without the explicit use of a tool. Beatings with hands and feet are examples
of this type of physical dehumanization. Table 3 presents the dehumanizing behavior
categories that we distinguished.
Once all the dehumanizing behaviors were divided among these ﬁve categories, a
smaller list containing the cruelest behaviors was compiled. To ensure that our analysis
was not only based on a compilation of cruel exceptions, the behaviors had to have
been regularly inﬂicted. However, it must be acknowledged that since our analysis is
based on the available second-hand literature, the precise frequency with which these
behaviors occurred is unknown. Consequently, the behaviors chosen were those that
were most common in the literature consulted. To compile this smaller list, behaviors
were ranked according to the physical and psychological pain they inﬂicted on the vic-
tims. The categories included no pain, least pain, pain, most pain, and death. Death was
further divided into “immediate death” and “prolonged death.” Based on this categori-
zation, the two most painful and most commonly employed behaviors for each geno-
cide were chosen per dehumanizing behavior category. As a result, 10 behaviors
representing the most common and most severe dehumanization were identiﬁed for
each case. Consequently, a ﬁnal list of 30 dehumanizing behaviors was compiled. To
determine which genocide had the most severe dehumanization, this ﬁnal list of 30 had
to be ranked on a scale from one to 30, with a score of 30 constituting the cruelest
behavior and a score of one representing the least cruel behavior. We chose not to do
the ranking ourselves to preclude any potential teleological result. Instead, we asked
eight members of a working group who did not know the aim of our research to do the
ranking for us. Although subjectivity was not completely defeated in this way, the opi-
nions upon which the ranking was based were diversiﬁed and as a result, the extremes
were averaged out and therefore play a smaller role.
Social distance measured
Rwanda
Rwanda’s ethnic characteristics and tumultuous political history—during which ﬁrst
the Tutsi minority, supported by the colonizing Germans and Belgians, but since the
1960s the Hutu majority dominated—often leads to the misconception that the Hutu
and the Tutsi were mutually exclusive tribes with little interaction.
In reality, however, they had much in common. They shared important customs,
routines, and societal arrangements, spoke the same language, attended the same
schools, shared the same religion (Christianity), frequented the same bars and shops, in-
termarried, and lived side by side.35 On a personal level, the Hutu and Tutsi shared
Table 3 – Categories of Dehumanizing Behavior
1. Dehumanizing Living Conditions
2. Psychological Dehumanization
3. Physical Dehumanization without Physical Pain
4. Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain - Abuse without Instruments
5. Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain - Abuse with Instruments
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amicable relations. They were neighbors, friends, and even members of the same fam-
ily.36 This was also true of the génocidaires. Scott Straus conducted interviews with 210
convicted genocide perpetrators detained in 15 prisons across Rwanda where he asked
the respondents four questions regarding interethnic proximity and intermarriage
prior to the genocide.37 The answers are presented in Table 4. Almost all génocidaires
claimed to have had Tutsi neighbors and would have allowed their child to marry a
Tutsi, or would have married a Tutsi themselves. More than two thirds had Tutsi family
members.
In addition, Straus enquired about the nature of Hutu-Tutsi interaction after
1990 but before 1994 when civil war broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF)—a Tutsi rebel group operating from Uganda—and the Hutu regime. These ques-
tions were designed to reveal the sentiments, either positive or negative, that character-
ized Hutu-Tutsi relations. Table 538 shows that the greater majority claimed that
relations were “positive” before 1994, while Table 6 shows that they remained “positive”
even after the war began in 1990.
Table 4 – Tutsi-Hutu Interaction in Percentages (weighted results)
Before 1994, did you
have any Tutsi
neighbors? (N=210)a
Before 1994, did you
have any Tutsi family
members? (N=205)b
Before 1994, would
you have allowed
your child to marry
a Tutsi, or would
you have married a
Tutsi yourself?
(N=195)c
Yes 96.0 68.8 98.9
No 3.6 28.3 1.1
I do not know 0.4 2.9 0
Total 100 100 100
a Only one respondent was not Hutu. Although he carried a Hutu identity card, he claimed
his entire family was considered Tutsi.
b Any blood relation or relation by marriage is considered a family member.
c Married men and fathers were asked if their child would be permitted to marry a Tutsi,
while unmarried men were asked if they themselves would marry a Tutsi woman.
Table 5 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors before 1994 in percentages (weighted
results)
Before 1994, how were your relations
with your Tutsi neighbor? (N=200)
Positivea 86.5
‘No problem’ 11.2
Negativeb 2.4
Total 100
a Responses that have been labelled as positive include: good, very good; truly good; more
than 100%; we were friends; we shared and we intermarried.
b Responses labelled as negative include: not good; we were friends before 1990; not good
after 1990 and; they were accomplices.
Social Distance and Dehumanization 229
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2/3 doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.223
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the reliability of the results could be called
into question due to the limited number of respondents on the one hand, and the fact
that the respondents were exclusively perpetrators on the other. Straus’s ﬁndings, how-
ever, mirror those from other sources.39
Intermarriage
Rwanda has a well-documented history of intermarriage.40 As generally described by
the literature, mixed marriages were a common occurrence and can be traced back to
pre- and early-colonial times.41 Callixte, a genocide survivor from the Ntarama locality,
recalls that “about two thirds of Tutsi daughters would be married to a Hutu. But Hutu
daughters married to Tutsi men were only 1 percent. Prospects were better for Tutsi
daughters marrying Hutu men. They would get better opportunities.”42 Although this
distribution is unlikely, we take Callixte’s statement as further evidence that intermar-
riage was widespread. The high degree of intermarriage is also mentioned in other sur-
vivor testimonies and in witness and perpetrator accounts, albeit often in the context of
inter-marital killing.43 According to one such a survivor, “Tutsi women married to
Hutu were killed. I know only one who survived. The administration forced Hutu men
to kill their Tutsi wives before they go to kill anyone else—to prove they were true inter-
ahamwe.”44 This high rate of intermarriage is indicative of a society with little social dis-
tance between victim and perpetrator groups.
Social Interaction
Numerous personal accounts from both Hutu and Tutsi reveal close social relationships
and personal friendships between the two groups.45 Hutu and Tutsi children and teen-
agers were relatively well integrated. Not only did they engage in shared leisure activ-
ities, but they were also part of the same sports teams. The Nyamata soccer team was
one such group of players that encompassed both Hutu and Tutsi.46 Tite Rushita, inter-
viewed by Hatzfeld, paints a picture of affable, cheerful relations in which the love of
the game overrode any hint of ethnic tension. Although the civil war of the early 1990s
marked the beginning of a swift decline in these once agreeable afﬁliations and the 1994
genocide pitted previous teammates against one another, their pre-1994 interactions
were generally social and harmonious in nature.47 Rushita’s description is reinforced by
numerous testimonies from those who lived through the genocide. Angélique Muka-
manzi conveys in her interview with Hatzfeld that her pre-1994 social circle was an eth-
nically mixed group of both Tutsi and Hutu.48 In Charles Mironko’s interviews with a
group of perpetrators residing in six Rwandan prisons, the majority alluded to a histori-
cal friendship between the two ethnic groups.49 While one respondent discusses regular
Table 6 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors after 1990 in percentages (weighted
results)
Did your relations with your Tutsi neighbor
change after the war began in 1990? (N=185)
No 86.5
A little 1.0
Yes 12.5
Total 100
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social visits and blood brotherhood pacts, another talks of regular gift exchanges in the
form of cows and other items.50 The common premise connecting these testimonies is a
high rate of amicable social interaction. Social distance can therefore be considered
minimal within this category.
Workforce Integration
To some extent, the workforce that characterized post-colonial, pre-genocide Rwanda
did show an ethnic division of labor. This was especially the case in the state sector. For
instance, in the army and the intermediate to upper strata of government, transparent,
anti-Tutsi policies were actively employed. Other areas of the public sector, although
absent of ofﬁcial discriminatory measures, also exhibited a Hutu-dominant workforce.51
Consequently, this sector of Rwanda’s pre-genocide workforce did not exhibit compre-
hensive ethnic integration.
However, the vast majority of Rwandans (both Hutu and Tutsi) did not participate
in the public sector labor force, but rather found employment in peasant farming.52 Sta-
tistics taken from Rwanda’s 1990 Human Development Report show that 92.8% of the
Rwandan labor force at the time worked in agriculture.53 The 1991 Rwandan census
puts this number at only a slightly lower 90.9% (91.9% for Hutu, 85.5% for Tutsi). It
further underlines the importance of agriculture by showing that only 5.5% of the popu-
lation lived in cities.
Land and cattle have traditionally represented the two sides of Rwanda’s agrarian
and pastoral economy. Hutu tended to manage more of the food production in Rwan-
dan society. Armed with farming implements such as the hoe and the machete, these
farmers employed intensive labor to ensure the harvesting of crops.54 Generally uncom-
fortable in the company of livestock, Hutu planters considered cattle breeding to be an
extravagance not beﬁtting the typically arid landscapes of Rwanda. Animal husbandry
was the historical pastime of the Tutsi pastoralists, who contributed to Rwanda’s econ-
omy through cattle breeding and milk production.55 Consequently, while the vast
majority of the Rwandan population was united in its agricultural occupations, differing
specializations within the agrarian economy resulted in an agricultural workforce that
was not comprehensively integrated. However, given that this agricultural specialization
was not associated with differences in socioeconomic status—those who worked in agri-
culture were generally poor56—the social distance between the two groups can, from
this perspective, still be considered small.
Community Integration
Pre-genocide Rwanda was initially divided into 11 prefectures. Table 7 depicts the eth-
nic distribution in these prefectures in 1991.
As the table shows, not a single one of these zones was restricted to just one ethnic
group. In spite of the clear numerical dominance of the Hutu, the two groups lived side
by side and generally without segregation.57 In fact, Straus’s analysis of ﬁve communes
from ﬁve prefectures shows that the Tutsi population was actually in excess of 10%.
Communes such as Giti, Musambira, and Kanzenze boasted quite large numbers of
Tutsi.58 As a result, ethnic segregation along provincial, regional, or community lines
does not appear to have been a feature of pre-genocide Rwanda.
Numerous survivor testimonies corroborate this portrait of community integration.
Christine Nyiransabimana, a Tutsi, for instance, stated, “In my area, and in Nyamata
town, I saw many Hutu relations and neighbors killing Tutsis every day of the
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genocide.”59 In describing the death of her father, Angélique Mukamanzi stated, “He
was run through by a Hutu neighbor.”60 When talking about their neighbors and rela-
tions who took part in the killings, many survivors and witnesses referred to it as “turn-
ing Interahamwe.” In other words, these individuals had displayed no previous
alignment with Hutu extremism or radical militia groups.61 This expression not only
implies a level of familiarity but also that those who were not expected to join the
slaughter did. Essentially, the Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side in the same villages and
in the same towns; there was little social distance with regard to their localities.
To conclude, in all categories of social distance studied, the Hutu and Tutsi dis-
played high levels of interaction. Social distance between these two groups prior to the
1994 genocide can therefore be considered to be small.
Germany
Assessing the social distance between the German perpetrators and the German-Jewish
target group within Germany is not a straightforward task as the Nazis implemented
widespread anti-Jewish legislation after their rise to power in 1933. As a result of these
discriminatory laws, the social distance between the Jewish victim group and the Ger-
man perpetrator group was deliberately manipulated in the years leading up to the
extermination carried out by the Nazi regime.
In the years prior to Nazi rule and following the fall of Imperial Germany, the Wei-
mar Republic was characterized by the widespread integration of Jews in all spheres of
German life. The 1925 census calculated the Jewish population at 564,379 Israelites or
0.9% of the total German population. The demographic distribution of the population
at that time showed that 66.8% of the Jewish populace lived in cities with over 100,000
inhabitants. Six of Germany’s largest cities—Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Breslau,
Table 7 – Distribution (%) of the Population of Rwanda by Prefecture and Ethnic Group in
1991a
Prefecture Ethnic Distribution Total Population
(numerical)
Hutu Tutsi Twa Other
Butare 82.0 17.3 0.7 0.0 753,868
Byumba 98.2 1.5 0.2 0.0 775,935
Cyangugu 88.7 10.5 0.5 0.3 551,565
Gikongoro 86.3 12.8 0.8 0.1 465,814
Gisenyi 96.8 2.9 0.3 0.1 731,996
Gitarama 90.2 9.2 0.6 0.1 848,027
Kibungo 92.0 7.7 0.2 0.1 648,912
Kibuye 84.8 14.8 0.4 0.0 469,494
Kigali 90.8 8.8 0.4 0.1 905,632
Kigali-ville 81.4 17.9 0.3 0.4 221,806
Ruhengeri 99.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 766,795
Total 91.1 8.4 0.4 0.1 7,099,844
a Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat au 15 Août, 1991. Résultats déﬁnitifs,
service national de Recensement, ministère du Plan, Kigali. [General census of population
and housing on 15 August 1991. Final Results, National Census Service, Ministry of
Planning, Kigali.]
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Leipzig, and Cologne—were home to 49% of all Jews in the country. 16% of the Jewish
population resided in smaller cities with between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, while
the remaining 17% lived in towns and villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants.62 The
assimilation of the Jewish community into the greater German society was especially
evident in of the high rate of intermarriage before the genocide. Among all Jewish mar-
riages between 1926 and 1930, 21.5% constituted mixed marriages.63 This trend pro-
ceeded into the early days of Nazi rule, with 44% of German Jews choosing to marry
non-Jews in 1933.64 In fact, roughly 35,000 Jews lived in mixed marriages in 1933.65
The Jews and gentiles enjoyed peaceful and indeed intimate relations during the pre-
genocide era.66
However, the ﬁnal years of the Weimar Republic were decidedly tumultuous and
witnessed an escalation of anti-Semitism, especially within the manifestos and propa-
ganda tactics of political parties like the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
(NSDAP, “Nazi” Party). The 1933 Nazi takeover represented a turning point in
German-Jewish integration. The years immediately preceding the genocide of European
Jewry were characterized by widespread efforts on the part of the Nazi regime to set up
barriers between German Jews and gentiles. The anti-Jewish policies and legislation out-
lined below not only depicts the ways in which the Nazis attempted to curtail their in-
teractions, but also the extent to which these policies were actively pursued.
Intermarriage
The 1935 Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor marked the ﬁrst phase in
the Nazi-led venture to curtail all interactions between Jews and gentiles. This law not
only prevented German women under the age of 45 from working in Jewish house-
holds, hotels, and health resorts, but also prohibited mixed marriages and extramarital
intercourse.67 Any mixed marriage occurring after the decree was not only automati-
cally invalidated, but also considered to be an afﬁrmation of guilt of extramarital inter-
course. This decree was immediately supplemented with laws concerning the marriage
practices of Mischlinge (crossbreeds) of the ﬁrst and second degree—that is, with two or
one Jewish grandparents, respectively. More speciﬁcally, marriages between a Mischling
of the second degree and a Jew were prohibited, as were marriages between a Mischling
of the second degree and another Mischling of the second degree. Furthermore, Mis-
chlinge of the ﬁrst degree could only marry other Mischlinge of the ﬁrst degree or Jews.
Through such policies, German-Jewish intermarriage was strictly curtailed.
Social Interaction
The 1930s were characterized by a number of laws that sought to reduce social interac-
tion between Jews and gentiles. In April 1933, the Law against Overcrowding of German
Schools was passed. It declared that the admission of non-Aryans into schools and col-
leges had to reﬂect the proportion of non-Aryans in the total German population. This
law had far-reaching repercussions for Jewish students. By 1936, more than half of all
Jewish students were forced to attend Jewish schools established by the Jewish commu-
nity. By 1938, all Jewish students had been denied access to German schools and were
as such enrolled in Jewish schools.68 Other restrictive measures included the introduc-
tion of travel regulations whereby Jews were forbidden access to dining and sleeping
cars on all trains within Germany; the introduction of separate Jewish shopping hours
by the Food and Agricultural Ministry; the introduction of separate Jewish hospitals;
and denial of access to beaches. From September 1939 onwards, Jews were further
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constrained and isolated by the installation of an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Such limitations
were exacerbated by the imposition of further restrictions on Jewish movements. For
instance, the installation of private telephones in Jewish homes was outlawed. All com-
munication and interaction with the gentile world was steadily reduced.69 The gap
between the perpetrator group and the target group was steadily widened.
Workforce Integration
As 1933 unfolded and Hitler embarked on his ﬁrst year of power, the position of Jews
in Germany’s economy was still strong and their role active. The majority of employed
Jews found themselves in commerce. Such specialization stems from a historically low
rate of Jewish employment in the civil service, the army, or agriculture.70 Therefore,
while this sphere of German economic activity witnessed relatively little Jewish-German
integration—only 1.2% of the total population in these professions were Jewish—other
spheres such as commerce and enterprise exhibited higher Jewish representation. For
example, in 1930, 48% of all private bankers and 40% of all textile businesses were Jew-
ish. The Jewish representation in liberal professions however, was nowhere near these
high levels. In 1933, only 2% of all professional positions in Germany were held by
Jews.71
The position of Jews in all spheres of economic life was the ﬁrst area targeted for
segregation by the Nazi regime. In 1933, all non-Aryan ofﬁcials were barred from posi-
tions in public ofﬁce in the state railway company, the civil service, and the Reichs-
bank.72 The ramiﬁcations of this law were not limited, however, to civil servants.
Professionals such as Jewish doctors were suddenly deprived of their afﬁliation with
state-sponsored health insurance programs, and Jewish notaries and lawyers were de-
nied admission to the bar.73 Within a year of Nazi rule, Jewish representation in Ger-
many’s economic and public arenas had been severely curtailed. With the ensuing
Aryanization and liquidation of Jewish enterprises and business establishments, the
Jewish working sector was progressively and deliberately isolated from the greater Ger-
man work force.
Community Integration
By 1939, forced emigration had reduced Germany’s Jewish population to 330,892. Ac-
cording to the 1925 census, the Jewish community was considerably urbanized, a trend
that increased rapidly after the Nazi takeover in 1933. In a bid to escape impoverish-
ment, Jews abandoned the isolation of small towns and villages for the promise of Ger-
many’s big cities. The 1939 census shows that there were 82,788 Jews in Berlin and
14,461 in Frankfurt.74 Jewish migration within Germany was not, however, accompa-
nied by integration into their new urban neighborhoods. The Nazi government greeted
Jewish urbanization with renewed segregation efforts: namely residential separation.
The Nazi administrative machine set about conﬁning German Jews to separate housing
blocs designated solely for Jewish inhabitants. Such a formidable task required wide-
spread evictions and accompanying legislation. For instance, in 1938, a decree was
passed in which German landlords were authorized to cancel the apartment leases of
Jewish doctors. In 1939, this decree was compounded by another that allowed all Ger-
man landlords to evict Jews if that landlord could provide a certiﬁcate declaring that the
tenant could ﬁnd alternative accommodation.75
Jewish emigration rose dramatically throughout this period. During the ﬁrst 10
years of Hitler’s reign, several hundreds of thousands left the country. By November
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1941, it was estimated that just 160,000 out of the 499,682 counted in the 1933 census
remained in Germany.76 With such deteriorating numbers, Jewish-German interaction
and integration in all areas, particularly living arrangements, would have been reduced.
Establishing an Overall Social Distance Estimate
From their inception into power through to the start of the genocide in 1941, the Nazi
regime set about the systematic separation of the German Jews from the gentiles. The
fact that these efforts were believed to be necessary indicates that social distance
between gentiles and Jews was relatively small. Furthermore, successfully isolating Ger-
man Jews from their non-Jewish counterparts was not guaranteed. Indeed, despite rig-
orous efforts, three events demonstrate the regime’s failure in entrenching considerable
social distance between Jews and gentiles.
The ﬁrst such event was the 1933 boycott. Two months after Hitler’s ascension to
power, the Nazi party organized several mass meetings led by an established boycott
committee. On the agenda was the implementation of a widespread national boycott on
Jewish goods, shops, lawyers, businesses, and doctors.77 Predominantly driven by radi-
cal Sturmabteilung (SA) members, the events of the boycott included the placement of
anti-Jewish placards and SA and Schutzstaffel (SS) guards outside such businesses. The
guards were responsible for deterring shoppers by “informing” them of the Jewish own-
ership of such establishments.78 However, in spite of these efforts, the boycott was ulti-
mately a failure. In truth, the German public largely ignored it and continued to go
about their daily affairs, which included shopping at Jewish-owned stores.79 The signiﬁ-
cance of this evident failure is explicit in its illustration of the overall German sentiment
and implicit in its illustration of the degree of community integration of the Jews. Com-
bined with the two events below, this illustrates the failure of the Nazi regime to create
the social distance it so desired.
The second event was the Kristallnacht. The night of 9 November 1938 was charac-
terized by the destruction of 171 synagogues and 7,500 Jewish businesses, as well as the
arrest and subsequent deportation of 20,000 Jews to concentration camps within the
Reich, such as Dachau and Buchenwald.80 The brutality of this evening must not, how-
ever, mislead one into thinking that it represents anti-Jewish sentiment among the col-
lective German population. The events of the Kristallnacht were no more than a
cleverly orchestrated invention through which the destruction of Jewish synagogues and
businesses were made to appear to be the work of the populace as a whole, when in fact
it was solely the work of Nazi militias.81 The Nazis had to concoct a popular revolt
because German civilians were simply not interested in an anti-Jewish pogrom. This
provides evidence of a smaller social distance than that sought by the Nazis.
The third event is known as the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident or protest. Recall that
German-Jewish intermarriage in 1933 and prior was relatively high. Essentially, it
would have been those Germans in mixed marriages who had close personal contact
with Jews who were most resistant to anti-Jewish policies and propaganda.82 It was
within this context that the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident occurred. At the start of that
year, it was estimated that there were still 16,760 mixed marriages within Germany
proper. It was primarily the Jewish husbands of these marriages who were incarcerated
by the Gestapo in early 1943 and held in a former welfare ofﬁce of the Jewish commu-
nity at Rosenstrasse 2-4 (Rose Street) in Berlin. In response to these arrests, non-Jewish
spouses and relatives openly resisted Nazi rule and gathered themselves in signiﬁcant
numbers outside the building.83 The SS, however, did not arrest or shoot the women
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standing in deﬁance. Instead, the Nazis negotiated with the protesters and ﬁnally re-
leased the detainees.84 The fact that the imprisoned men were released indicates a small
social distance between some Germans and Jews. The Nazis were aware that the popu-
larity of the persecution of the Jews was limited and were anxious not to lose support
for their regime. In an effort to prevent social unrest, the regime ignored its ideological
principles and let the Jewish men go free.85
The ﬁnal conclusion to be drawn from this section on social distance is less
straightforward than the one drawn in the case of Rwanda. The years preceding the
1933 Nazi takeover consisted of peaceful relations and increasing integration.86 How-
ever, the ascension of the Nazi party to power brought with it a number of anti-Jewish
policies and laws.87 Through the administrative apparatus of Hitler’s machine, anti-
Jewish decrees sought to isolate the Jews and corrode German-Jewish interaction. How-
ever, in spite of such extensive legislation, there were several incidents which point to
the maintenance of small social distances. Consequently, although legislation made
strides toward widening the social distance between the two groups, interaction contin-
ued to occur. The bonds that connected the two were therefore still present, though
admittedly weakened.
Eastern Europe
Following the model of the previous sections, this paragraph addresses the degree of
social distance between the Polish and Baltic victim groups and the German perpetrator
group prior to the outbreak of the Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe (Poland and the
Baltic States). At this point, however, we depart from the previous composition. Speciﬁ-
cally, the perpetrator group in this case refers to the German army that invaded Poland
in 1939 and the Einsatzgruppen—small, mobile killing units of the Sicherheitspolizei
(Sipo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD)—that invaded the USSR in 1941.88 The geographic
distance separating the victim and perpetrator groups limits the likelihood of social con-
tact, therefore rendering the social distance categories obsolete. Simple logistics imply
that intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration, and community integra-
tion on anything other than a minimal level were absent. It can therefore be assumed
that the overall rate of victim and perpetrator group interaction prior to the outbreak of
genocide was so minimal that the social distance between them can be classiﬁed as
large.
Summing Up
The social distance in each pre-genocide context is summarized in Table 8.
Rwanda constituted the case with the smallest social distance. The Hutu perpetra-
tor group and the Tutsi victim group were not only characterized by high rates of inter-
marriage and social integration, but were also part of the same general workforce, social
circles, and neighborhoods. As a result, they had the greatest rate of interaction prior to
the outbreak of genocide in 1994. In the context of Eastern Europe, social distance
between the German perpetrator group and the Polish and Baltic victim groups was, for
all intents and purposes, nonexistent. Due to the geographic distance separating the
two, any meaningful interaction was unlikely. Ergo, it can be stated that the social dis-
tance between the perpetrator group and the victim group prior to the outbreak of the
Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe was large.
Comparatively speaking, the social distance prevalent in Western Europe (i.e., Ger-
many) falls somewhere between that of the other two genocides. This conclusion rests
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on the bisection of German-Jewish interactions before the outbreak of genocide. The
interaction between these two groups resembled two competing forces: high rates of
German-Jewish interaction before 1933 on the one hand, and institutionalized attempts
by the Nazi government to separate them on the other. Although not entirely successful,
the Nazis did manage to widen the social distance between these two groups. Conse-
quently, this case lies somewhere between Rwanda and Eastern Europe.
Dehumanization Measured
Table 9 below contains the 30 selected dehumanizing behaviors that the perpetrator
groups inﬂicted on victim groups. The table also illustrates which behavior belonged to
which genocide, as well as the method of categorization. It is important to keep in mind
that the table given to the participants only contained the behaviors. Following the pro-
cedure outlined under “Measuring Severity of Dehumanization,” these behaviors were
ranked based on their severity/cruelty.
The respondents’ answers enabled us to formulate several rankings of dehumaniz-
ing behaviors.89 They will be presented below.
Table 10 gives an overview of the different types of dehumanizing behavior per case
study and the average dehumanization score that our respondents attributed to them.
In terms of total severity of dehumanization, Rwanda received the highest total
average score of 19.6. Eastern Europe was placed second with a total score of 15.0, while
Western Europe received the lowest score at 11.9. When we look at the subtotals of the
dehumanizing behavior categories, Rwanda’s position as the genocide manifesting
the most severe behavior is further cemented. As Table 10 shows, Rwanda received the
highest score in three of the ﬁve categories. The Holocaust in Western Europe, on the
other hand, clearly exhibits the least severe dehumanizing behavior, despite having re-
ceived the highest score for psychological dehumanization (10.2). The Holocaust in
Eastern Europe is placed between Rwanda and Western Europe with several middle-
ranking scores.
Finally, we looked at the speciﬁc types of behavior with the ﬁve highest scores. The
ﬁgure below displays the results in the form of a column chart. The values represent the
data presented in Table 9.
Table 8 – Social Distance Prior to the Genocides in Rwanda, Western Europe and Eastern
Europe
Theatre Socio-Demographic Condition
Rate of
Inter-
marriage
Rate of
Social
Interaction
Rate of
Workforce
Integration
Rate of
Community
Integration
Total
Social
Distance
Rwanda High High High High Small
Germany
(Western
Europe)
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Average
Poland and
Baltic States
(Eastern
Europe)
Low Low Low Low Large
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Table 9 – The Dehumanization Behavior List
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
1 Members of the victim group were
forced into slave labor for 12 hours a
day.
Western
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
2 Members of the victim group were
forced to march huge distances with
no food or rest.
Western
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
3 Members of the victim group were
forced to attend daily roll call.
Western
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
4 Skin of dead victims would be tanned
and stored for later use.
Western
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
5 Members of the victim group were
made to stand naked waiting to be
shot.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
6 Members of the victim group were
herded like sheep by members of the
perpetrator group.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
7 Men from the victim group were
kicked and dealt heavy blows.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
8 Members of the victim group were
forced to stand for a night outside in
the rain.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
9 The following medical experiments
were inﬂicted on members of the
victim group:
Hypothermia where victims were
placed in freezing water
Infectious diseases were injected
into victims
High altitude experiments using
low-pressure chambers
Pharmacological where victims
were subjected to poisons or gas to
test possible antidotes
Sterilization
Surgery such as bone-grafting
experiment
Traumatic Injuries to simulate battle
wounds
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
10 Members of the victim group
experienced beatings with riﬂe butts,
clubs, and whips.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
11 Up to 200 members of the victim
group were forced into closed cattle
wagons with no fresh air.
Eastern
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
(Table continued on next page)
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Table 9 – (continued)
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
12 Members of the victim group were
forced to live in fenced-off ghettos in
unsanitary conditions that resulted in
the repeated outbreak of epidemics
and high mortality rates.
Eastern
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
13 Members of the victim group were
assigned numbers to replace their
names.
Eastern
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
14 Laughing and jeering accompanied
beatings by the perpetrators.
Eastern
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
15 Members of the victim group were
made to march naked to pits and
forced to lie on top of corpses.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
16 Women from the victim group were
forced to throw their children into
graves alive where they would be shot
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
17 Members of the victim group were
forced to stand for hours in the
freezing cold, rain and snow and often
froze to death.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
18 Female members of the victim group
were raped.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
19 Members of the victim group were
beaten to death with clubs and iron
rods.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
20 Attack dogs would be set on members
of the victim group.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
21 Members of the victim group were
deprived of methods to collect water,
which led to dehydration and death.
Rwanda Dehumanizing living conditions
22 Members of the victim group were
forced to live in mud and swamps in
the company of snakes, mosquitoes
and corpses.
Rwanda Dehumanizing living conditions
23 Members of the victim group were
called worms, cockroaches and
snakes.
Rwanda Psychological dehumanization
24 The killers would laugh, sing and
dance while they went about the task
of killing.
Rwanda Psychological dehumanization
25 Women from the victim group were
forced to march naked while being
forced to sing songs.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
(Table continued on next page)
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As one can see from this ﬁgure, four out of ﬁve of the highest-scoring behaviors
originated in Rwanda, thereby solidifying Rwanda’s position as the genocide with the
most severe dehumanization.
Severity of Dehumanization Scores and Social Distance Findings
Combining Results
When one combines the above ﬁndings for severity of dehumanization with those for
social distance, the relationship between the two variables becomes visible. While Rwanda
exhibited the least social distance but the greatest severity of dehumanization, Eastern
Europe, with its much greater social distance, displayed less severe dehumanization.
These ﬁndings imply that a high degree of social proximity dictates a high degree
of severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. Conversely, the
Table 9 – (continued)
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
26 Members of the victim group were
forced to kill their own children and
spouses were forced to kill their
partners.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
27 Female members of the victim group
experienced systematic gang rape
from up to 15 perpetrators.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
28 Children from the victim group were
slammed against the walls until dead.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
29 Members of the victim group would
have their body parts cut off and be
left to die slowly.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
30 Female members of the victim group
would have their vaginas punctured
with spears, arrows, or pointed sticks
and then have their genitals cut off
entirely.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
Table 10 – Average Severity of dehumanization Score per Dehumanization Category (with
the scores for the categories: abuse with instruments and abuse without instruments)
Dehumanizing Behavior Category: Rwanda Eastern
Europe
Western
Europe
1 Dehumanizing Living Conditions 15.05 11.9 9.75
2 Psychological Dehumanization 9.3 6.65 10.2
3 Physical Dehumanization without Physical Pain 21.2 21.5 10.1
4 Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain-
Abuse without Instruments
25.3 18.05 10.10
5 Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain-
Abuse with Instruments
27.15 16.85 19.45
Total Average Score 19.6 15.0 11.9
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less social interaction there is prior to the outbreak of genocide, the less severe the dehu-
manization behaviors appear to be during the genocide.
These results corroborate our hypothesis, which had postulated that dehumaniza-
tion reduces the moral and cognitive obstacles that stand in the way of killing fellow
human beings. As explained by Bandura, empathetic emotions are elicited when one
perceives another as human.90 The elicitation of these feelings stems from perceived
similarity and identiﬁcation. Yet, if perceived similarity is replaced with perceived dif-
ference, the victim is removed from the moral, human realm and thus becomes destruc-
tible.91 In this way, dehumanization can break the bonds that tie human beings to one
another. Consequently, no matter the surrounding contexts, circumstances, cultures, or
environments, killing human beings is easier when those targeted are no longer bound
to the killers by their shared humanity. In support of this reasoning, one Nazi comman-
dant maintained that the degradation inﬂicted on concentration camp prisoners des-
tined to die was administered not with the aim of inﬂicting cruelty for cruelty’s sake,
but rather to severely diminish the humanity of the prisoner. In this way, those operat-
ing the gas chambers could carry out their duties with minimal distress.92 When ques-
tioned about a mass of bodies, another Nazi camp guard said, “It had nothing to do
with humanity, it couldn’t have; it was a mass—a mass of rotting ﬂesh.”93
In light of the results of this research, it can be stated that if dehumanization is nec-
essary in the mass murder of strangers (the Eastern Europe case), it appears absolutely
imperative in the mass murder of acquaintances (the Rwanda case). Breaking the ties
that bind human beings is difﬁcult in itself, so breaking ties that have been solidiﬁed by
social closeness is even harder and requires more effort. As noted by Albert Bandura,
“the joys and suffering of similar persons are more vicariously arousing than are those
of strangers”.94 Therefore, the termination of empathetic feelings and subsequent
Figure 1 Behaviors with the Five Highest Scores
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destruction of shared human bonds will require greater dehumanization if the targeted
individual is known to the perpetrator than if they were unknown. It is therefore unsur-
prising that out of all three cases the perpetrators in Rwanda infused their killing opera-
tions with the most severe dehumanization. As stated by Rwililiza, a survivor of that
genocide, “They cut and mutilated Tutsis to take from them all that was human and
thus kill them more easily.”95 The same survivor goes on to articulate, “Neighbors of
longstanding turned in a matter of hours into beasts.”96 Both statements imply a strong
relationship between severity of dehumanization on the one hand and the close social
proximity of the victim and perpetrator groups on the other.
In contrast to the Rwanda case, the genocide in Eastern Europe was deﬁned by a
vast social distance separating the German perpetrator group and the Eastern European
(Polish and Baltic) victim groups. They were not only physically separated but they
were also culturally and linguistically distinct. The victim group therefore represented
an entirely foreign body requiring a level of severity of dehumanization necessary only
to break the common bonds of general humanity, not those solidiﬁed by social close-
ness. With the paper’s theoretical framework constantly in mind, it can be concluded
that this entrenched social distance enabled the perpetrator group to approach their vic-
tims with a level of detachment not possible in Rwanda and as such, less severe dehu-
manization was administered. As stated by Felix Landau, an Einsatzgruppen member,
on recounting the experience of shooting Jews in the Eastern territories, “Strange, I am
completely unmoved. No pity, nothing. That’s the way it is and then it’s all over. My
heart beats just a little faster when involuntarily I recall the feelings and thoughts I had
when I was in a similar situation.”97
Importantly, brief attention should be given to the role played by local perpetrators
within the Baltic region and their dehumanization practices, as it strengthens our case
further. Recall, among the German forces that invaded the USSR were four units of the
Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst referred to as Einsatzgruppen. A main purpose
of these unites was to kill all Jewish inhabitants as they came into contact with them.98
The swiftness with which these units operated was reﬂected in the magnitude of the kill-
ings they carried out. For example, Einsatzgruppe A, which was sent to the major cities
of the Baltic States with their 250,000 Jewish inhabitants,99 reported the murders of
125,000 Jews by October 15 1941 – just four months after their initial invasion.100 In
fact, the overall proportion of Baltic Jewish deaths constitutes one of the largest in
Europe at 95%.101 The type of execution murder practice which predominated at the
hands of the Einsatzgruppen was mass outdoor shootings.102 As described by Kaufmann
“women and men embraced in farewell in the face of death. The luckless ones stood
there in their thousands and had to wait their turn, watching their brothers and sisters
being shot.”103 He goes on to describe, “it was the Germans who dragged Jews into the
prayer house, not to pray but to be burned alive. Thus the prayer house disappeared, as
did the old kworesman (gravedigger) R. Chaim.”104 The sheer number of these deaths
can be attributed to a straightforward approach backed by vast army assistance. How-
ever, one cannot overlook the role played by local collusion.105
The Einsatzgruppen in the former USSR territories were aided in their killing op-
erations by local auxiliary police units.106 In fact, vast numbers of Baltic Jews were mur-
dered by their fellow Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, and dehumanization was
particularly severe. As one Lithuanian survivor recalls, “the coarse Lithuanian mob [. . .]
acted with such beastly cruelty that by comparison, the Russian pogroms seemed like
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humanitarian deeds.”107 Another survivor recalls: “The Lithuanian murderers [. . .]
brought 550 men to the cemetery, forced them to dig a large pit and then ordered them
to kill each other with the shovels they were holding. A father was made to kill his son,
a brother his own brother.”108 The Lithuanians involved in the killings were often for-
mer customers, neighbors and classmates,109 which provides further corroboration for
our hypothesis. So while local Baltic perpetrators are not included in the German perpe-
trator group under examination and their genocidal behavior has no bearing on the re-
sults, the level of their dehumanization is interesting and worth mentioning given the
hypothesis posed.
Finally, the correlation between small social distance and severe dehumanization
ﬁnds additional support in previous studies, particularly the 1971 Stanford Prison
Experiment conducted by Phillip Zimbardo. To brieﬂy explain, a sample of 24 college
students from Stanford were selected to take part in a two-week experiment regarding
the psychology of prison life. These participants were randomly divided into two
groups – prisoners and guards – and were left to assume their respective roles. After
just six days, the experiment was terminated due to the extreme levels of dehumaniza-
tion and humiliation inﬂicted by the “guards” onto the “prisoners.”110 Although not a
genocidal incident, this experiment illustrates characteristics that are present in geno-
cide. Essentially, it pits two deﬁned groups against one another where one group holds
a dominant, more powerful position and the other is weaker and becomes victimized.
Furthermore, the groups in this example are separated by relatively small social dis-
tance. The volunteers were characterized by several common features, which in turn as-
sumes diminutive social distance. Speciﬁcally, they were all male college students of the
same age, from middle class backgrounds and lived in the same area.111 It can therefore
be assumed that the close social proximity deﬁning these two groups played a role in
the subsequent severity of dehumanization exhibited by those who played the part of
the guards. In keeping with the reasoning of this paper’s proposed hypothesis, severe
dehumanization was required in order to shatter the ties of humanity and social close-
ness thereby enabling the guards to perform their duties with greater ease.
The social distance-severity of dehumanization correlation intimated by Zimbar-
do’s study is strengthened further when compared to the BBC Prison Study. As with the
Stanford Prison Experiment, this 2002 study, broadcasted on BBC, pitted a prisoner
group against a guard group in a simulated prison scenario in order to study the psy-
chological and social ramiﬁcations. Unlike, Zimbardo’s study, however, the participants
were separated by a much larger social distance. The ﬁfteen participants were composed
of mentally stable men from all over Britain.112 Another distinction between the two
studies lies in the contrasting behavior of the guards. In the BBC experiment the guards
did not automatically adjust to their roles nor did they become accustomed to the
power that came with those roles. More importantly, they did not humiliate nor did
they dehumanize the prisoners under their charge.113 These particular developments
conﬁrm the proposed relationship between social proximity and severity of dehuman-
ization. It is likely that the social distance was much smaller between the participants in
the Stanford experiment, hence the severity of dehumanization. Conversely, the social
proximity between the BBC participants was much greater limiting the necessary sever-
ity of dehumanization. Thus, the Zimbardo experiment conducted in 1971 along with
the BBC Prison Study conducted in 2002 effectively corroborates our hypothesis.
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The Anomaly of Germany (Western Europe)
When applying the same comparative lens to the ﬁndings for Germany, the inverse
relationship between social distance and severity of dehumanization was not found.
Recall, the results for Germany revealed a social distance of a medium degree. Bisected
by two opposing forces, Germany was left with a social distance that was not as exten-
sive as desired by the Nazi regime, yet neither was it of the social proximity evident in
Rwanda. Moreover, the perpetrators within this context exhibited the least severe dehu-
manization behavior out of all three cases. If the ﬁndings were to support the reasoning
behind the hypothesis, this case would have exhibited greater severity of dehumaniza-
tion than Eastern European where the social distance was larger. The reasons behind
these particular results shall be tentatively explained below.
The relatively mild dehumanization evident in the case of Germany ﬁnds its roots
in the basic character of the Nazi regime and an underlying concern of Nazi bureaucrats
for the psychological and spiritual wellbeing of their killers. The Nazi perpetrators were
discouraged from excessive use of cruelty, torture and brutality, not just because such
savagery was considered counterproductive to the organized nature of the genocide
machine,114 but also because of their psychological wellbeing. The psyches of those em-
ployed to kill were considered to be of great importance to the functioning of the entire
operation.115 As a result, a number of steps were taken to restrict opportunities for sav-
age depravity and to lessen trauma and damage to the psyches of the perpetrators. It
was these steps that set the stage for more mild forms of dehumanization behavior.
First and foremost, the workings of the Holocaust were kept sharply in check by
the prohibition of unofﬁcial killings.116 In the clinical style so favoured by the Nazis,
killings fuelled by bloodlust or the emotional desires of the perpetrator were considered
beneath the superiority espoused by the Nazi regime. As a result, any action or killing
believed to be driven by cruel, sexual or egocentric intentions were punishable offences.
Killings that were conducted in line with Nazi legislation or under the umbrella of polit-
ical idealism went without penalty.117 Consequently, through these administrative and
legal restrictions, the perpetrators were limited in their opportunities to kill German
Jews brutally and were therefore restricted in their ability to dehumanize severely.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Nazi machine attempted to ease any
damage to the psyches and souls of the perpetrators by distancing them from their vic-
tims as much as possible.118 To clarify, despite the large social distance characterizing
the perpetrator and victim groups in Eastern Europe and the severe dehumanization in-
ﬂicted by the perpetrators, the mass shootings still proved traumatic for many perpetra-
tors. Not all the killers were able to approach the mass shootings with the degree of
detachment illustrated by Felix Landau above. In truth, these mass shootings involved
pervasive psychological distress that was illustrated by the widespread incidences of
alcoholism.119 Rudolph Höss, SS Kommandant in Auschwitz, illustrates the extent of
alcohol used by the ﬁring squad men: “Most of the members of the Special Action
Squads drank a great deal to help get through this horrible work. According to Captain
Rudolf Hofﬂe’s accounts, the men of Globocnik’s extermination section drank tremen-
dous quantities of alcohol.”120 Such extensive alcoholism was not limited to those per-
petrators stationed in the former USSR territories. As illustrated by Browning,
alcoholism was equally prevalent amongst the ﬁring squads of the Order Police sta-
tioned in Poland.121 Another reaction to the killings was the occurrence of suicide. As
recalled by Höss: “Another thing on my mind was the many suicides among the ranks
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of the SS Special Action Squads who could no longer mentally endure wading in the
blood bath. Some of them went mad.”122
In light of this, the Nazi administrators were impelled to ﬁnd a solution for the
more extreme “soul damage” and psychological distress that would certainly accompany
the killing of Western and speciﬁcally German Jews who were of a closer social proxim-
ity to the perpetrator group.123 The solution was the gas chamber. Höss explains the
reasoning behind it in the mass annihilation of Jews from Germany and other parts
of the West: “Only gas was suitable since killing by shooting the huge numbers ex-
pected [. . .] would also be a tremendous strain on the SS soldiers who would have to
carry out the order as far as the women and children were concerned.”124 Höss explains
further: “Now we had discovered the gas and the procedure [. . .] I had had enough
of hostage executions, and the mass killings by ﬁring squad ordered by Himmler and
Heydrich. Now I was at ease. We were all saved from these blood baths.”125
Consequently, an artiﬁcial distance was imposed between perpetrator and victim
that not only restricted the potential for greater psychological trauma, but also the
severity of dehumanization that would have occurred with the killing of socially closer
German and other Western European Jews. This artiﬁcial distance was increased fur-
ther by the employment of Jewish inmates both in the gassing process and also in the
subsequent clearing away of the dead bodies.126 The burial of the corpses as well as
their later incineration was also the responsibility of the Jews.127
The pervasive concern for the psychological wellbeing of the perpetrators allowed
the mass slaughter of the Jews from Germany, and by extension from Western Europe,
to ensue with milder dehumanization behavior. The synthetic distance imposed during
the killing operations of the German Jews therefore provides an explanation as to why
the German (Western Europe) case received the lowest score on the scale of severity of
dehumanization.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper developed the hypothesis that the smaller the social distance between the
perpetrator group and the victim group prior to genocide the more severe the dehu-
manization behaviors of the perpetrators during genocide. In order to illustrate this
hypothesis, the paper employed a literature-based analysis supplemented by a Vignette-
orientated severity scale in three genocide cases: Rwanda, the Holocaust as it occurred
in Western Europe and the Holocaust as it occurred in Eastern Europe.
The results show that Rwanda – the case with the smallest victim-perpetrator social
distance – displayed the most severe dehumanization behavior. Conversely, Eastern
Europe (Poland and the Baltic States) – the case with the greatest social distance
between the German perpetrator group and the Jewish Polish and Baltic victim group –
manifested less severe dehumanization behavior. From these two case ﬁndings, it ap-
pears as if the smaller the social distance preceding the outbreak of genocide the greater
the severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. The corrobo-
ration of this hypothesis is, however, encumbered by the Western Europe (Germany)
anomaly.
Despite greater intimacy between its victim and perpetrator groups, Western Europe
displayed less severe dehumanization than its Eastern Europe counterpart. However, the
distancing methods used by the Nazi administration to protect their perpetrators from
psychological trauma provide a tentative explanation as to why Western Europe received
a low severity of dehumanization score. Consequently, the demonstrated relationship
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between social proximity and severity of dehumanization still stands: the smaller the
social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups prior to the outbreak of geno-
cide, the more severe the dehumanization behaviors of the perpetrators during the killing
operations of the genocide.
It is acknowledged, that this research is limited in the extent to which it can draw
unequivocal conclusions. It is readily admitted that the literature-based nature of such
analysis contains restrictions in its ability to render unbiased objective information.
However, despite the limitations this type of research may have, it appears that the
hypothesis regarding the inverse correlation between social distance and severity of
dehumanization during genocide has found corroboration. With this in hand, one is
equipped with an adequate platform from which to launch further research and investi-
gation.
The Holocaust and later the Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to human-
ity’s ability to circumvent all moral, ethical and bureaucratic obstacles in a merciless
quest to exterminate fellow human beings. But more than this, the Holocaust and the
Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to the fundamental role dehumanization
plays in genocide and the ways in which its intensity varies and its trajectory is affected.
As long as humanity continues to commit genocide, dehumanization will continue
to chaperon it. Consequently, it is our duty as scholars and as members of the human
race to understand the dynamics of dehumanizing behavior during genocide, why it oc-
curs, why it varies and what can be done to combat it.
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The Question of an Armenian Revolution and the
Radicalization of the Committee of Union and Progress
toward the Armenian Genocide
Wolfgang Gust
Hamburg, Germany
Hilmar Kaiser, one of the ﬁrst German historians to work on the Armenian Genocide and one who
has often written about it as a historical fact, is now trying to dilute that history. In his latest article,
which consciously avoids use of the term genocide, Kaiser seeks to portray Mehmed Djemal Pasha,
a member of the Young Turk triumvirate ruling the Ottoman Empire during World War I, as an
individual resisting the genocidal policies of his co-conspirators within the Committee of Union and
Progress. Kaiser claims to employ Ottoman documents to demonstrate that the initial intention of
the Turkish government was to relocate the Ottoman Armenians for military reasons, although he
admits that they posed no imminent danger to the state. Kaiser indicates that the ﬁrst “relocations”
of Armenians took place in areas controlled by Djemal and were initiated by him, then goes on to
claim that even though the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor was located within his sphere of
power, he, in reality, protected the Armenians. However, facts showing the extent of the genocide
have been overlooked. This article will use archival documents from the Foreign Ofﬁce of the Ger-
man Empire, the Ottoman Empire’s wartime ally, to demonstrate the shortcomings of Kaiser’s evi-
dence and arguments.
Key words: Armenian Genocide, Djemal, Young Turks, Kaiser, German archives, Ottoman ar-
chives, German compliance, Zeitun, deportations
Hilmar Kaiser’s latest publication, “Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies:
Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring
and Summer of 1915,”1 states that there never was a national Armenian revolution that
seriously threatened the Ottoman Empire. This, however, is the key theory behind the
main argument that previously denied the Armenian Genocide, a theory that was
adopted at that time by the German allies of the Young Turk killers, against the better
knowledge of their own observers on site who vehemently contradicted this, but were
unable to assert themselves against their superiors.
Kaiser restricts his statements mainly to the sphere of control of the Fourth Army,
which was commanded by Mehmed Djemal Pasha. This sphere ranged from Zeitun, the
Armenian stronghold in the north, to the city of Urfa in the east, and included Syria
and Palestine, as well as Arabia as far as Mecca and Medina.
Regarding the Armenians in this region, the German vice-consul of Alexandretta
(Iskenderun), Hermann Hoffmann-Fölkersamb, who was often temporarily in charge
of such important consulates in Djemal’s area as Aleppo, Damascus, and Haifa, was cer-
tain: “I do not believe that they would commit treason.”2 Furthermore, with regard to
the alleged military danger posed by the Armenians, Hoffmann wrote,
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Apart from the case of Van and its adjacent zone, particular caution is called for
relative to the charge of a “militarily organized plot.” Certain local insurrectionary
movements cannot be treated as proof of such. For example, the fact that the revolt
in Zeitun cannot be singled out as a case of a conspiracy of that kind, is clearly evi-
denced in the reports of the Imperial Consulate in Aleppo. The uprising of the Ar-
menians in the region of Suediye [Musa Dagh] (to the south of Alexandretta) was,
according to the descriptions even on the part of the Turkish military, not a con-
spiracy. The recovery of the revolutionaries from Suediye by French warships was
also not a long-planned act. This is apparent from the circumstances and the opi-
nions of well-informed Turks.3
Kaiser agrees with him, albeit more theoretically, because he justiﬁes the brutal ac-
tions of the Turks against the supposed revolutionaries. And after his verbal knockout
against those who deny the genocide, he lets them land gently by claiming that Djemal
did not carry out any genocidal actions against the Armenians and, therefore, the word
genocide should not be included in his article.
Kaiser wants to prove that Djemal attempted to rescue the Armenians from annihi-
lation. This is surprising because not only was the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor
located within Djemal’s sphere of power, but also the desert strip along the Euphrates
and especially along the Chabur River, where the surviving Armenians were literally
butchered.
Kaiser divides those who have done research on this genocide into two schools of
thought: on the one hand, there are those, including Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner
Akçam, who started with the assumption that there was a central plan for eliminating
the Armenians; on the other hand, there are others, such as Raymond Kévorkian, who
assumed that there was a policy of resettlement that was meant to create a general
majority for the Turks or at least the Muslims. Both schools of thought, however, as-
sumed that there was intent to annihilate the Armenians and other Christian minorities,
whose fate was, therefore, already settled before the beginning of the war.
Kaiser’s theory that originally there was no central plan at all opposes this. He
writes,
This article suggests that the notion of a uniﬁed body of genocidal conspirators exert-
ing unrestrained control over the entire Ottoman Empire cannot be sustained. . . .
This regional study will challenge such notions. It claims that Ottoman deportation
policies concerning Armenians evolved in 1915 in a concrete historic context and
not from a conspiratorial plan waiting to be revealed.4
It was only at the end of May 1915, according to Kaiser’s conclusion, that the “actual”
situation led to the systematic deportation of Armenians from their areas of settlement
and a central management was put into place.
With regard to Mehmed Talât, the main person accused, and the Interior Ministry,
he writes,
Far from simply imposing its decisions, the ministry quickly met with resistance
from Djemal who doubted the wisdom of the central government’s policies. . . .
The opposition against Talaat’s and the ruling [Committee of Union and Pro-
gress]’s policy was stronger than has been assumed so far, reaching into the leader-
ship of the party. At its core stood Ahmed Djemal Pasha.5
252 Gust
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2/3 doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.251
Kaiser notes that by
introducing extensive documentation produced by Ottoman provincial and
military authorities, the article contextualizes Ottoman central government direc-
tives. . . . [The] Ottoman ofﬁcials at the highest level of government had detailed
knowledge of the consequences of their decisions. The data also conﬁrms in detail
shocking Western consular reports. Thus, the various sources corroborate each
other and form a consistent record.6
Many of these Western reports (mainly American and German) have meanwhile been
published. What new ﬁndings does Kaiser now convey based on these internal ﬁles? He
ﬁrst describes events that are certainly known. For example,
Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa units were to perform acts of sabotage and stir up rebellions
among the local Muslim population. In this connection, the CUP hoped to win the
cooperation of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which had branches
in both countries. During CUP–ARF negotiations Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa members re-
vealed their secret agenda, but failed to obtain the ARF’s cooperation.7
Kaiser then goes on to write of the Gulf of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), where the Turks
feared naval attacks by the Entente ﬂeet and arrested several Armenians whom, accord-
ing to Kaiser, they suspected of being in contact with British ships.
Vice-Consul Hoffmann reported the following regarding this episode from the
Consulate in Alexandretta: twice, when the English cruiser Doris landed, Armenian sol-
diers were taken prisoner. “Once, an Armenian sergeant of a group of seven men
(equipped with malfunctioning Martinis) in a trench (with no emergency exit) suppos-
edly surrendered by waving a handkerchief.”8 In his article, Hilmar Kaiser now presents
the reasons, based on Ottoman ﬁles:
In the south, along the Gulf of Alexandretta, Ottoman commanders worried about
an allied landing that could cut off the supply lines of the Ottoman armies in Pales-
tine, Mesopotamia, and parts of the eastern front. In Adana province, authorities
had apprehended some Armenians who had been in touch with British warships
bombarding the coast. The espionage was deemed serious as few troops and hardly
any artillery were available to defend the coast. Moreover, Adana provincial autho-
rities had ﬁled worrying reports about the activities of Armenian political parties.
The governor now considered the removal of all Armenians from the coast to the
interior of the province. Exemplary punishment was to be meted out to those Ar-
menians found guilty in order to serve as a deterrent to others. Talaat approved the
governor’s proposal for the deportation of the town of Dortyol on March 2, 1915.
Moreover, the minister ordered the authorities to eradicate any Armenian revolu-
tionary activity. On March 13, 1915, Djemal speciﬁed other measures against a
feared Armenian uprising. A number of troops would stay in Adana, while regional
commanders would establish courts-martial in Armenian-inhabited areas. More-
over, preparations for the deportation of Armenians from Aleppo province had
been authorized.9
What Vice-Consul Hoffmann regarded as a triﬂe and, therefore, what the consulate
ignored, was sufﬁcient reason for Talât, Djemal, and the rest to initiate the genocide.
According to Kaiser, courts martial were established for civilians, Armenians hanged
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merely as a deterrent and driven from their native areas, not because of anything they
had done that was proven, but solely on the basis of suspicions. Vice-Consul Hoffmann
reported at the time on this matter, using Dortyol as an example, “Out of Fakhri Pasha’s
own mouth I heard that they will not shy away from violence and even injustices.”10
General Fakhri Pasha was Djemal’s military leader in that region.
In other words, internal reports also stated that the main initiator of the ﬁrst Arme-
nian deportations was the supposed member of the resistance, Djemal Pasha. Kaiser
could hardly have begun the defense of his hero in a more curious manner, but it be-
comes even stranger! According to Kaiser, “In this climate . . . Zeitun gained special
importance.”11 The mountain town of Zeitun, located north of Marash, had been an
Armenian stronghold since time immemorial. It had previously defended itself against all
of the persecutions against the Armenians. In August 1914, Armenians who were once
again called to arms escaped to the mountains and entrenched themselves in a monastery
just outside of the town. Kaiser states that “the Muslim population in the region was agi-
tated as it had answered the call.”12 As a result, this could—and probably was meant to—
create the impression that desertion was a very Armenian type of problem. In actual fact,
the deserters in Zeitun also included Turks, and desertion was to become one of the lar-
gest problems faced by the Turkish Army. “Today, the number of Turkish deserters is
higher than the number of soldiers actually in the army,” General Liman von Sanders,
the commanding German ofﬁcer, ascertained at the end of the war.13
The events in Zeitun are described in far more detail in the German documents
than in Kaiser’s article.14 For example, Kaiser does not reveal that, with the assistance of
the German artillery ofﬁcer Eberhard Count Wolffskeel von Reichenberg, the monas-
tery the deserters escaped to was destroyed; nor does he mention the request made by
the German gunner to prohibit the journey of the German consul in Aleppo Walter
Rössler to Zeitun—which the Embassy then did—or the extremely detailed and enligh-
tening report by the Armenian Catholicos of Cilicia on these events.15 In particular,
Kaiser does not report that, after his investigation in Marash, Rössler did not ﬁnd any
evidence at all why the government should have had a reason for accusing the Arme-
nians in Zeitun of conspiracy. The Armenians were deported simply out of fear (i.e.,
completely indiscriminately).
According to Kaiser, Djemal ordered the deportation of some families, but then
local authorities “demanded that all Armenians should be investigated, including those
who were not suspect, on the grounds that they all shared the same mentality.”16
Although the reader does not ﬁnd out who these “local authorities” are, their attitude
does become clear: “The local authorities alleged that Armenians had displaced Mus-
lims in the past. Now Armenian villagers should be deported wholesale and replaced
with Muslim settlers.”17 Djemal soothed his conscience by ordering that no innocent
Armenian be harmed, but then agreed in practice with the unqualiﬁed arguments of the
unnamed sources: “The general proposed sending two-thirds of Zeitun’s Armenian
population to the plains of Konia province. There they would be dispersed and settled
among Muslim villagers” because he “thought the time had come to solve the ‘Zeitun
problem’ once and for all,” Kaiser reports.18 According to German reports, there was no
uprising in Zeitun, and the Armenian population worked closely with authorities to
turn in deserters. Why, then, in Djemal’s (or Kaiser’s) view, did a problem have to be
solved “once and for all” by ﬁnally deporting all of the Armenians? Kaiser gives the fol-
lowing explanation: “This ambitious project went beyond controlling the area and
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aimed at destroying the demographic basis for any possible sustained popular Arme-
nian resistance.”19 However, the governor of Aleppo, Djelal Bey, did not see any reason
at all for deporting the Armenians of Zeitun, and had this view placed on record. Dje-
mal arranged that Djelal no longer have jurisdiction over the region around Marash,
and therefore Zeitun, so that Djelal could not exert any inﬂuence on the deportations.
Contrary to Djemal, Djelal was regarded by the Germans—and the Americans—as a
real opponent of the Armenian deportations in Cilicia.
Kaiser writes that “by the middle of April 1915, Djemal extended the deportations
within the 4th Army’s area, arguing that concentrations of Armenians might become
dangerous in future”—in other words, pure and unadulterated ethnic cleansing.20 The
settlement of deported Armenians was, therefore, to be carried out far away from other
Armenian communities, but care was to be taken to ensure the safety of the Armenians.
Kaiser offers as proof a report by Baron Max von Oppenheim, head of the German
Information Service for the Orient, to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin, dated
29 August 1915. This report included ﬁve orders by Djemal as enclosures, written in
French. Enclosure two, dated 2 April 1915, includes the following extract from Djemal’s
orders to the commanding chief of the army: “Tout groupement arménien existant dans
la zone de la IV. Armée et pouvant être dangereux à l’avenir doit être dispersé” (Any
Armenian grouping existing in the zone of the Fourth Army and which could be poten-
tially dangerous for the future must be dispersed). It is worded in a way that anticipates
the subsequent national deportation order. However, Enclosure one contains an order
issued by Djemal dated 16 March 1915, stating that “le bien et la vie et l’honneur de la
population arménienne et musulmane sont sous la sauvegarde du Gouvernement Otto-
man. Ils peuvent être convaincus qu’ils ne seront l’objet d’aucune oppression et peuvent
vaguer tranquillement à leurs affaires et travaux” (The well-being and life and honor of
both the Armenian and Muslim populations are under the protection of the Ottoman
Government. They can be convinced that they will not be subject to any oppression and
therefore can go about their business and work calmly).21
Anyone who has dealt with the Armenian Genocide will rub their eyes in disbelief
because it is documented there in black and white that Djemal ordered for both Mus-
lims and Armenians to be treated equally well. He ordered this, but it seems no one fol-
lowed this order. Strangely, however, Kaiser cites a German source for Djemal’s order,
while previously he used only Ottoman sources for such orders. The reason is soon dis-
covered: the author of this document is Baron Max von Oppenheim, who was extremely
well-known in Germany at that time as a great archaeologist, while, at the same time,
being one of the most ambivalent German politicians in the entire “Orient,” known by
the British only as the “Lying Baron.”
Oppenheim described himself as a friend of Djemal’s and, therefore, his opinion of
what constitutes the typical characteristics of an Armenian is not without interest:
Their proverbial trickiness in business, their addiction to intrigues, their conceit
and sense of revolution, but especially the way they constantly sprawl all over their
environment and, during the recent past, the way they openly show their hostility
towards the Turks.
Oppenheim says that “should the enemy land, the Armenians would join the enemy to
form a mutual revolt.” According to Oppenheim, “such a landing could be expected
foremost just here, at the Gulf of Alexandretta and near Mersina.” He warned that
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the consequences in connection with a large Armenian uprising could have been
unforeseeable: once it held the passes over the Zeihun, the Djihan, and the Cilician
highland, the enemy could have separated Asia Minor and the European part of
Turkey from the entire southern and southeastern part of the empire.22
Vice-Consul Hoffmann’s reply to the report on Oppenheim’s fantasies of espionage in
the Gulf of Alexandretta was, “I have never heard this accusation, not even from the
Turkish Muslim side, although the case is known to me in full detail.”23
Kaiser deals with the prophylactic deportations of the Armenians from Zeitun and
the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta as events that were decided on from case to case,
even though they follow exactly the same logic—or rather, illogic—as the deportation
orders set out in writing on May 27. Kaiser claims that “more carefully planned and co-
ordinated deportations were not part of Ottoman government action at this point” and
believes that this allows him to conclude that “this indicates that the decision for such a
change of policy came about signiﬁcantly later than many authors suspect.” This is pure
speculation. In fact, the differences between the deportations in February–March and
those in May–June are minor.
Actually, one could say that a change in policy had already taken place several
years earlier, when the leading Young Turks gave up their idea of a multinational coun-
try and began calling for a homogenous Turkish state. As early as 14 October 1910, Zit-
kovszky, the Austrian-Hungarian vice-consul in Monastir, reported to his foreign
secretary, Aehrenthal, that Ottoman Home Secretary Talât had given a political speech
in the secret circle of the Young Turk Committee in Thessaloniki, in which he had said
the following:
You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution, equality of Muslim and Ghiaur
was afﬁrmed by you. One and all know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal.
The Sheriat and the history from the past oppose this, as do the feelings of hun-
dreds of thousands of Muslims, and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs themselves,
who stubbornly resist every attempt to Ottomanize them, present an impenetrable
barrier to the establishment of real equality. We have made unsuccessful attempts
to convert the Ghiaur into a loyal Ottoman, and all such efforts must inevitably
fail. . . .24
In documents currently housed at the Archives of the French Foreign Ofﬁce, the
Austrian consul is identiﬁed as the best-informed man about the secret circles of the
CUP. And Talât’s long speech, reported by the French consul, was fully conﬁrmed by
Djavid, one of Talât’s closest friends, who examined the paper three days later.25 There
was to be no room in this unitary state for Christian minorities, and ultimately, the con-
cept of Ottomanizing the empire was consolidated into a policy of annihilation. Dje-
mal’s deportations of the Armenians within his sphere of control were the beginning of
the end of the Ottoman Armenians.
For Kaiser, the arrests and deportations of the Armenian elite from Constantinople
on 24 April 1915 are not a reply to Van—where, after all, the Armenians took defensive
action that was under military organization and successful for weeks—but to Zeitun. At
least, “the Zeitun affair was given as one reason for the crack down” against the Arme-
nians.26 He lists orders given by Talât during the days right after April 24 to the most
important provincial towns, in which allegedly dangerous Armenians were staying.
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Djemal was informed by Talât that the deportations from Zeitun to Konia had been
stopped and the deportees were sent to Deir-es-Zor in the Syrian Desert; this suggests
that a ﬁnalized and very deﬁnite plan already existed. Kaiser himself is forced to admit
that
the order demonstrated that the central government asserted its leadership in the
organization of deportations empire-wide, including the 4th Army’s region. Talaat
did not wait for Djemal’s response and instructed the authorities at Adana, Aleppo,
and Marash accordingly.27
Those Armenians who had been deported received very little assistance from the
government. Kaiser reports that there were letters regarding ﬁnancial aid that never ma-
terialized and writes, “In other words, the Armenian deportations would be disastrous
and Ottoman authorities knew this from the moment they gave the orders.”28 Aleppo
Governor Djelal Bey, especially, had repeatedly requested exact information on the
form and ﬁnancing of a (supposedly planned) resettlement; except for promises, he
never received anything. The offers from foreign organizations—for example, the
American Red Cross—were, according to Kaiser, rejected on “political grounds.”29
While the houses the Armenians were forced to give up became available to Muslim re-
fugees from the Balkans, it was not possible to procure any housing whatsoever for the
Armenians. Whatever Djelal requested—and he was supported by Djemal—was, at
best, answered by Talât with promises. However, according to Kaiser, “Talaat’s pro-
mises for sufﬁcient funding had not materialized.”30
Kaiser writes, “The Ottoman defeat at Van marked a turning point after which the
deportations were gradually transformed into a comprehensive policy to eliminate the
Armenian community as a political force.”31 Talât also sent Djemal a detailed plan of
all those cities and regions from which the Armenians were deported, whereby “the Ar-
menians were allowed to take along all of their movable property.”32 However, a “provi-
sional law” was declared on 27 May 1915 and “details of the expropriations showed that
the deportations were to create permanent changes in the demographic structure and
that the deportations were not a temporary wartime measure as had been stipulated in
the law.”33
Kaiser reports on the alarming information passed on by the German consul in
Aleppo, Walter Rössler, to his embassy and comments on it:
The reports by Rössler document a degree of cooperation with Djelal that went
beyond the usual consular practice. The two men tried to mobilize the German
embassy in order to lobby the Ottoman central government on behalf of the Arme-
nians. At the same time, Rössler cooperated with Sahag, a leader of a community
accused of treason.34
Was Sahag, the Catholicos of the Armenians in Cilicia, a traitor in Kaiser’s eyes because
he took care of his ﬂock? Kaiser continues, “Obviously, both the consul and the gover-
nor entertained views on what needed to be done quite different from those prevalent
in the capital.”35
During the ensuing period, Hilmar Kaiser quotes from letters written by Sahag to
the German ambassador, Wangenheim, even though they were actually letters to the
Armenian patriarch in Constantinople. The German consul in Adana, Büge, had had
these letters sent via the embassy to the Armenian spiritual leader.36 There was,
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however, no conspiratorial connection between Armenians and top German politicians
and diplomats in Constantinople, who continued to be on the side of the Young Turks,
who were guilty of genocide. On the embassy’s orders, letters from the catholicos to the
patriarch were not even allowed to be transported by German couriers in the ensuing
period without being opened. German censorship replaced that of the Young Turks.37
On July 26, the German embassy went even a step further in its refusal to send messages
from the catholicos to the patriarch and simply returned an unopened letter from Sahag
that had been passed on by Rössler.38
Kaiser writes that Djemal ordered that those Armenians who were deported because
of their political beliefs were to be treated “correctly,” whereby he refers once again not
to Ottoman ﬁles, but to Djemal’s orders, which had been passed on to the German
authorities by Max von Oppenheim.39 According to these texts, Djemal had ordered
that Armenians were to be treated according to their social position (leur position so-
ciale); this leaves room for a great deal of interpretation.40 The fact that Kaiser does not
quote any Ottoman documents appears to make it questionable whether the orders
passed on by von Oppenheim were issued at all and whether they were ever followed.
Another unclear point in Kaiser’s article is Djemal’s request to send a particular
ofﬁcial to Aleppo; Kaiser does not make clear what assignment this ofﬁcial was to carry
out in Aleppo. However, there is an indication from Rössler that may possibly refer
to the same person: “A particular ofﬁcial, Eyub Bey, has been sent to Aleppo to carry
out the government’s policies against Armenians. He reports directly to Fakri (Bey)
Pasha,” the German consul said in his telegram. “This effectively eliminates the gover-
nor, Djelal Bey; the government knows that he is in favor of a more lenient policy.”41
On the other hand, Kaiser gives the impression that the mild-mannered governor,
Djelal, and the mild-mannered commanding ofﬁcer, Djemal, were the best of friends;
both advocated a more humane treatment of the Armenians. Eyub Bey, however, was a
notorious annihilator of the Armenians, as proven by German sources. If Kaiser is refer-
ring to Eyub Bey when he speaks of the ofﬁcial, then the Armenian annihilator was at
least subordinate to Fakhri Pasha and, therefore, Djemal.
Kaiser describes how Djemal attempted to inform Talât of the suffering of the Ar-
menians and ﬁnd money for them. In Aleppo, he ordered that ﬁve metallics be spent on
adults and four on children. He referred to a report by Rössler dated 17 July 1915, who
had listed the amounts in a single paragraph and remarked that, as a result of Djemal’s
order, the deported Armenians were able to rest somewhat in Aleppo. However, Röss-
ler’s report consists of a long list of atrocities that were carried out against the Arme-
nians in Djemal’s sphere of control. It ends with the following paragraph:
The Turkish government has driven its Armenian subjects—the innocent ones,
mark you—into the desert in thousands upon thousands, under the pretext of hav-
ing to remove them from the war areas, exempting neither the sick nor pregnant
women nor the families of conscripted men, has given them both food and water in
insufﬁcient quantities and irregularly, has done nothing against the epidemics
which have broken out amongst them, has driven the women to such desperation
that they set out their babies and newborns by the wayside, has sold their adoles-
cent daughters, with the result that they have thrown themselves even with their
small children into the river. It has left them to the mercy of their guards and there-
fore to dishonor; an escort which dragged away the girls and sold them. It has
driven them into the hands of the Bedouins, who have plundered and kidnapped
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them. It has had the men illegally shot in desolate places and the bodies of its vic-
tims fed to the dogs and birds of prey. It is supposed to have arranged for the mur-
ders of the representatives whom it had sent into exile. It has released prisoners
from the prisons, put them in soldiers’ uniforms and sent them to the areas where
the deportees would be passing through. It has called up Circassian volunteers and
set them onto the Armenians.42
Djemal had six of these Circassian murderers executed, as Kaiser proudly reports.
Kaiser picks harmless sentences out of the German reports so as to give the impression
that the foreign witnesses were covering up their euphemisms.
Kaiser’s article becomes even stranger. He writes, “Rössler met with Djemal and re-
ported positively on his talks.”43 In note 94, Kaiser quotes as his source “Consulate of
Aleppo, Package 1, Vol. 1/2, No. 1366, Rössler to Embassy, Aleppo, June 28, 1915, tele-
gram 18.” The text found in the consulate ﬁles goes as follows: “Have now repeatedly
negotiated with Djemal Pasha. All of my assignments will be handled smoothly together
with him. Will presumably travel south with Djemal in approx. eight days.” This text
was sent as telegram no. 18 to Constantinople on June 28, but not to the embassy and,
therefore, it is not in the ﬁles there. Kaiser has confused Rössler with Oppenheim, who
had written this text. In the document quoted by Kaiser, Rössler had struck out the sen-
der, “Oppenheim,” and had written “Rössler” beneath it. Kaiser, the historian, was
unable to interpret this event—or did not want to—because at the beginning of the text
Rössler had clearly added in his own handwriting: “No. 18 dated June 28—from Baron
Oppenheim.” The telegram was then sent to Oppenheim’s ofﬁce in Constantinople.
Kaiser then describes the deportations and killings that began to take place
throughout the country, whereby he generally follows Rössler’s reports and Djemal’s or-
ders in Oppenheim’s report.44 Without doubt, the most important decision made by
the government during this period was to recall the mild-mannered Djelal, of which
Rössler informed his embassy in a telegram that is quoted by Kaiser, albeit once more
in an abridged fashion:
Rössler cabled that Djelal would have to leave his post because of his refusal to
deport Armenians from his province. Djelal had even guaranteed their good beha-
viour. Rössler suspected that the government wanted to have a free hand against
the Armenians.45
However, Kaiser suppresses an addendum to the telegram. Rössler had noted, “This
recall is regrettably not in Turkey’s interest; presumably, the result will also be an escala-
tion in the government’s Arabic policy.”46 Kaiser cites Rössler’s handwritten note as the
source on which his telegram was based.47 It includes not only the addendum regarding
Arabic policy, but also Rössler’s original sentence: “He [Djelal] had the opportunity to
send a telegram to the government during the past few days, informing it that he did
not approve of the actions against the Arabs in Beirut.” It was, therefore, apparent that
it was primarily Djelal’s protest against Djemal’s hard-line policy against the Arabs that
resulted in his being recalled. In his article, Kaiser does not mention the Fourth Army’s
commanding ofﬁcer’s policy on Arabs anywhere at all.
Using Ottoman ﬁles, Kaiser describes in detail the purely statistical progress of the
deportations. With regard to a description of the inhuman treatment of the deportees
as well as the political consequences, he refers to Rössler’s reports.48 Rössler had written
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that “it is becoming ever clearer that the orders for the harshest and most merciless
implementation of the deportation decided on by the government must be put down to
Fakhri Pasha and comes from him”—in other words, from Djemal’s military assistant.49
However, Kaiser also hints several times at Fakhri’s fatal role.
Kaiser argues that the fate of the deported Armenians proves the lack rather than
the existence of an annihilation plan. As a consequence, the decision regarding the Ar-
menians could not have been made in March, as some researchers claimed. Elements of
planning were ﬁrst cited in May and June as “a response to the ensuing chaos along the
deportation routes and in the destination areas.” He states that the deportations had
not begun when the long-awaited opportunity presented itself, nor was a long-term pro-
gram put into action. In his view, the CUP pushed the deportations without any previ-
ous planning or preparation. There was neither a monolithic CUP nor a dominating
group on the committee.
Kaiser offers very little proof in his article for his antithesis. The behavior of Djemal
and his ofﬁcers could certainly have also been explained if the Committee for Union
and Progress had already agreed at this time on a deportation plan. The Young Turks’
fear that the Entente ﬂeet would attempt to land in the Gulf of Alexandretta was under-
standable—the coastal strip was, in fact, without any defense whatsoever. Even the Ger-
man consul in Adana had determined this to his great surprise and reported it to his
embassy. The Entente’s ﬂeet was intact and on site; ships landed several times in those
Ottoman harbors of the Mediterranean that had declared themselves free cities. With-
out doubt, the Armenian population in this region sympathized with the British and
the French, but they were by no means prepared or in a position to provide military
assistance. The Armenians may have been deported into the interior for reasons of
extreme military caution, or following a decision that had been made to eradicate them.
Therefore, Kaiser’s conclusion is not substantiated.
At the beginning of the war, the situation for the Armenians within the sphere of
control of the Fourth Army, of which Djemal was commanding ofﬁcer, was somewhat
worse than in the rest of the country, as shown by the actions taken against them.
Towards the end of the war, the situation was reversed; apart from Constantinople and
Smyrna, far more Armenians survived within Djemal’s sphere of control than elsewhere
in the Ottoman Empire. Western Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were the only regions in
which a relatively large number of Armenians (estimated at approximately 100,000–
150,000 people) survived the end of the war, albeit under the most severe conditions.
Kaiser believes that this is due to the resistance of the governor of Aleppo, Djelal,
and to a lesser extent that of his successor, Bekir Sami, which is even more surprising
since the latter described the Armenians as “microbes,” thereby outing himself as a rac-
ist. Kaiser even speaks of a tacit agreement between these two and Rössler, without
going into details. However, he presents Djemal Pasha as the chief resistance ﬁghter.
According to Kaiser,
If there ever was a secret CUP conference passing a decision on the deportations,
CUP leader Ahmed Djemal had failed to learn about it. . . . He had his own ideas
about settlement areas, the execution of deportations, the provisioning and reim-
bursement of deportees and, most importantly, also on their protection. Brieﬂy put,
he advocated some deportations and even initiated some others, but wanted to
have them organized in a way that did not mean annihilation (of the Armenians).
His orders for the protection of deportees were not empty words, as prominent
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CUP operatives found out when they were convicted by a 4th Army court martial
and executed.50
Kaiser remarks that the honor of the Fourth Army demanded that the Armenians be re-
settled and Armenian villages set up. Djemal transmitted this to the governor of Syria
Hulusi Bey, who immediately reported him to the central administration, thereby pass-
ing this on for future generations.
Kaiser writes that neither civilians nor the military in the Fourth Army determined
that there were either revolts or a widespread conspiracy by or a dangerous threat from
the Armenians. The leader of the army, Djemal, gave political or social reasons as
grounds for the deportation programs, which were temporary and limited to the dura-
tion of the war. Either he was unaware of the long-term plans of the home secretary or
he opposed them. Djemal knew exactly what was happening in other regions; he cer-
tainly did not prevent deportees from being sent to these regions. Kaiser writes that this
must have led to their annihilation: “at times collaboration and resistance were close
neighbours.”51 According to Kaiser, the case of the Fourth Army “shows, however, that
the notion of an empire-wide genocide of Ottoman Armenians perpetrated by a uniﬁed
CUP is untenable. This kind of thinking needs to be revised and freed of claims that are
based on imagination rather than evidence.”52
Until today, the only German historian who has seriously engaged himself with the
Armenian Genocide—for which he was greatly admired—now argues against the theses
of other researchers, but is not in a position to prove his own argument conclusively.
He conceals severe atrocities committed by the Ottoman perpetrators, for example by
Fakhri Pasha, who brutally suppressed alleged uprisings (e.g., in Urfa), and fantasizes
about Western political powers who undertook less against the murderous frenzy of the
Young Turks than the Fourth Army, even though he knows very well that the only
Western power in Asia Minor that had military possibilities, namely Imperial Germany,
was most deﬁnitely not prepared to do anything for the Armenians and permitted its
own ofﬁcers to drive Armenian civilians to their deaths.
There was a major difference between the age-old settlement areas of the Ottoman
Armenians in northeastern Turkey and their settlements in the cities, and Djemal’s
sphere of control. There were hardly any Armenians in Palestine or even in the Leba-
nese mountains, which even today is still a center of Armenian life. The majority of the
Armenians within Djemal’s sphere of control came from Cilicia, the province around
the city of Adana; Djemal was governor of this city before the war and had many old
connections from that period.
While the Armenians in the northeast were mainly farmers and craftsmen in the
towns, wealth was a characteristic of many of those Armenians in Cilicia and also in the
west who were deported to Djemal’s sphere of control. They had built up economically
ﬂourishing businesses and accumulated property. Their wealth was one of the keys to
survival for many deportees, by giving “rescuers” a share of their companies, transfer-
ring ownership of their properties to public ofﬁcials, providing money for bribes, or
creating ties between Turkish and Armenian businessmen. Consul Hoffmann, who
often represented Rössler, suspected that “the Armenian population of Aleppo seem to
owe the fact that they are still here mainly to the resistance of those local circles who
would suffer great ﬁnancial losses if they disappeared.”53 However, these economic
components do not appear at all in Kaiser’s study, which only claims to identify “a deﬁ-
nite historical connection.”
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Djemal, who dreamed of building himself a long-term power base in Palestine and,
if possible, Egypt, did a great deal to ensure that in future he would have wealthy and
hard-working Armenians, namely those whose lives he had saved. He began by setting
up Sahag, the catholicos who was expelled from his home in Cilicia, in Jerusalem
and ensuring that, in accordance with the decree dated 30 July 1916, he became the
catholicos-patriarch of all of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and resided in
Jerusalem after the Young Turks dissolved the Constantinople patriarchate. In this
way, he assured himself of the important spiritual leadership over the Armenians. Un-
fortunately, while preserving the lives of perhaps 150,000 Armenians—in terrible
conditions—he helped kill another 150,000.
Instead of speaking of the opportunities missed by the Great Powers of the West to
stop this genocide, Kaiser could have pointed out Djemal’s attempts to use these Great
Powers for his own interests. Raymond Kévorkian brought up the subject of secret dis-
cussions that were held between Djemal on the one hand and the French, British, and
Russians on the other. In December 1915, Djemal informed his partners in these discus-
sions that he was prepared to march to Constantinople with an army in order to dismiss
the CUP and take over power himself, provided the Entente guaranteed the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Armenia, and
Kurdistan, and, furthermore, provided it was prepared to make him the sultan with the
right of succession for his descendents. In return, he would protect the Armenians and
end the genocide. In the end, these discussions failed because of the fears of the French
and the British that the Russians, who at that time had advanced as far as Trebizond
and Erzerum, would use this opportunity to ﬁnally entrench themselves in Constanti-
nople, for which they had been striving for a very long time.54
This was not the only aspect that Hilmar Kaiser completely ignored in his assess-
ment of Djemal. What was inconsistent with his gloriﬁcation of the good guy of Jerusa-
lem was also the fanatical hatred with which Djemal persecuted the Arabs; he had
begun to physically wipe out their elite.
It was not only the Arabs who trembled before Djemal, but the Jews and possibly
other groups as well, as still unpublished German documents may show. One case was
researched recently by German historian Michael Hesemann. At the beginning of 1917,
the Palestine potentate had ordered the deportation of the Jews from Jaffa due to alleged
collaboration with the British. Hesemann writes that
over 8,000 Jews were chased out of their houses without permission to take food or
baggage with them. Their houses were looted by the Turks in front of their eyes.
Two Jews were hanged at the gates of the Jewish suburb, as an example for anyone
who dared to resist the looters. Eyewitnesses reported on the inhuman cruelty of
the soldiers. Dozens of Jews were later found dead in the dunes of Jaffa. A dispatch
from the Zionist ofﬁce in Copenhagen ended by voicing the fear that after the
threats from Djemal Pasha the Palestinian Jews could expect the same cruel fate as
the Armenians: extermination by hunger, thirst and epidemics.55
At the beginning of December 1917, shortly before the British took Jerusalem, the
Jews of that city were saved by German General von Falkenhayn, who received informa-
tion through Eugenio Pacelli, the nuncio in Germany at that time who was to later
become pope, and the Foreign Ofﬁce. Jakob Thon, head of the Zionist ofﬁce in Jerusa-
lem at that time, wrote,
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It was a particular stroke of good fortune that General von Falkenhayn had
supreme command during the last critical days. In this case, [Djemal] Pasha would
have chased the population out of the entire region, as he had often threatened to
do, and turned the country into ruins. Together with the entire rest of the popula-
tion, both Christian and Muslim, we must be deeply grateful to P[acelli] who pro-
tected the civil population from demise by preventing the complete evacuation of
this region as planned.56
It will still take a long time before we are fully clear on all the details of the Arme-
nian Genocide after so much effort has been spent on manipulating it to make it disap-
pear.
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Reviews
Samuel Totten, ed., An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide. Santa
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011. Pp 556, cloth. $104.95 US.
Samuel Totten and Raﬁki Ubaldo, eds., We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2011. Pp 207, cloth.
$72.00 US. Paper. $26.95 US.
Reviewed by Sheldon Wardwell, University of Florida–Gainesville
Despite all the good intentions and ﬁnely wrought promises of “never again!” in the after-
math of the Holocaust, genocide remains a scourge that won’t go away. This terrible fact
is supported by evidence demonstrating the large number of genocides that have occurred
since the ratiﬁcation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, the best known of which took place in Cambo-
dia, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, although there were many others. Hundreds of
books have been written about the Rwandan Genocide and although far fewer have been
written about the atrocities in Darfur, there are still plenty to choose from.
While only deniers contest that what transpired in Rwanda was clearly a case of
genocide, the arguments over how to classify violence in Darfur have been more com-
plex and uncertain. Some have deemed the conﬂict to be ethnic cleansing or crimes
against humanity, while others assert it was clearly genocide. Interestingly, while the
United States government deemed it genocide, the United Nations International Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur (COI) asserted that it was a case of crimes against human-
ity. Just as critics of the US position claim that power politics were at the heart of the
decision to call Darfur genocide, critics of the COI decision claim that a different set of
political interests drove the COI’s position. In addition to this ongoing geopolitical
debate over the appropriateness of applying the “G” word to the Darfuri case, scholars
remain entrenched on different sides of this debate.
Making a powerful case for identifying and raising awareness about genocide are
two new books by Samuel Totten: We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda (co-edited with Raﬁki Ubaldo) and An Oral and Documen-
tary History of the Darfur Genocide. These masterful works combine oral history with
scholarly analysis and ofﬁcial documents to challenge naysayers’ arguments. Both col-
lections use interview data to effectively demonstrate that the human turmoil that took
place in Rwanda and Sudan was motivated by an overarching theme of genocidal intent,
perhaps the most useful concept for distinguishing genocide from war crimes.
The interviews in We Cannot Forget add greatly to our understanding of events
and perceptions surrounding the horriﬁc, 100-day genocide in Rwanda, which resulted
in 500,000 to 1 million deaths. As relatively few Rwandan survivor testimonies make it
into this type of literature, Totten and Ubaldo address a signiﬁcant lacuna. Existing tes-
timonies tend to be from geographically limited parts of Rwanda and do not provide
in-depth accounts about the survivors’ experiences before and after the genocide.1
Though We Cannot Forget focuses only on the stories of the survivors and not the
perpetrators, the text presents detailed interviews with a diverse pool of individuals cov-
ering events in the years leading up to, during, and following the genocide, with the
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goal of demonstrating the coordinated and vicious nature of the killings. Indeed, inter-
viewees relate how they received instructions from church leaders, community leaders,
and the military to travel to certain locations where they would be “protected” after
Rwandan President Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down on 6 April 1994. Such in-
structions were used to dupe Tutsi into gathering in large numbers so they could be
slaughtered.
A critique that is often made of the narrow, legalistic approach to genocide is that
it forces the international community to be reactive versus proactive. This is because
many international and national leaders argue that genocide can only be ascertained
when clear intent is established. Thus, even when horriﬁc violence is clearly taking
place, such leaders may argue that it’s due to civil war, ethnic cleansing, or a ﬂare up of
“ancient animosities.” Totten and Ubaldo, however, point out the documented early-
warning signs of the looming genocide in Rwanda that were ignored by the interna-
tional community on several occasions. These included a January 1994 report by the US
Central Intelligence Agency warning that if the unabated violence continued, up to
500,000 Rwandans could die. Human Rights Watch also issued numerous reports
throughout the early 1990s warning the international community that something signif-
icant was afoot in Rwanda. Ultimately, the editors make it very clear that the UN deci-
sion to block an effective intervention was both conscious and unconscionable.
In the ﬁrst volume of An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide,
Totten presents interviews with 19 victims whose communities were devastated by the
scorched-earth policies and ethnic cleansing carried out by Government of Sudan
(GoS) and Janjaweed forces even prior to 2003, which is when the international com-
munity began to focus its attention on the crisis. These detailed and vivid personal ac-
counts, combined with the ofﬁcial documents in the second volume, which delineate
the evolving stance of the international community as it lurched toward action, offer a
compelling argument that GoS actions in Darfur constituted genocide.
The ﬁrst of the two volumes provides a succinct and effective overview of the his-
torical factors leading up to the conﬂict. Here, Totten discusses several antecedents that
contributed to the genesis of mass violence, including drought and desertiﬁcation;
growing tension and violence between nomadic Arab herders and black African farm-
ers; the breakdown of traditional methods of conﬂict resolution; the marginalization of
black Africans; Arab supremacism; and a malevolent, scorched-earth counterinsurgency
strategy. Throughout, Totten stresses the complexity of the situation and the fact that
many Arabs in the region were in no way complicit in the killings.
Before transitioning into the interviews—19 powerful, ﬁrst-person accounts col-
lected at refugee camps in eastern Chad in 2007 and 2009, in N’djamena in December
2009, and in the Nuba Mountains in 2010—Totten goes on to summarize the numerous
attempts to bring about peace and their less-than-favorable results, as well as the inter-
national community’s rather ineffective response(s). The interviews were conducted
using a standardized questionnaire administered by the author and his interpreter.
Questions focused on basic demographic information, the survivors’ experiences with
violent encounters and their chronology, any information they could give about the per-
petrators, and personal insights into the causes and ramiﬁcations of the conﬂicts. Inter-
views were arranged by locating willing participants in refugee camps, or based on
recommendations from personal contacts or umdas (camp sheikhs). The interviewees
include four females and 14 males ranging in age from 23 to 70, with 11 being members
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of the Massaliet tribe, six Fur, and one Dajo, most of whom lived in western Darfur
prior to being displaced.
The interviews cover a broad range of topics and events, from growing tensions
over access to water and land, to an increase in the prevalence of robbery and assault,
to all-out attacks on villages by GoS-afﬁliated men on horseback in coordination with
Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships. Though it would have been helpful for the
author to analyze the testimonies to highlight patterns and parallels, it is easy enough
for the reader to identify recurring themes or motifs him/herself. Repeated survivor
accounts, for example, conﬁrm that the GoS and Janjaweed were clearly pursuing a
scorched-earth strategy against the black Africans of Darfur; entire communities were
reduced to rubble and ash; those captured were raped, murdered, or both, and any
sources of subsistence were destroyed (i.e., crops consumed or uprooted and water sup-
plies poisoned), leaving people wandering the desert to perish. Particularly disturbing
are the many accounts of mass rape, both during attacks on villages and later, as girls
and women were often captured collecting ﬁrewood outside displacement camps.
One account in particular, given by an elderly imam, demonstrates the resolve and
determination of the perpetrators to eliminate their black countrymen. He explains that
the attackers dug a large grave between his village, which had been destroyed, and the
camp that people were attempting to ﬂee toward, and then waited for weeks, killing
every man and boy they could capture. After their murders, the perpetrators buried
their victims in the hole. The following is a noteworthy exchange between this imam
and Totten:
The women, they didn’t kill, but they beat them and took what they have. [Note: At
this point, Totten asks the interpreter what exactly the imam meant by “took what
they have.” Totten says, “Could you please ask the imam, with sensitivity, whether
he is talking about their . . . material wealth or something personal?”] Yes! They
beat the women and raped the young women. Many women, young women—14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20—were raped, for sure. They raped others, much older, but
any women 20 or under were surely raped (5).
These narratives are packed with many similar accounts and are sometimes even
more descriptive than that. With the wisdom of one who has visited Sudan and the
Nuba Mountains on several occasions—most notably for the US State Department’s
Atrocities Documentation Project and then four more times on his own between 2004
and 2011—Totten takes special care to ensure that interviewees clearly differentiate
between those matters that they experienced ﬁrsthand and those they heard about from
others. Respondents’ personal insights into the causes and ramiﬁcations of the conﬂicts
are presented as such, and may or may not be accepted as fact, though I have found
them to be among the book’s most engaging elements. The author is to be praised for
allowing readers to see the informants not only as sources for eyewitness accounts but
also as individuals able to reﬂect on their own experiences and to draw meaningful con-
clusions themselves.
It should be noted that only about a third of respondents are women, though this is
likely to be attributed to the aversion of many survivors of rape—a well-documented
weapon of genocide—to sharing their experiences with a male foreigner. The interviews
are also largely limited to individuals from western Darfur, something the author ex-
plains is a result of tight GoS visa restrictions put in place to prevent such information
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from becoming widespread. Still, the interviews include broad and varying perspectives
from eclectic backgrounds, such as farmers, teachers, engineers, and community lea-
ders. The survivors proﬁled in the book include individuals with no education, some
with solely an elementary-level education, and a very few with college experience.
The second volume is composed of nine ofﬁcial documents, all pertaining to the
issue of whether or not the actions of the GoS and the Janjaweed constituted genocide.
This collection traces the international community’s response to Darfur from the ﬁrst
US-sponsored investigation of the situation, to its ofﬁcial declaration that genocide had
occurred, to the ensuing UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations
and decisions, leading ultimately to the ICC arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar
al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Totten begins the volume with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, the international community’s agreed-upon deﬁnition of
genocide. The two documents that follow include the insightful ﬁndings of the US Atro-
cities Documentation Project (the US-sponsored investigation into the crisis) and the
remarks of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 2004, declaring the GoS’s actions a case of genocide.
In the fourth document, Totten presents the Report of the International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, which ultimately
concludes that the atrocities committed by the GoS and Janjaweed were crimes against
humanity and war crimes, but not genocide. He is fair when he admits here that many
scholars agreed with this ﬁnding. The author’s even-handed analysis and criticisms are
a key strength of the publication, which goes on to present other documents with con-
troversial conclusions. Totten presents the Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for
a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, in which the majority of
ICC judges (two of the three) rendered a decision that excluded the crime of genocide
from the warrant. Alongside it is the powerful dissent of ICC Judge Anita Usacka, in
which she delineates why she believed the charge of genocide should have been honored.
The volume concludes with the revised arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, which
charges him with three counts of genocide. To my knowledge the volume includes all
the vital documents relating to the situation in Darfur and its international legal status,
making it an invaluable reference tool for scholars of genocide and human rights.
Totten’s work shows us that researching genocidal intent and its execution on the
ground—from the “bottom up,” through repeated individual accounts—is a necessary
practice for changing the scholarly, legal and political climate around genocide. Such
“bottom up” accounts are valuable precisely because accurate evidence of intent in the
echelons of power is often suppressed, thus not available in time to stop atrocities from
happening. Totten's research and the conclusions he can draw from this research pro-
vide a valuable step forward in learning from the patterns of these horriﬁc acts.
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